Cavs' 2009 Season Provided Reasons for Hope, Reasons for Concern
The Cleveland Cavaliers stormed to the NBA's best regular season record (66-16), seemed to be invulnerable at home (39-2, including a meaningless late season loss during which the majority of their key players did not play) and swept through the first two rounds of the playoffs, which is impressive and rare no matter what one thinks of the relative quality of the Detroit Pistons and Atlanta Hawks. They seemed to be on course for a Finals showdown with the L.A. Lakers but then the Orlando Magic stunned the Cavs in game one of the Eastern Conference Finals and went on to eliminate Cleveland in six games.Were the "real" Cavs the team that seemed unbeatable at times or were the "real" Cavs the team that fell to the Magic? In my newest CavsNews article, I attempt to answer that question, compare how Cleveland defended against Orlando with how the L.A. Lakers guarded Orlando in the NBA Finals and offer my take on whether the Cavs should acquire Shaquille O'Neal (6/19/15 edit: the link to CavsNews.com no longer works, so I have posted the original article below):
The Cleveland
Cavaliers produced the best regular season in franchise history in 2008-09 but
the joy and excitement generated by a league-best 66-16 record were tempered by
the 4-2 loss to the Orlando Magic in the Eastern Conference Finals. Were the
“real” Cavs the team that stormed through the regular season and easily swept
through the first two rounds of the playoffs or were the “real” Cavs the team
that squandered homecourt advantage in the first game of the Orlando series and never recovered from that
setback?
In the wake
of Cleveland’s loss to Orlando, there is a natural—though
unfortunate—tendency to belittle everything that the Cavs accomplished prior to
that series. It is important to remember that the Cavs ranked first in points
allowed (91.4 ppg, nearly two ppg better than the second place San Antonio
Spurs), first in scoring differential (8.9 ppg, 1.3 ppg better than the second
place L.A. Lakers) and tied with the Boston Celtics for first in defensive
field goal percentage (.431). The versatile and deep Cavs also ranked second in
three point field goal percentage (.393), third in rebounding differential (3.3
rpg) and fifth in fewest turnovers per game (11.99). Over the grueling 82 game
schedule the Cavs proved to be a well rounded team that does not have many
weaknesses in the game’s fundamental areas (defense, shooting, rebounding,
ballhandling).
Coach Mike
Brown has been a lightning rod for criticism ever since the Cavs hired him and
it is unfortunate that a trip to the NBA Finals, two Eastern Conference Finals
berths, the 2009 Coach of the Year award and Cleveland’s emergence as one of the league’s
best defensive teams have not completely silenced Brown’s detractors. Brown
came to Cleveland with the goal of transforming the Cavs into a
defensive-minded team much like the San Antonio Spurs, a franchise that won the
2003 championship when Brown was an assistant coach to Gregg Popovich—and the
defensive statistics cited above show that the Cavs are one of the best
defensive teams in the NBA. Just as significant as the numbers, though, is the
undeniable fact that Brown’s superstar player LeBron James clearly buys into
Brown’s defensive program and that therefore every player on the roster follows
suit. Until the Orlando series, Coach Brown had never lost a playoff series
that the Cavs were expected to win but he led the Cavs to one clear upset (over
Detroit in 2007 en route to the NBA Finals) and forced the eventual champion
Boston Celtics to seven games in 2008 despite James setting records for poor
field goal shooting in the first part of that series; that Eastern Conference
semifinal series against the Celtics proved just how good the Cavs can be
defensively and showed that they are not simply a one man team.
What happened
versus Orlando?
There are three main reasons that the Cavs lost to the Magic:
1) All-Star Mo Williams was markedly less
efficient offensively than he had been in the regular season; his field goal percentage
plummeted from .467 to .371. If I were running the Cavs the first thing that I
would try to ascertain—by talking to the coaching staff and Williams himself
and by watching game film—is what caused Williams’ productivity to slide so
suddenly and so dramatically. Williams was brought in to be the team’s second
offensive option and if he cannot fill that role at a championship level then
the Cavs have to act accordingly but I would be wary of giving up on Williams
after one bad playoff series.
2) During the regular season the Cavs had
10 players who averaged at least 16.0 mpg and all 10 of those players were
productive but only five Cavs averaged at least 16.0 mpg versus the Magic and
only three of those players—LeBron James, Delonte West, Anderson Varejao—were
consistently productive (relative to their roles/regular season output).
3) The Cavs had numerous defensive
breakdowns, primarily consisting of leaving three point shooters open and not
making sure to foul Howard instead of letting him dunk.
In my Eastern Conference Finals preview I picked Cleveland to beat Orlando because I thought that the Cavs had the necessary
frontcourt depth to single cover Dwight Howard for the most part, thus enabling
Cleveland’s perimeter defenders to stay at home
on Orlando’s
brigade of three point shooters. I also expected that homecourt advantage would
be significant for a Cleveland
team that went 39-2 at Quicken Loans Arena during the regular season and I
concurred with NBA analysts Hubie Brown and Mike Fratello, veteran NBA
observers who noted that the Cavs have a deep roster filled with players who
have been starters for playoff teams.
