Westbrook spent the first 11 seasons of his career with the Oklahoma City Thunder before being traded to the Houston Rockets in 2019 for Chris Paul and four first round draft picks. Westbrook's stay in Houston lasted just one season, as his serious approach to the game--playing hard consistently and showing up on time for practices and games--did not mesh well with the much more casual approach favored by James Harden. The Rockets traded Westbrook to the Washington Wizards in 2020 for John Wall and a first round draft pick. Westbrook averaged 22.2 ppg, 11.7 apg, and 11.5 rpg for the Wizards in 2020-21, capturing his third assists title in four years while leading the Wizards to their only playoff appearance between 2018 and 2024. Westbrook also broke Oscar Robertson's record for career triple doubles.
After the 2021 season, Westbrook landed with the L.A. Lakers as part of a five team trade. The LeBron James-Anthony Davis-Russell Westbrook trio could have been a force to reckon with if the Lakers committed to playing defense and then pushing the ball up the court at a fast pace after defensive stops, but James prefers to slow the game down, monopolize the ball, and then find scapegoats after his team loses. Westbrook and Coach Frank Vogel became the prime scapegoats for James and his media sycophants. The Lakers fired Vogel in 2022, just two years after he led the Lakers to the championship, and then they traded Westbrook to the Utah Jazz in February 2023. The Jazz waived Westrook, who finished the season with the L.A. Clippers. Westbrook averaged 15.9 ppg, 5.8 rpg, and 7.5 apg overall in the 2022-23 season, and he averaged 23.6 ppg, 7.6 rpg, and 7.4 apg during the Clippers' first round loss to the Phoenix Suns. The Clippers acquired James Harden early during the 2023-24 season, and Westbrook accepted being relegated to a reserve role. Westbrook averaged 11.1 ppg, 5.0 rpg, and 4.5 apg while shooting .454 from the field. He finished tied for seventh in the voting for Sixth Man of the Year. Not surprisingly, the Clippers flamed out again in the playoffs, with Kawhi Leonard getting hurt, Harden putting up his typical "concert tour" field goal percentages, and Paul "I call myself Playoff P" George disappearing as usual.
In short, Westbrook has spent the past four seasons with organizations that are not serious about consistently putting together a championship caliber program: he should get a special award for carrying the "Wheeze-hards" to the playoffs, the Lakers have not advanced past the first round in three of the four seasons after winning the 2020 "bubble title," and the Clippers put way too much faith in Leonard's balky knees, George's flimsy playoff resume, and Harden's documented record of disappearing in the games that matter most.
Westbrook will benefit tremendously from leaving teams engulfed in drama to go to a team that is serious about winning but a bit shorthanded now due to salary cap constraints; in the past two years, the Nuggets have lost Bruce Brown and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, two key rotation players from their 2023 championship team. Westbrook will not replace their "3 and D" contributions, but he is an elite scorer, rebounder, and playmaker who consistently plays hard and who would do anything to help his team. The Nuggets have a great organization from ownership to management to the coaching staff to the tone set by Jokic, and Westbrook will fit in perfectly with a team that is serious about winning.
Westbrook's critics dismiss his rebounding numbers as stat padding.
It is evident that Westbrook's critics--including but not limited to Amin Elhassan and Zach Harper--either have an agenda or do not understand basketball very well, because it is easy to demonstrate (1) that Westbrook's rebounds are not fungible and (2) there are many real, documented examples of stat padding that the league and its media partners are quite happy to ignore.
Westbrook will be a great energizer as a sixth man for the Nuggets, and he is still capable of being a starter as well.
Thoughts About Team USA's Performance in the USA Basketball Showcase
Team USA went 5-0 in the USA Basketball Showcase in preparation for the 2024 Olympics, but Team USA was far from dominant, and needed late rallies to survive versus South Sudan and Germany. Although many commentators argue that it is important for Team USA to be stocked with three point shooters, history has shown that defending the three point line--and perimeter defense in general--is much more critical for Team USA to be successful. Team USA does not typically have a great halfcourt offense, so it is essential for Team USA to create pressure on the perimeter to force turnovers and low percentage shots, and then to score easy baskets in transition. Team USA's depth becomes a big advantage if Team USA pushes the pace to wear down opposing teams that have some talent at the top of their roster but lack depth.
Team USA opened the USA Basketball Showcase with an 86-72 win versus Canada. The most notable thing about that game is that Canada's starting lineup of Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Jamal Murray, Dwight Powell, Dillon Brooks, and R.J. Barrett held their own against Team USA's starting lineup of Stephen Curry, Jrue Holiday, Joel Embiid, LeBron James, and Devin Booker. Team USA's top five bench players--Anthony Davis, Anthony Edwards, Tyrese Haliburton, Jayson Tatum, and Bam Adebayo--each had double digit plus/minus numbers, while three of the five starters had negative plus/minus numbers. Plus/minus numbers can be noisy in small sample sizes, but here they told an accurate story: Team USA's starters were sluggish, Canada led 21-14 at the end of the first quarter, and Team USA's bench turned the game around in the second quarter.
In Team USA's 98-92 win versus Australia, Team USA's starters again struggled, and the bench again saved the day. This time, Anthony Edwards and Jayson Tatum started while Jrue Holiday and Devin Booker came off of the bench. Australia is fifth in the FIBA rankings with a roster featuring several players with NBA experience but no upper echelon NBA players.
Team USA improved to 3-0 by beating Serbia, 105-79. Serbia is fourth in the FIBA rankings, led by three-time NBA regular season MVP Nikola Jokic supported by a talented cast of non-NBA players. Jokic struggled versus Team USA, finishing with just 16 points on 6-19 field goal shooting, and Team USA's depth again carried the day with four bench players registering plus/minus numbers of at least +21.
Perhaps the easy win over Serbia made Team USA overconfident, because in the fourth game of the tour Team USA narrowly avoided the most embarrassing loss in USA Basketball history, escaping with a 101-100 victory over a South Sudan squad that is 33rd in the FIBA rankings. Team USA needed a dominant performance from 39 year old LeBron James--25 points on 10-14 field goal shooting in just 23 minutes, capped off by the game-winning layup with 8 seconds remaining. South Sudan managed two offensive rebounds and three field goal attempts in the final six seconds before Team USA escaped with the win.
It does not make sense to overreact to one game, let alone a game that does not count in the standings, but South Sudan's near upset of Team USA is not an isolated event; in the past two decades, Team USA has suffered several humiliating and inexcusable losses to teams that, on paper, should have been cannon fodder, and this should give pause to anyone who lionizes today's NBA players while slandering the great players from previous eras. J.J. Redick mocked Bob Cousy while asserting that Kyrie Irving would have been perceived as a "wizard" had he played in the 1950s, but the reality is that a significant portion of Irving's so-called wizardry is a product of rules changes and lack of enforcement of rules; specifically, Irving and his contemporaries are permitted to travel and to palm the ball, and they are rewarded with free throw attempts after jumping into defenders. We are seeing in FIBA play that American players who are used to traveling, palming, and being rewarded with free throw attempts after jumping into defenders are not nearly as effective when they are not provided with such leeway.
Look at South Sudan's roster both in terms of individual player resumes--none of the players are currently on an NBA roster and only two have even minimal NBA experience--and skill set evaluations. Is South Sudan better than the 1950s Boston Celtics, let alone the 1986 Boston Celtics, the 1992 Dream Team or the 1996 Chicago Bulls? I would expect those four teams to each beat South Sudan by 20 points or more, because those teams were fundamentally sound, and they consistently played hard.
It is easy to say that the game versus South Sudan was an exhibition contest and that Team USA did not play hard--but isn't the point of the exhibition schedule to develop the necessary habits and mindset to win the gold medal? I could understand Team USA letting up a little after building a 20 or 30 point lead, but there is no excuse for Team USA to trail for most of the game--by double digits at times--and need heroics from James to survive.