Ironically,
in the NBA Finals the L.A. Lakers followed the prescription listed above to
perfection and defeated the Magic in the manner that I had thought that the
Cavs would: the Lakers held Howard to 15.4 ppg on .488 field goal shooting while
also limiting the Magic to just 38-115 shooting (.330) from three point range
and the Lakers set the tone for the series by pounding the Magic in game one in
L.A. Although the middle three games of the series were highly
competitive—which puts the lie to the fiction that Orlando only posed matchup
problems for the Cavs but not for the Lakers—the Lakers claimed the
championship with a dominant road win in game five. In contrast, as Cavs’ fans
know all too well, Howard had a tremendous series versus Cleveland (25.8 ppg on .651 field goal
shooting) and the Magic shot 62-152 (.408) from three point range.
Coach Brown
elected to go with several crossmatches defensively, putting small forward
LeBron James on point guard Rafer Alston, shooting guard Delonte West on small
forward Hedo Turkoglu and point guard Mo Williams on shooting guard Courtney Lee.
Although the Magic supposedly enjoyed matchup advantages at several positions,
the Cavs consistently built double digit first half leads while using these
crossmatches; if the Cavs had won the series, people would likely be praising
Brown for his “innovative” defense! Instead, the Magic recovered from those
deficits to make the games close down the stretch and then they hit big shots
late in most of those games to prevail.
It has become
fashionable to say that Cleveland simply matched
up poorly with Orlando—some people (most notably
Charles Barkley) made that point before the series and many others chimed in
after Orlando
won. However, that is oversimplifying things to the point of being deceptive;
as Albert Einstein once said, “Make everything as simple as possible but not
simpler.” Most contests between two good NBA teams involves various matchup
problems for both sides. It is true that guarding Dwight Howard in the paint
can be challenging and that the Magic surround Howard with three point shooters
much like the mid-1990’s Magic did with Shaquille O’Neal and the mid-1990’s
Rockets did with Hakeem Olajuwon--but the Cavaliers also presented matchup
problems for the Magic, most notably LeBron James, who lit up the Magic with one of the greatest individual playoff series in NBA history; the biggest
single mismatch in the series turned out to be James versus the Magic, as he
averaged 38.5 ppg, 8.3 rpg and 8.0 apg in the Eastern Conference Finals.
When the Cavs
led Orlando 63-48 at halftime of game one as
James set a franchise playoff record with 26 first half points it hardly looked
like Orlando’s
matchup advantages mattered very much. However, although James finished with a
playoff career-high 49 points, the Magic rallied to post a 107-106 victory. The
story of that game turned out to be that James received very little offensive
help from a supporting cast that had made significant contributions throughout
the season. Mo Williams shot poorly (6-19 from the field) and no one else
picked up the slack. Despite the subpar shooting, though, the Cavs led 106-104
with :25.6 remaining but they inexplicably allowed Rashard Lewis to take an uncontested
three pointer that proved to be the game-winning shot. Game one winners go on
to win the series roughly 80% of the time, so in a very real sense the Cavs
were playing from behind for the rest of the series. Anderson Varejao not
closing out on Lewis on that critical late game play is just as big an error as
Jameer Nelson giving Derek Fisher airspace in a similar situation in game four
of the Finals.
So much has
been said about the Cavs being smaller than the Magic at key positions but the
6-3 West almost exclusively guarded the 6-10 Turkoglu and held him to 17.2 ppg
on .390 field goal shooting; Turkoglu averaged 18.0 ppg on .492 field goal
shooting in the Finals versus the 6-8 Trevor Ariza. On the other hand, Rashard
Lewis did hurt the Cavs much more (18.3 ppg on .493 field goal shooting) than
he hurt the Lakers (17.4 ppg on .405 field goal shooting) but the bottom line
is that in both series one of those guys shot well and one did not—it’s not
like the Lakers shut down both players or the Cavs let both players run free.
The difference is that the Lakers contained Howard offensively without having
to commit so many extra defenders that their overall perimeter defense (not
just against Turkoglu and Lewis but also the supporting cast) was compromised.
The Lakers accomplished this primarily with Pau Gasol guarding Howard, as
Andrew Bynum played fewer than 20 mpg and was constantly in foul trouble. Gasol
is not bigger or stronger than Zydrunas Ilgauskas, though he obviously is more
mobile. Gasol did a good job of making Howard catch the ball outside of the
paint so that Howard could not simply turn and dunk. The Lakers did not trap
Howard often on the catch but when Howard put the ball on the floor they had a
guard or a forward “dig” at the ball, taking advantage of the fact that Howard
is not a great passer when he is on the move (the same thing was true of Hakeem
Olajuwon and Tim Duncan in the early stages of their careers). Most
importantly, the Lakers all but eliminated dunking from Howard’s repertoire by
fouling him virtually every time he was close enough to the hoop to throw one
down; one of the biggest plays in the Finals happened near the end of
regulation in game four, when Kobe Bryant fouled Howard and the Magic center
missed both free throws, setting the stage for Fisher’s three pointer versus
Nelson. In the Cleveland series, that play would likely have been a Howard dunk
and possibly a three point play opportunity; indeed, if I had to pick one
moment that turned Cleveland’s season around I would choose the opening stretch
of overtime in game four versus Orlando when Howard repeatedly scored at point
blank range without the Cavs making any attempt to foul him to prevent
layups/dunks. That had nothing to do with “mismatches” but was simply a matter
of the players on the court understanding the situation and making the right
read. Howard did not have a dunk in game one of the NBA Finals and that was
because the Lakers not only made him work for post position but whenever he got
free they made sure to foul him.