In the wake of the near disaster versus South Sudan, Team USA barely held off Germany, 92-88. For the second game in a row, Team USA needed James to save the day, this time with 20 points on 8-11 field goal shooting, including Team USA's last five points after Germany cut Team USA's lead to 87-84 with 1:43 remaining. Germany is third in the FIBA rankings, and Germany beat Team USA last year. Here is what I wrote after Germany upset Team USA in the 2023 FIBA World Cup:
From an individual talent standpoint, there is no German player who
would start for Team USA, and few if any German players who would have
even been selected for the Team USA roster had they been American
citizens, so USA Basketball has to take a long, hard look not only at
roster composition but also coaching philosophies. Should the Team USA
roster be constructed based primarily on individual talent, or on
actually putting together a group of players who can collectively play
championship-caliber basketball in FIBA events? Is Team USA's coaching
staff putting enough emphasis on the importance of perimeter defense,
and is the roster comprised of players who grasp and implement that
message? Two of the best Team USA squads ever--the 1992 Dream Team and
the 2008 Redeem Team--featured
guards/wing players who applied tremendous defensive pressure on the
perimeter, primarily Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen in 1992 and Kobe Bryant and Jason Kidd in 2008.
The
current version of Team USA is not good enough at pressuring
ballhandlers, and is not disciplined enough in terms of getting back on
defense and making sure that every shot is contested. It is safe to say
that the 1992 U.S. team and the 2008 U.S. team would beat this year's
Lithuania team and this year's Germany team by more than 20 points each,
so while it is true that other countries have improved at basketball it
is also undeniably true that Team USA has regressed from both a talent
standpoint and an execution standpoint. I understand that the 2023 FIBA
World Cup squad is not our "A" Team, but even our "B" Team should beat
Lithuania and Germany, because those squads are not as good as the truly
great FIBA teams from outside the United States such as Argentina's
squads led by Manu Ginobili and Spain's teams led by Pau Gasol--and it
must be noted that many other countries also sent their "B" Team, as
Nikola Jokic and Giannis Antetokounmpo are just the two most prominent
of many non-American players who skipped the 2023 World Cup.
Team USA's 2023 loss to Germany was brushed off by some commentators because Team USA had a "B" team roster--but in 2024 Team USA has an "A" team roster and still only beat Germany by four points. Team USA's 2023 loss to Germany echoed Team USA's 2021 loss to France in the Olympics, when it was glaringly evident how much Team USA missed the perimeter defensive pressure provided by Kobe Bryant as Team USA won gold medals in the Olympics in 2008 and 2012:
Bryant was the difference maker for Team USA in the 2008 Olympics, and Kidd retired with a perfect record in FIBA play.
There is a reason that Team USA's 2004 squad with young perimeter
players LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Carmelo Anthony, Allen Iverson, and
Stephon Marbury did not win gold, but the 2008 and 2012 squads won gold
after adding Bryant and Kidd. When Team USA loses in FIBA play, poor
perimeter defense is usually a main culprit, resulting in wide open
three pointers and/or easy cuts to the hoop. It is not essential for
Team USA to make a lot of three pointers--Team USA can win with pressure
defense, fast break points, and points in the paint--but it is
essential that Team USA make opposing guards uncomfortable and
ineffective.
Team USA would not have lost to France with prime Kobe Bryant guarding Evan Fournier. Period.
Another
factor is that Team USA always has to make adjustments to the
differences between the NBA game and the FIBA game. FIBA games are only
40 minutes long instead of 48 minutes long, the FIBA three point line is
closer to the hoop, goaltending is permitted under FIBA rules after the
ball hits the rim, there are fewer timeouts in FIBA, in FIBA timeouts
can only be called by the coach, in FIBA a player is disqualified after
five fouls (instead of six in the NBA), and in FIBA a technical foul
also counts as a personal foul.
Also, NBA officiating has
always differed from FIBA officiating, but the differences are now more
pronounced than ever; in the NBA, offensive players can get away with
murder on the perimeter--including traveling, carrying, and running over
defenders--while any defender who is in close proximity to an offensive
player (especially an offensive player who is viewed as a star) is
liable to be whistled for a foul. In the loss to France, five Team USA
players had more fouls than field goals made! Durant, Booker, Lillard,
and the other NBA All-Stars who are big time scorers are used to not
only attempting a lot of free throws per game but they are also used to
(1) not being whistled for fouls, and (2) having a lot of space to
operate because defenders are wary of being whistled for fouls that not
only put them in foul trouble but also put their team in the penalty.
Team USA failed to win a medal in the 2023 FIBA World Cup after losing to Canada in the bronze medal game, and Team USA won the gold medal in the Olympics in 2021, avenging the opening game loss to France. It is facile to say that the world has caught up with Team USA, but it may be more accurate to say that Team USA has regressed at least as much as the world has progressed. American players have lost touch with basketball fundamentals, they have become accustomed to officiating that coddles them on offense, and they are not used to consistently having to put forth effort defensively.
Due to injury, Kevin Durant did not play during the USA Basketball Showcase, but a roster featuring James, Curry, Embiid, Tatum, Edwards, Davis, and other big-name players should not be dependent on adding yet another superstar in order to beat Australia, Canada, Germany, or Serbia, let alone South Sudan.
It is becoming evident that the current level of NBA basketball is not
as good advertised, and this is particularly true regarding U.S. born
NBA players. Unless one is delusional enough to think that a team led by Franz Wagner and Dennis Schroder would pose any threat to the Jordan-Pippen Bulls, the Bird-McHale-Parish Celtics, or the Russell-Cousy Celtics, one must concede that the current NBA stars--individually and collectively--are not quite as great as the hype suggests. It is one thing for Redick to call Irving a "wizard," but does he think that Wagner and Schroder are "wizards"? Does he think that South Sudan has a roster full of "wizards"? Today's NBA stars put up gaudy numbers versus each other in a controlled environment in which "entertainment"--punctuated by slam dunks and three pointers, which are favored by both "stat gurus" and the league's media partners who feature dunks and treys in highlight packages--is favored over basketball fundamentals; remove those stars from that controlled environment, and they often do not look quite so great. This is not an overreaction to one game or one exhibition tour; this is analysis based on a sample size of over 20 years of Team USA's play in FIBA events, coinciding with the NBA's shift toward highlighting offense and handcuffing defense.
It would be shocking on paper if the 2024 Team USA squad headlined by LeBron James, Stephen Curry, and Joel Embiid fails to win Olympic gold, but the reality is that this team has displayed weaknesses that opposing teams can exploit. To be clear, I still expect Team USA to win Olympic gold, but I also expect that there will be at least one close call along the way--and when a team that is superior on paper lets the opposition hang around, an upset can happen.
This has been a sad week for fans of the 1970s and 1980s 76ers; on Tuesday, Joe "Jellybean" Bryant passed away. Bryant played for Williams' 76ers in the mid to late 1970s, and was part of the "Bomb Squad" reserve unit, along with World B. Free. Free and former 76ers coach Gene Shue reunited with the San Diego Clippers in the late 1970s/early 1980s.
Williams took over a moribund 76ers team and quickly turned them into a championship contender by drafting Doug Collins, signing George McGinnis away from the ABA's Indiana Pacers, and then acquiring Julius Erving from the New York Nets after the 1976 ABA-NBA merger. The 76ers' owner at that time, Fitz Eugene Dixon, had only recently purchased the team and was not very familiar with pro basketball. After Williams informed Dixon that Erving was available for the then-astronomical price of $6 million (including compensation to the Nets plus a long term contract for Erving), Dixon asked who Erving was. Instead of replying that Erving was a three-time regular season MVP, Williams explained simply that Erving is "the Babe Ruth of basketball." Dixon then told Williams "Fine and dandy," and the rest is history: Erving spent the last 11 seasons of his pro career with the 76ers, winning the 1981 regular season MVP and earning five All-NBA First Team selections while leading the 76ers to the league's best overall regular season record from 1976-83 plus the aforementioned seven Eastern Conference Finals appearances, four NBA Finals appearances, and one NBA title.
Williams had a "20-20-20" vision for Erving, McGinnis, and Collins,
convincing those three stars that the 76ers would be best served by having a balanced attack with three 20 ppg scorers as opposed to an offense featuring one 30 ppg scorer and two 15 ppg
scorers. The 76ers posted the Eastern Conference's best regular season record in 1976-77 (50-32) with Erving averaging 21.6 ppg, McGinnis scoring 21.4 ppg, and Collins chipping in 18.3 ppg. All three players made the All-Star team, and Erving and McGinnis earned All-NBA Second Team selections as well. The 76ers lost 4-2 in the NBA Finals to a Portland Trail Blazers team featuring Bill Walton and Maurice Lucas.
The 76ers gradually moved away from the 20-20-20 approach toward an approach recognizing that Erving was clearly the team's best player. Erving averaged an NBA career-high 26.9 ppg in 1979-80 and he finished second in regular season MVP voting to Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, whose L.A. Lakers defeated Erving's 76ers 4-2 in the NBA Finals after rookie Magic Johnson had 42 points, 15 rebounds, and seven assists in game six to earn Finals MVP honors.
Erving won the 1981 NBA regular season MVP, becoming the first non-center to capture that honor since Oscar Robertson won the 1964 NBA regular season MVP and foreshadowing the way that non-centers would soon dominate MVP voting--but during that era a team needed a dominant center to win an NBA title, and even the great Erving could not win an NBA title with a center duo of Darryl Dawkins and Caldwell Jones trying to match up with Hall of Fame big men Bill Walton, Washington's duo of Wes Unseld-Elvin Hayes, Jack Sikma, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, and Robert Parish; teams led by those big men won every NBA title between 1976 and 1982. Williams solved the 76ers' big man problem by acquiring Moses Malone prior to the 1982-83 season. Malone, who had already won the 1979 and 1982 regular season MVPs, teamed with Erving to form one of the greatest duos in pro basketball history: Malone won the 1982-83 regular season MVP after averaging 24.5 ppg and a league-leading 15.3 rpg, while Erving was fifth in 1982-83 regular season MVP voting, his fourth straight top five finish. The 1983 76ers' 12-1 playoff record stood as the all-time standard for postseason excellence until the 2001 L.A. Lakers went 15-1 in an expanded playoff format, followed by the 2018 Golden State Warriors going 16-1 after the NBA again expanded the playoff format.
Although Williams enjoyed his greatest professional success while working in the NBA, he began his sports career in baseball, not basketball. He played catcher on a scholarship for Wake Forest, and then he spent two years playing in the minor leagues before moving into a front office role for the Miami Marlins, then a minor league affiliate of the Philadelphia Phillies. In 1967, The Sporting News honored Williams as the Minor League Executive of the Year.
Williams first became involved with the NBA in 1968, and he worked for several different franchises. He began his NBA career with the Philadelphia 76ers, enjoyed a successful tenure as the Chicago Bulls' General Manager, briefly took that same role with the Atlanta Hawks, and then returned to Philadelphia in 1974. In 1989, Williams
helped to launch the Orlando Magic expansion franchise, and Williams was a pillar in Orlando ever since that time, not only building the Magic into a championship contender but also attempting to bring a Major League Baseball franchise to Orlando.
Nick Anderson, the first player chosen in the NBA Draft by the expansion Orlando Magic in 1989 with the 11th overall pick, posted a heartfelt tribute to Williams that reads in part, "I'm totally devastated. This is a sad day for Basketball and Orlando. My kids asked 'Why you crying Daddy?' and I told them because I lost a father for the second time. The last time I felt this tore up was when my father passed away. And now my basketball father Pat Williams has gone to join my dad in Heaven."
During Williams' tenure with the Magic, the expansion team quickly became a contender, reaching the NBA playoffs in their fifth season, and then making four straight playoff appearances from 1994-1997. The Magic drafted Shaquille O'Neal in 1992, and acquired Penny Hardaway in a draft day trade in 1993. Those two players led the Magic to the 1995 NBA Finals.
Williams was also a motivational speaker, and the author of more than 100 books, including The Winning Combination: 21 Keys to Coaching and Leadership Greatness. Williams was not only a shrewd personnel evaluator and savvy businessman, but he was a wonderful ambassador for basketball. In 2012, Williams received the John Bunn Award, the highest honor bestowed by the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame short of induction. He was inducted into the Wake Forest Sports Hall of Fame and the Delaware Sports Museum and Hall of Fame. Faith and family were always foremost for Williams, who raised 18 children (14 of whom were adopted) with his wife first wife Jill.
I interviewed Williams twice. He was very generous with his time, and very forthcoming with his answers. Williams will be deeply missed by all of the people whose lives he touched, and his impact and legacy will never be forgotten.
Remembering Joe "Jellybean" Bryant, NBA Player/European Player and Father of Kobe Bryant
Joe Bryant passed away on Tuesday at the age of 69, reportedly succumbing to a massive stroke. Younger fans may only think of Joe Bryant as the father of Pantheon member Kobe Bryant, who tragically died with his daughter Gianna and seven other passengers in a helicopter crash four years ago--but "Jellybean," as Joe was known, had a long professional basketball playing career, including eight seasons in the NBA and 10 seasons in Europe. Kobe's middle name Bean is derived from Joe's nickname. For clarity in this article, I will refer to Joe and Kobe by their first names.
Joe was ahead of his time as an athletic, slender forward who could
shoot the jump shot but also attack the hoop off of the dribble. After averaging 20.3 ppg and 11.1 rpg in two seasons at LaSalle, he was drafted by the Golden State Warriors as an underclassman Hardship selection (now referred to as Early Entry) with the 14th overall pick in the 1975 NBA Draft, but the Warriors traded him to the Philadelphia 76ers before the start of the 1975-76 season. Joe averaged 7.4 ppg in a solid rookie season, and he scored 7.7 ppg in three playoff games as the 76ers reached the postseason for the first time since 1971. George McGinnis was the 76ers' best player that season, with fellow All-Star Doug Collins serving as a strong second option.
The ABA-NBA merger happened prior to the 1976-77 season, and in the aftermath of the merger the 76ers acquired Julius Erving, the three-time ABA regular season MVP who had shared that honor with McGinnis in 1975. Joe's role was reduced on this star-studded team, but he was part of a talented bench that became known as the "Bomb Squad." The 76ers lost 4-2 in the NBA Finals to a Portland Trail Blazers team featuring Bill Walton and Maurice Lucas.
Joe played two more seasons for the 76ers before they traded him to the San Diego Clippers for a 1986 first round draft pick that the 76ers later traded to the Cleveland Cavaliers, who selected Brad Daugherty. San Diego's coach was Gene Shue, who was Joe's first coach with the 76ers, and San Diego's leading scorer was World B. Free, a fellow "Bomb Squad" member with the 76ers. Joe spent three seasons with the Clippers, averaging a career-high 11.8 ppg in 1981-82.
The Clippers traded Joe to the Houston Rockets on June 28, 1982, and he finished his NBA career by averaging 10.0 ppg for the 1982-83 Rockets. Joe spent the next 10 years playing professionally in Europe. After his playing career ended, Joe held a variety of coaching positions in America and overseas, including three seasons as coach of the WNBA's L.A. Sparks (2005-06, 2011). Joe led the Sparks to the Western Conference Finals in 2006.
There is no doubt that Kobe learned a lot about basketball from his
father and from his father's journey, and it is evident that Kobe's
experiences growing up in Italy had a significant influence on him. Joe was often frustrated by his relatively limited role during his NBA career, and it is not a stretch to say that Kobe's determination to be the number one option at all times was fueled in part by refusing to be relegated to a subordinate role the way that Joe had been.