There is
speculation that the Cavs will try to acquire Shaquille O’Neal. While O’Neal is
certainly a big body who can pose a potential challenge to Howard at both ends
of the court, he is also a 37 year old who has a disturbing recent history of
injury problems, though he was relatively healthy last season. O’Neal has never
been fully committed to exerting himself at the defensive end of the court,
particularly on pick and roll plays—a staple of Orlando’s offense. The Suns acquired O’Neal
two seasons ago to match up with their big man nemesis, San Antonio’s Tim Duncan, but while O’Neal
helped the Suns to win a couple regular season games versus the Spurs when push
came to shove in the 2008 playoffs the Spurs once again prevailed. O’Neal said
that he would accept a lesser offensive role in order to facilitate Amare
Stoudemire’s development but it did not take long for him to undermine new
coach Terry Porter (who has since been fired) and not so subtly demand more
touches. This year the Suns did not even make the playoffs. O’Neal’s tenures in
Orlando, L.A. and Miami
all ended acrimoniously and he seems to have worn out his welcome in Phoenix very quickly. Even
if the Cavs can acquire O’Neal without giving up core players—the Suns are
likely more interested in dumping salary than trying to obtain equal value for
O’Neal—I am not convinced that this would be a good move; the Suns brought in
O’Neal out of desperation because their championship window was rapidly closing
and their Steve Nash-led nucleus had never even made it to the Finals but
LeBron James has already been to the Finals once and his championship window is
certainly much more wide open than Nash’s, meaning that it is less necessary
for the Cavs to make high risk moves.
Labels: Cleveland Cavaliers, L.A. Lakers, LeBron James, Orlando Magic
posted by David Friedman @ 7:06 PM
4 Comments:
The Cavs were built more to deal with a 'traditional' team like Boston than a weird hybrid like Orlando, but a couple of smart moves could change that. I think what they need is more athleticism on the wing and in the frontcourt. A big man who can single-cover Howard (Rasheed Wallace, warts and all, would be ideal in this regard) and a rangy swingman who can occasionally guard smaller PFs like Lewis (Ariza? Barnes?) should be priorities.
I'm with you on Mo Williams: if he plays to his usual standard I think Cleveland wins that series. If they decide he really can't be a legit second option, they have a major problem because it won't be easy to find that player elsewhere. For that reason I suspect they will bite the bullet on the Shaq trade. As a mitigating factor, he is in the last year of his contract so there's a limit to how much damage he can cause if things go south. :P
Joel:
If Sheed is still willing/able to play at a high level on at least a semi-consistent basis then he could indeed help the Cavs but I'm not sure that is the case at this stage of Sheed's career. Also, the Cavs have to be wary of giving up too much to get Sheed, because even though he could indeed help if the Cavs faced Orlando in the playoffs again Sheed also has a tendency to drift mentally, so the Cavs would still have to have enough productive players to be able to win on the nights when Sheed just isn't there. People seem to forget that the Cavs won 66 games by being a great all-around team that specialized in defense; they are most assuredly not a one man gang.
While it is possible that Shaq could help the Cavs, bringing him in smacks of desperation--and a Cavs team led by a young LeBron James that has already made it to the Conference Finals twice and the NBA Finals once hardly needs to be desperate.
To me, the problem with "standing pat" is that Illgauskas and Ben Wallace are going to be around 35 years old next year, and both are injury-prone and slower than average.
This is not a problem against many teams in the regular season, but it will be against the Lakers or Orlando, who have younger, faster and better big mans (Odom had his best game of the year in Cleveland).
And, while I like Varejao, He wouldn't be a starter for any other elite team (just like you say about Ariza)
Warsaw:
That is a valid point. I don't think that Wallace is a big part of their plans, though, and he may even retire. Z is obviously nearing the end of the line but he is still effective and he is a good pick and pop player. Putting Shaq in the low post will not work any better offensively with LeBron than it did with Nash in Phoenix. The Suns finally figured out that they needed a real big man to deal with Duncan, so I don't blame them for rolling the dice, but if the Cavs are going to replace Z it should be with a younger player or at least one better suited to go against Howard/Garnett, etc., not with a Shaq who is on his last legs.
Varejao actually was coming off of the bench until Wallace got hurt.
Again, I have no objection to the Cavs upgrading by adding a big or a 6-6/6-7 wing player but I think that they should not add Shaq for the reasons I explained in the article and I also think that they should be leery of breaking up their nucleus unless they are really getting a stud player (say, for instance, Chris Bosh) in return. The Cavs had the best record and, arguably, the best defense in the NBA over 82 games and that means that the supporting cast worked pretty well together.
Post a Comment
<< Home