The Bryant family has suffered the loss of three members in the past four years, and I wish them peace and comfort in this difficult time.
Is "Playoff P" the Answer for Philadelphia's Postseason Woes?
Paul George expected the L.A. Clippers to give him the same contract terms that Kawhi Leonard earned, and after the Clippers declined to do so George signed a maximum contract with the 76ers that will pay George $212 million over the next four seasons. Leonard won two NBA Finals MVPs while leading two different teams to NBA championships (2014 San Antonio Spurs, 2019 Toronto Raptors), but George has never reached the NBA Finals, owns an 8-11 career playoff series record, and has a .423 career playoff field goal percentage, so George is the only person surprised that the Clippers do not value him as highly as they value Leonard.
George is a 34 year old shooting guard who has played in more than 60 regular season games just once since 2019; granted, his most durable season during that time frame was last season (74 games), but is it reasonable to assume that an injury-prone player is going to become less injury-prone in his mid to late 30s? The 76ers are wagering more than $200 million that between the ages of 34 and 38 George will be healthier than ever and that he will be more efficient in the playoffs than ever. George dubbed himself "Playoff P," but that is a self-proclaimed belief as opposed to a performance-based tribute. James Harden's 2024 playoff disappearing act with the Clippers should not obscure the reality that "Playoff P" also came up short as the Clippers lost 4-2 in the first round to the Dallas Mavericks, culminating in horrific shooting performances in game five (4-13, .308) and game six (6-18, .333).
The 76ers are desperate to provide more help for Joel Embiid, their injury-prone star who received the 2023 regular season MVP award but has yet to play in more than 68 games in a regular season or lead his squad past the second round of the playoffs. Embiid's regular season career field goal percentage is .504, but his playoff career field goal percentage is just .459. He shot better than .490 from the field once in his seven postseason appearances. Embiid's resume indicates that he is not healthy enough, consistent enough, or dominant enough to lead a team on a long playoff run.
On paper, the George acquisition improves the 76ers by adding defensive versatility, playmaking, and perimeter scoring, but the reality will likely turn out to be that when the chips are down Embiid and George will be injured, inefficient, or both. The 76ers will have to reply heavily on Tyrese Maxey, who averaged 29.8 ppg on .478 field goal shooting in the 2024 playoffs, to save the day for Embiid and George.
The fact that Morey is betting over $200 million that George can help the 76ers win a championship is an excellent reason to believe that the 76ers will once again fall short of reaching the NBA Finals, as has been the case with every Morey-led team during his tenure running NBA franchises first in Houston and now in Philadelphia.
The Mikal Bridges Trade Lifts Knicks to Contender Status, Plunges Nets Into Tank Mode
The Brooklyn Nets dealt Mikal Bridges to the New York Knicks for five first round draft picks plus a second round draft pick and a first round pick swap; three of the first round picks and the first round pick swap are in 2027 or later, indicating that the Nets are planning to try the trendy--but thus far unsuccessful--plan of "tanking to the top." Tanking does not work, as Philadelphia 76ers fans have seen for the past decade. In contrast to the Nets giving up proven talent while hoping that unproven talent acquired years from now will help the team win, the Knicks are trying to win now, as Bridges joins three of his teammates from Villanova's 2016 NCAA
championship team: Jalen Brunson, Josh Hart, and Donte DiVincenzo.
Bridges has never missed a game during his NBA career. In the 2022-23 season he played in 83 regular season games, appearing in 56 games with Phoenix before being traded to Brooklyn, for whom he played in 27 games. Bridges averaged a career-high 20.1 ppg that season, and he averaged 19.6 ppg in 2023-24. He shot at least .510 from the field during each of his last three full seasons with the Suns, but his field goal percentage dropped significantly as he assumed a larger offensive role with the Nets (.475 in 2022-23, .436 in 2023-24). He is not a great rebounder or passer but he is an excellent defensive player, earning a selection to the All-Defensive First Team in 2022, when he also finished second to Marcus Smart in the Defensive Player of the Year voting. Bridges is an above average three point shooter (.375 3FG% for his career).
Last season, the undersized but scrappy Knicks overcame a host of injuries to rank second in points allowed and fifth in rebounding while finishing second in the Eastern Conference with a 50-32 record. The Knicks defeated the Philadelphia 76ers 4-2 in the first round before losing 4-3 to the Indiana Pacers. Bridges' superior defense and his three point shooting could have made a difference versus the Pacers, and could also be valuable in a playoff series versus the NBA champion Boston Celtics.
Two players have won two NBA titles in the past five years: Jrue Holiday (Milwaukee Bucks 2021, Boston Celtics 2024) and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope (L.A. Lakers 2020, Denver Nuggets 2023). Holiday and Caldwell-Pope are athletic perimeter players who can guard multiple positions and shoot three pointers efficiently. Bridges fits that mold.
A prevailing NBA narrative suggests that first round draft picks are worth their weight in gold. That is why "stat gurus" and media members mocked the Minnesota Timberwolves for giving up four first round draft picks plus other assets to Utah in exchange for Rudy Gobert in 2022--but after making that deal the Jazz missed the playoffs the past two seasons and are sliding backwards in the standings; in contrast, Gobert anchored a Minnesota defense that led the league in points allowed and defensive field goal percentage in 2023-24 en route to the Timberwolves advancing to the Western Conference Finals for the first time since 2004. Maybe the Jazz will pan for gold someday with the first round draft picks that they obtained, but it is worth noting that even owning the number one overall draft pick provides no guarantee of striking it rich: the last number one overall draft pick who won an NBA title with the team that drafted him is Kyrie Irving (selected first in the 2011 NBA Draft), and he only enjoyed that success after LeBron James returned to Cleveland. Other number one overall draft picks since 2000 include Kwame Brown, Andrea Bargnani, Greg Oden, John Wall, Anthony Bennett, Andrew Wiggins, Ben Simmons, Markelle Fultz, and Deandre Ayton; put all of those players on the same team in their respective primes and you still do not have a championship contending team!
Teams that have superior scouting departments and excellent player development programs find and develop winning players much more consistently than teams that hoard first round draft picks without having a coherent plan for how to build a superior roster--not to mention the fact that the NBA is in the entertainment business and charges premium rates for tickets and for broadcast rights, which in turn means that the league and its teams have an obligation to the paying customers to put the best possible product on the floor. The Nets, like the Jazz and other teams that have given up proven players to obtain draft picks, will not likely be putting an attractive product on the floor next season.
After firing Darvin Ham and being rebuffed by first choice Dan Hurley, the L.A. Lakers are gambling a reported $32 million over the next four years that J.J. Redick is the next Pat Riley--but their recent record of hiring and firing coaches provides little reason for optimism, as Phil Jackson has proven to be a tough act to follow. Since Jackson left the L.A. Lakers after the 2010-11 season, the Lakers have
had seven different head coaches prior to Redick: Mike Brown, Bernie Bickerstaff, Mike
D'Antoni, Byron Scott, Luke Walton, Frank Vogel, and Darvin Ham.
Vogel--who led the Lakers to the 2020 "bubble" title--and Walton are the only members of that group who lasted three seasons on the job.
Vogel was by far the most successful Lakers coach post-Jackson, leading the Lakers to a 52-19 regular season record (.732 winning percentage) in 2020 en route to winning the franchise's first and only championship since Kobe Bryant carried the Lakers to repeat titles in 2009 and 2010. The Lakers fired Vogel after the Lakers lost in the first round in 2021 and then missed the playoffs in 2022.
In Requiem for the 2022 L.A. Lakers,
I analyzed several issues facing the team, many of which are still
issues two years later: most notably, LeBron James' lack of consistent
defensive effort and his focus on so many things other than team success
limit the effectiveness of his leadership--and this is further complicated by the reality that James'
friends in the media make sure that James is immune from any
criticism regarding the Lakers' failure to live up to reasonable
expectations.
James and his media allies often lament that the Lakers have not surrounded James with better three point shooters, despite the evidence clearly showing that James' sole title run with the Lakers had nothing to do with three point shooting. The 2020 Lakers ranked fourth in points allowed and eighth in defensive field goal percentage. Contrary to revisionist history, their winning formula had nothing to do with surrounding James with three point shooters; they ranked 23rd in three point field goals made and 21st in three point field goal percentage--and it's not like they caught fire from beyond the arc during their playoff run: they ranked 12th out of the 16 playoff teams in playoff three point field goal percentage.
James and Redick have hosted a podcast together for the past few months, and it is evident that the podcast served as an interview process for James to decide who the Lakers would hire to replace Ham. James publicly denies having any input in the Lakers' firing and hiring decisions, but that is beyond disingenuous: star NBA players are consulted about such decisions as a matter of course, and James demonstrably has more influence on such decisions than most other NBA stars.
James' media allies portray Redick as a basketball savant positioned to become the next Pat Riley. Riley became the L.A. Lakers' head coach early in the 1981-82
season despite having no head coaching experience; he led the Lakers to
four championships (1982, 1985, 1987-88), and then he coached the Miami
Heat to the 2006 championship. The obvious difference between Riley and Redick is that Riley worked in the trenches as a Lakers assistant coach for a couple seasons before becoming the head coach, while Redick has spent more time cultivating a social media following than he has spent in the trenches as a coach (his only head coaching experience to this point is with his son's youth league team).
Redick was the consensus 2006 NCAA Player of the Year before having a long career as an NBA role player, but his resume as a player and James' tacit endorsement do not guarantee that this will work out well for the Lakers. It will be fascinating to see how the other Lakers react to being coached by the inexperienced Redick with James pulling the marionette strings even more blatantly than James has with previous coaches.
Redick displayed both his arrogance in general and his specific ignorance about basketball history when he made disrespectful comments about Bob Cousy, and Cousy correctly retorted that Redick is an example of someone who attacks people with superior credibility and skills because he is deficient in both departments. Redick's arrogance and smug demeanor are apparent every time he opens his mouth; you can get away with thinking that you are the smartest person in the room if you really are the smartest person in the room, but if you are not the smartest person in the room then that act gets old very quickly. The extent to which Redick (1) is ignorant about basketball history, and (2) relies on "advanced basketball statistics" are both strong indicators that Redick is not quite as smart as he thinks he is.
Deep knowledge of basketball history may not be essential to being a successful coach--though I would argue that such knowledge can be a powerful tool in terms of understanding the evolution of the game--but arrogance combined with ignorance is toxic. Based on his public NBA commentary, Redick seems smitten with a very narrow view of basketball tactics focused on "advanced basketball statistics." That kind of biased and limited thinking has not helped Daryl Morey, Sam Hinkie or Sam Presti to win even one NBA title during a combined 38 years of running NBA front offices, and it is not likely to help the Lakers win a championship with Redick at the helm steering the Lakers toward making decisions based on "advanced basketball statistics."
It is worth noting that James' greatest success as an NBA player--when he won two championships, won back to back regular season MVPs, won back to back NBA Finals MVPs, and made four straight trips to the NBA Finals--happened during his four years in Miami, the only franchise that did not give James free reign over the front office's decision making processes. Riley runs the Heat, which includes making personnel decisions, and not letting James--or any other player--undermine the authority of Coach Erik Spoelstra. In contrast, James has exercised large influence on coaching and personnel decisions in Cleveland and L.A., where he has won a combined two championships in 17 seasons while compiling a 2-4 NBA Finals record with four non-playoff seasons and two first round exits.
Thus, there is a large body of evidence spanning 21 years showing that James--even when in his absolute prime--fared much better when he did not have his fingerprints on every organizational decision. The Lakers have lost their last two playoff series with a combined 1-8 record, and it is doubtful that they can substantially improve the roster around James and his hand-picked sidekick Anthony Davis, so it will be fascinating to watch James and Redick attempt to coach the Lakers past the first round of the 2025 playoffs.
Last season, the Lakers ranked second in field goal percentage, eighth
in three point field goal percentage, and sixth in scoring, so it is
incorrect to assert that offense is their primary issue. In order to become more successful, the Lakers must improve their lackluster defense--last season they ranked 17th in defensive field goal percentage and 23rd in points allowed--and they must improve their rebounding (last season they ranked 18th in that category, a marked decline from ranking ninth during their 2020 championship season). Defense starts with (1) a good scheme designed by the coaching staff to maximize the team's matchup advantages and minimize the impact of matchup disadvantages, and (2) the team's best players putting forth maximum defensive effort, setting the right example for the rest of the team to follow.
Thus, intelligent Lakers fans should be concerned that during Redick's introductory press conference on Monday he focused on ways that he plans to change the Lakers' offense, including using Anthony Davis as a "hub"--presumably, a playmaker a la Nikola Jokic--and encouraging LeBron James to be a high volume three point shooter. Although James shot a career-high .410 from three point range last season, offense is not where the Lakers struggled last season, and deploying one of the greatest drivers in pro basketball history as a three point shooter is unlikely to help the team's offense or the team's overall performance; if Davis is going to be the Lakers' Jokic and James is going to be Michael Porter Jr. then who is going to be Jamal Murray and Aaron Gordon? There is a cliche that the NBA is a copycat league, but copying what one team did well when your roster does not have the same skill set strengths is not a recipe for success. The Lakers won the 2020 "bubble" title because James and Davis attacked the paint on offense and defended the paint on defense; turning them into a three point shooter and a point center respectively just takes the Lakers even further away from what worked in the best season of James' Lakers career.
The Lakers should be focused on getting stops and then scoring easy baskets in transition, as opposed to trying to dissect a set half court defense with Davis pretending to be Jokic and James settling for being a three point bomber.
Casual fans know that the 2024 NBA Champion Boston Celtics ranked first in three point shots made and three point shots attempted while ranking second in three point field goal percentage--but intelligent fans understand that what matters most is that the Celtics ranked second in defensive field goal percentage, second in rebounding, and fifth in points allowed.
Redick stated that he signed up to lead a "championship caliber" team. A championship team must win four playoff series in one postseason, so that is quite an ambitious goal for a franchise that has won just four playoff series in the past four years. Rest assured that if the Lakers have another season that fails to meet those lofty, unrealistic expectations, Redick--not James--will receive the blame from James' media allies who uncritically accept the narrative that James had no input on the decision to hire Redick.
NBA Stat Padding is Not New, and Calls Into Question the Accuracy and Relevance of "Advanced Basketball Statistics"
Tom Haberstroh's June 20, 2024 article about NBA stat padding focuses on discrediting Michael Jordan's statistics for steals and blocked shots that helped Jordan win the 1988 Defensive Player of the Year award, but Haberstroh ignores two larger issues:
1) NBA stat padding is not limited to just Jordan or just steals and blocked shots, nor is NBA stat padding a relic from the 1980s, as Haberstroh suggests.
2) To the extent that raw boxscore numbers are inaccurate, the "advanced basketball statistics" derived from those boxscore numbers are inaccurate and thus irrelevant.
Haberstroh's laser focus on Michael Jordan's 1987-88 statistics is understandable because the NBA and its media partners are in the entertainment business, and it is not good for ticket sales, merchandise sales, or broadcast ratings to assert that the greatest player of all-time played in the 1980s or 1990s (and forget about the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s); the NBA and media members like Haberstroh benefit from promoting the narrative that the greatest player of all-time is playing right now. LeBron James has openly lamented that the one trophy missing from his extensive trophy case is the Defensive Player of the Year award, so it is not surprising that--since it is unlikely that James will ever win that award now at his advanced age--Haberstroh seeks to elevate James by diminishing Jordan. Brian Windhorst and Dave McMenamin have made a lot of money crafting narratives for James, so Haberstroh is just running a play from their already successful playbook. When McMenamin cites an anonymous source within the Lakers organization,
do you think that his source is LeRoy the ball boy or LeBron the
self-proclaimed "King"? McMenamin did not obtain his current position by
advancing narratives favored by LeRoy the ball boy, because LeRoy the
ball boy has no power.
Writing an article discrediting Jordan for winning the one award missing from James' trophy case is a proven way to obtain access to "anonymous" sources, and to lay the groundwork for book deals, podcasts, and more.
How do I know what motivated Haberstroh to write his article? I can't read Haberstroh's mind, but I can read his words, and he framed his article not around a narrative focused on improving NBA stat keeping--indeed, he even asserted that there is no problem now (i.e., we should have full faith in all of LeBron James' numbers, including his likely inflated assists)--but rather declaring in his opening sentence, "It may be the most consequential Defensive Player of the Year award in NBA history." Haberstroh understood the assignment: Jordan has something that James does not have but very much wants, so that 1988 Defensive Player of the Year award must be discredited by any means necessary. Haberstroh makes it clear that his mission is not to set the record straight overall about NBA stat keeping, but just to discredit one player's statistics to undermine one specific award from 36 years ago. The subtitle of his article--"Has LeBron James Been Chasing a Ghost?"--further emphasizes Haberstroh's agenda; writers generally do not write the headlines for their articles, but in this instance the headline accurately reflects Haberstroh's theme and purpose.
Haberstroh is not doing investigative reporting about NBA stat keeping in general, even though he mentions the topic in his article, nor is he examining why individual scoring numbers have soared in recent seasons. That is why we are still waiting for Haberstroh, Windhorst, McMenamin or any of the other well-known NBA reporters/commentators to do an in depth video analysis showing that the scoring totals of many current NBA players are inflated by their deployment of a host of illegal moves, including palming, traveling, and flopping/flailing. It is instructive to contrast the step back move used by Larry Bird, Dell Curry and Adrian Dantley with what is called a step back move in today's game, but such an analysis does not mesh with the NBA's preferred narrative.
Even though Haberstroh clearly states his agenda, that does not mean that his basic premise about Jordan's steals and blocked shots being inflated by home team statisticians is wrong--but instead of focusing just on Jordan to elevate James, let's look at the larger issues. There is good reason to believe that NBA stat padding extends well beyond just Jordan's steals and blocked shots in the 1987-88 season, and the problem is not just that statisticians favor the home team's players.
An assist is supposed to be a pass that leads directly to a basket, but I charted assists in a number of games for several years and found that Chris Paul's gaudy assist totals are inflated (for more details, see A Brief History of NBA Stat Padding after the end of this article). Inflating Paul's assist totals affects not just Paul but it alters the NBA's official record book rankings of players, and it also renders meaningless the highly touted "advanced basketball statistics" that are treasured by "stat gurus." If assists are being handed out more often than they should be, then the vaunted "advanced basketball statistics" for assists per 36 minutes, assists per 100 possessions, and any player ranking formulas relying on assist numbers are skewed. Further, if Haberstroh is correct that steals and blocked shots numbers are easy to manipulate as well, then those inaccurate boxscore numbers further skew the "advanced basketball statistics."
On March 31, 2009, I addressed this issue in If Some of the Numbers are Bogus Then How "Advanced" are "Advanced Stats"? My consistent position for over 20 years is that there is some value in raw boxscore numbers, and there is some value in the intelligent use of certain "advanced basketball statistics," but the best way to evaluate players and teams is detailed skill set analysis based on a combination of in person observation, film review, and consideration of the opinions of qualified observers (i.e., reviewing what coaches, scouts, other players, and competent analysts say). As Haberstroh noted in his article, even if Jordan's 1987-88 statistics were inflated, qualified observers at that time such as Pat Riley and Bob Ryan considered Jordan to be an elite defensive player. Similarly, even though it is obvious that Chris Paul's assist totals are inflated, I would still argue that Paul is an elite playmaker based on analyzing his skill set: he makes great reads, he has the ability to deliver a variety of kinds of passes even under pressure, and he understands the right pass to make depending on how the defense is deployed and who is the intended recipient of the pass.
Detailed skill set analysis is not easy, nor does it mesh with our current culture dominated by screaming hot takes delivered in 30 seconds or less, but if you love basketball and respect basketball history then detailed skill set analysis is the best way to evaluate players and teams.
Boston Celtics Cap Dominant Season With Dominant Win Over Dallas Mavericks
The Boston Celtics led wire to wire en route to posting a 106-88 game five win over the Dallas Mavericks to clinch an NBA record 18th championship. The Celtics notched just the third wire to wire win in an NBA Finals series-clincher since 1982, joining the 1982 L.A. Lakers and the 1986 Boston Celtics. The Celtics led by as many as 26 points in game five, and their lead never fell below 17 during the second half.
Jayson Tatum scored a game-high 31 points on 11-24 field goal shooting while also passing for a game-high 11 assists, snaring eight rebounds, and committing just two turnovers. He played a game-high 45 minutes, and he set the tone from opening tip to final buzzer while joining Walt Frazier (1970), James Worthy (1988), Michael Jordan (1991), and Stephen Curry (2017) as the only players to have at least 30 points and at least 10 assists in a Finals-clinching win.
Tatum has been much maligned by many media members--even during what turned out to be a 16-3 postseason run culminating in a championship--so it should be noted that Tatum led the Celtics in points (25.0 ppg), rebounds (9.7 rpg), and assists (6.3 apg) during the 2024 playoffs; even when Tatum is not scoring efficiently, his fingerprints are on everything that the Celtics do at both ends of the court: he is an elite defensive rebounder, he is an excellent playmaker, and even on the scoring plays for which he does not receive an assist he draws the double teams that create open shot opportunities for his teammates. He is the team's one indispensable player, and he led the Celtics in scoring (22.2 ppg), rebounding (7.8 rpg), and assists (7.2 apg) during the NBA Finals. Tatum has now won 68 career playoff games, fourth most all-time for a player younger than 27 behind only Kobe Bryant (76), Tony Parker (75), and Magic Johnson (70). Bryant, Parker, and Johnson each won three championships before the age of 27, while this championship is Tatum's first--but winning multiple championships before age 27 is the exception, not the rule, and Tatum now has won one more championship than six-time champion Michael Jordan and four-time champion LeBron James had won at age 26.
Jaylen Brown added 21 points on 7-23 field goal shooting, plus eight assists and six rebounds. Tatum is Boston's best and most complete player, but Brown's consistency helped him to earn the 2024 Bill Russell NBA Finals MVP after winning the 2024 Larry Bird Eastern Conference Finals MVP. Throughout the NBA Finals, Brown played excellent defense versus Luka Doncic in addition to providing his customary contributions as a scorer, rebounder, and passer. Brown averaged 20.8 ppg, 5.4 rpg, and 5.0 apg during the NBA Finals, but he outshot Tatum from the field (.440 to .388), and that probably made the difference in the Finals MVP voting. Brown averaged 23.9 ppg, 5.9 rpg, and 3.3 apg during the 2024 playoffs while shooting .516 from the field.
Jrue Holiday had 15 points on 7-14 field goal shooting, a team-high 11 rebounds, four assists, and a game-best +21 plus/minus number, giving the Milwaukee Bucks yet another reason to rue trading him to Portland for Damian Lillard, which resulted in Boston acquiring Holiday. Holiday has been a key contributor for two of the past four NBA champions, as he helped Milwaukee capture the 2021 title.
Al Horford, a five-time All-Star in his 17 season NBA career, had nine points and nine rebounds in game five and won his first NBA title after playing 1086 regular season games and 186 playoff games. Tatum and Brown are Boston's headliners, but Horford is a highly respected veteran who is still logging impactful minutes as a 38 year old.
Kristaps Porzingis missed 10 straight playoff games with a right calf injury, made a sensational return to action in game one of the NBA Finals, and then suffered a lower left leg injury late in game two that forced him to miss games three and four. He scored five points in 16 minutes off of the bench in game five, and his +8 plus/minus number indicates that he had a positive impact during his limited minutes. It is likely that Porzingis will need surgery followed by months of recovery time now that the season is over.
Joe Mazzulla (35) is the youngest coach to win an NBA title since Bill
Russell served as the player-coach for the 1969 Boston Celtics. Tatum is 26, and Brown is 27, so the Celtics--who have already reached the Eastern Conference Finals six times in the past eight years--are in great position to contend for championships for the next several years. Their 16-3 playoff record in 2024 is the second best since the NBA went to its current postseason format of four seven game series in 2003, trailing only the 16-1 mark posted by the Kevin Durant-Stephen Curry 2017 Golden State Warriors.
Luka Doncic scored a team-high 28 points on 12-25 field goal shooting, grabbed a game-high 12 rebounds, and passed for five assists. The only blemish on his stat line was a game-high seven turnovers--matching Boston's team total--and it is fair to say that this game was a microcosm of the series: Doncic played well against the league's best defense, but the Celtics had the necessary personnel and scheme to guard him one on one without fearing what any of Doncic's teammates would do. Anyone who watched the playoffs knows that Doncic played through an assortment of injuries without making excuses, and after game five he refused to discuss the extent of his injuries, concluding simply that he has to play better. There are many stars who would not have played through injuries the way that Doncic did, and many of the stars who might have played through injuries would certainly have not missed an opportunity to remind everyone just how injured they were: after being swept in the 2018 NBA Finals, LeBron James hastened to mention that he "pretty much played with a broken hand." James never clarified if his hand was actually broken or just "pretty much" broken, and it should be noted that the injury was self-inflicted: James punched a whiteboard after losing game one of that series. It is refreshing to not hear from Doncic how he "pretty much" played through whatever was ailing him.
ESPN's J.J. Redick has repeatedly called Kyrie Irving a "wizard," and Redick joins the chorus praising Irving as the most skilled ballhandler of all-time--but all of that so-called wizardry resulted in 15 points on 5-16 field goal shooting in game five, including 0 points on 0-3 field goal shooting in the first quarter as the Celtics took command and never looked back. Irving averaged 19.8 ppg on .414 field goal shooting during the series, numbers well below what the Mavericks needed from him. Irving was particularly bad during the three games played in Boston, and he candidly admitted that the pressure of playing in front of his former team's fans got the best of him. There is a difference between being a flashy ballhandler versus having the necessary ballhandling skills to defeat a championship-level defense, a distinction that Redick and many others fail to understand or acknowledge. It will be interesting to see how many media members continue to force
feed us the Kyrie Irving redemption narrative while ignoring Irving's unrepentant antisemitism and the fact that his Chinese shoe company profits from utilizing slave labor.
The NBA is often a first quarter league, and this game was no exception: the Celtics led 28-18 after the first 12 minutes, and the outcome was never in serious doubt the rest of the way. Every Boston starter had at least eight rebounds as the Celtics outrebounded the Mavericks, 51-35. We are told so much about "pace and space" and "small ball," but the Celtics won this championship by exploiting their old school advantages in size, defense, and versatility that I emphasized in my series preview.
The Celtics enjoyed a dominant 2023-24 regular season, posting a
64-18 record and the fifth best point differential (11.3 ppg) of
all-time, and they went 12-3 during the first three rounds of the
playoffs--but many pundits tried to convince themselves (and others)
that the Mavericks would beat the Celtics in the NBA Finals, and
that noise became louder after Dallas routed Boston in game four. If the overrated concept of momentum had any validity, then Dallas would have won game five--or at least been competitive in game five--but this series demonstrated yet again that the NBA playoffs are about matchups, not momentum. After Dallas' game four win, ESPN's Brian Windhorst blasted Doncic--who has emerged as a perennial MVP candidate--as someone who will never win a championship without dramatically changing his game, and other ESPN talking heads spent much of the time between games four and five talking about the potential implications of a Dallas win in game five. The Mavericks did not make some brilliant game four adjustments, nor did the Celtics make some brilliant game five adjustments. The reality is that the Mavericks were content to not be swept on their
court, and they did not offer much resistance in game five; the Mavericks' one win was an outlier that did not alter the fact that the Celtics enjoyed significant, decisive matchup advantages.
The Celtics earned this championship without tanking, load management, or building a "super team": they drafted two strong prospects--Brown and Tatum--and then not only patiently developed those prospects into stars, but they built around those stars while tuning out the loud voices who asserted that this duo could never lead the Celtics to a title. The Celtics' patience and wisdom has been rewarded with a championship, and it would not be surprising if the Celtics win multiple titles if they continue to demonstrate patience and wisdom.
The Boston Celtics' coronation will have to wait at least one more game; after taking a 3-0 NBA Finals lead, the Celtics suffered a record-setting 122-84 loss to the Dallas Mavericks. The defeat snapped Boston's franchise record 10 game playoff winning streak and prevented the Celtics from becoming the first team to ever notch a sweep in the Conference Finals and the NBA Finals in the same postseason. Luka Doncic scored a game-high 29 points in just 33 minutes on 12-26 field goal shooting while also grabbing five rebounds, passing for five assists, and committing just one turnover. Dallas Coach Jason Kidd provided a not so subtle rebuttal to Doncic’s critics by correctly noting that Doncic played the same excellent way that he usually does. Kyrie Irving had his second good game in a row at home after being a nonfactor in games one and two on the road; he finished with 21 points, six assists, and four rebounds. The Mavericks emptied their bench for the entire fourth quarter, so their other individual numbers are skewed by what Marv Albert would call "extensive garbage time."
The Celtics shot 29-80 (.362) from the field. Jayson Tatum was their leading scorer with just 15 points on 4-10 field goal shooting. Jaylen Brown (10 points on 3-12 field goal shooting) and Jrue Holiday (10 points on 4-10 field goal shooting) were their only other starters who scored in double figures. The Celtics jacked up 41 three pointers and were outscored in the paint 60-26. They missed the imposing presence of the injured Kristaps Porzingis at both ends of the court, but the larger issue is that they played like a team enjoying a three game cushion while the Mavericks played like a team facing not only elimination but humiliation.
Despite frequent talk about "clutch statistics," the reality is that the NBA is often a first quarter league--and this game is an excellent example of that, with Dallas never looking back after jumping out to a 34-21 lead in the first 12 minutes. The Mavericks led 61-35 at halftime as Doncic poured in 25 points to break Dirk Nowitzki's franchise record for points in one half of an NBA Finals game. The Mavericks had the second largest lead at the end of the third quarter in NBA Finals history (92-60), and they ended up enjoying the third largest win in NBA Finals history.
After game three, ESPN's Brian Windhorst led the charge of the bloviators bleating about how terrible Doncic is and how Doncic must dramatically alter his game to ever have a chance of leading the Mavericks to an NBA title. Doncic had 27 points on 11-27 field goal shooting in 38 minutes in game three, with six rebounds, six assists, and three turnovers--numbers that are virtually identical to his game four statistics--but much will be made of how Doncic "responded to the critics" in game four when the reality is that he has been Dallas' best player throughout this season, this postseason, and this series; the difference in game four is that he received a lot more help from his teammates at both ends of the court.
In the wake of game four, the predictable narrative is that Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown are failures because they did not lead the Celtics to a sweep, ignoring the fact that NBA Finals sweeps are rare: there have been just nine of them—little more than one per decade in the league’s history, and just three since 1996—with Bill Russell notching just one in his record-setting 11 championship runs, and Magic Johnson, Larry Bird, and Michael Jordan never achieving an NBA Finals sweep. Jordan's 1996 Chicago Bulls--arguably the greatest NBA team of all-time with Hall of Famers Scottie Pippen and Dennis Rodman alongside Jordan--took a 3-0 NBA Finals lead only to suffer back to back losses before winning game six. The 1982 L.A. Lakers led by Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Magic Johnson won their first nine playoff games and enjoyed a 3-1 NBA Finals lead versus Julius Erving's Philadelphia 76ers before losing game five, 135-102. Abdul-Jabbar scored just six points in that loss, and Magic Johnson had 10 points on 4-9 field goal shooting with a game-high five turnovers. The Lakers won game six 114-104 to clinch their second title in three years en route to winning five championships in the 1980s.
It is funny to listen to the talking heads/screaming heads and observe how little they know about basketball history and how little they understand about the natural ebbs and flows of competition. Every possession and every game is not a referendum on a player's legacy, and to suggest otherwise is to demonstrate that one is more interested in providing clickbait than in providing intelligent analysis. The first letter in ESPN stands for "entertainment," not intelligence, and the network decided a long time ago to prioritize sound and fury over logic and reason, with Hubie Brown and Tim Legler being rare, welcome exceptions--but Brown has a reduced role now, and Legler is mostly relegated to cameo SportsCenter appearances.
Despite all of the ranting and raving to the contrary, momentum does not exist in an NBA playoff series; the Danny Ainge quip from decades ago is still apt: This is not the Tour de France. In other words, a team that wins by 38 points does not start the next game with a 38 point lead, unlike riders who win a Tour de France stage. Game five will likely have a different flow and tone, and the Celtics will likely finish off the Mavericks to clinch their record 18th NBA title.
Celtics Deliver Knockout After Withstanding Mavericks' Initial Punch
The Dallas Mavericks opened game three of the NBA Finals by hitting the Boston Celtics with a 22-9 punch, but the Celtics delivered a knockout by posting a 106-99 win to drop the Mavericks into a 3-0 hole from which no NBA team has ever recovered. The Celtics are the fourth team to take a 3-0 lead in each of the last two playoff series in a season, joining the 1983 Philadelphia 76ers, the 1996 Chicago Bulls, and the 2017 Golden State Warriors. If the Celtics win on Friday night, they will become the first such team to sweep both series.
Jayson Tatum scored a team-high 31 points while also contributing six rebounds and five assists. Jaylen Brown had an even better all-around game (30 points, team-high eight rebounds, game-high eight assists). Tatum did most of his damage early, registering 20 first half points, while Brown poured in 24 second half points. Tatum and Brown became the first Celtics duo to each post a 30-5-5 stat line in an NBA Finals game. Derrick White was the only other Celtic who scored in double figures (16 points). Kristaps Porzingis, the MVP of game one and a major factor at both ends of the court, missed game three with a rare lower leg injury suffered late in game two of the NBA Finals. His absence was particularly felt on the boards--Dallas outrebounded Boston, 43-36--and in the paint (Dallas outscored Boston 52-36 in the paint), but the Celtics are so big and talented that they can survive without a player who would be the second option on some very good playoff teams.
Kyrie Irving finally showed up three games into a series that may only last four games, and he scored a game-high 35 points on 13-28 field goal shooting. Luka Doncic added 27 points, but he shot just 11-27 from the field before fouling out with 4:12 remaining in the fourth quarter. He also had six rebounds and a team-high six assists. Those are good boxscore numbers for most players, but they are also acceptable numbers from Boston's perspective considering that the Celtics are containing the 2024 regular season scoring champion primarily with single coverage, which limits the lob dunks and corner three pointers that are the twin cornerstones of the Mavericks' offense. P.J. Washington had 13 points on 3-9 field goal shooting, and he grabbed eight rebounds. Dereck Lively II contributed 11 points on 5-6 field goal shooting and a game-high 13 rebounds off of the bench.
This game was even more of a roller coaster ride than usual for an NBA that has become overrun with high variance three point shooting, but the one constant is that Boston's size poses a lot of problems for Dallas. Correctly deployed size leads to high percentage shots in the paint, wide open three pointers after the opposing defense collapses into the paint, and low percentage shots for a smaller team forced to pass and shoot against long, outstretched arms. Doncic (13 points) and Irving (nine points) came out blazing in the first quarter as the Mavericks built that early 13 point lead, but Tatum countered with 13 first quarter points as Boston trimmed the margin to 31-30 by the end of the opening stanza. The second quarter was a 20-20 tie, but Boston dominated the third quarter 35-19 while shooting 13-20 (.650) from the field, including 5-11 (.455) from three point range. The three point shooting catches the eyes of casual fans and "stat gurus," but the real story is Boston's suffocating defense that limited Dallas to 8-21 (.381) field goal shooting and that has not yet given up 100 points to the Mavericks in a game.
Just when the Celtics seemed poised to blow out the Mavericks, the Celtics lapsed into poor fourth quarter shooting (7-18, .389) and sloppy ballhandling (five turnovers) as the Mavericks wiped out what had been a 21 point deficit to trail by just one point (93-92) after Irving nailed a jumper at the 3:37 mark. The Celtics closed the game with a 13-7 run, limiting Irving to just two points in that critical stretch.
The story of this game--and this series thus far--is Boston's great defense, but there are media members who are predictably mesmerized by Irving's flashy play. J.J. Redick--who repeatedly slanders the great players of the past while shamelessly acting like Irving's biggest fan--described Irving as a "wizard" and as an "ethical scorer" who does not flop and flail. However, Redick neglected to mention that two major components of Irving's "wizardry" are palming and traveling. Irving's space-creating moves would be much more impressive if he could accomplish them within basketball's traditional rules, because the game he plays now would result in more turnovers than field goals made if Irving played in previous eras when the rules were correctly enforced.
After the game, ESPN's Brian Windhorst declared that Doncic's performance was "unacceptable" and that Dallas can never win a title until Doncic vastly improves his defense and stops complaining so much to the referees. Windhorst is correct that Doncic has reverted to being a defensive liability after playing acceptable defense in earlier playoff series, and Windhorst is also correct that Doncic's whining is not helpful--but Windhorst failed to mention that Irving's plus/minus number in game three was -3, while Doncic's plus/minus number in game three was a team-best +9. Somehow, despite Doncic's "unacceptable" performance the Mavericks won Doncic's 38 minutes by nine points and lost the 10 non-Doncic minutes by 16 points. Further, Windhorst also neglected to note that Irving scored just 28 points on 13-37 (.351) field goal shooting as Dallas
fell into an 0-2 hole versus Boston with eight assists, five turnovers, and a
-22 plus/minus number. Irving shot 0-8 from three point range and 2-2
from the free throw line in the first two games of this series, meaning that he was not successful from either
long range or by drawing fouls.
If Irving were as great as his fans suggest, then Doncic fouling out of game three should not have been fatal. In game four of the 2000 NBA Finals, Kobe Bryant took over after Shaquille O'Neal fouled out, leading the Lakers to a 120-118 overtime win and a commanding 3-1 series lead en route to a 4-2 series win.
Windhorst's Doncic-bashing combined with white glove treatment of Irving only makes sense when you realize that LeBron James loves Kyrie Irving, as recent quotes from James show. Windhorst's media career is founded on following James around and presenting whatever narratives best suit James. Criticizing Irving would not sit well with James, so Windhorst knows the assignment. "Windy" is too busy blowing hot air to fairly assess Irving's play, let alone bother to mention Irving's unrepentant antisemitism and Irving's profiting from Chinese human rights abuses, two storylines that are very relevant not only in the big picture but in this series because Irving literally wears his passions on his head, around his neck, and on his feet; Irving openly advertises how he thinks and feels, but no one who is on James' payroll is going to ask questions that punch holes in the popular Irving redemption narrative.
In my series preview, I picked Boston to beat Dallas because the Tatum-Brown duo is superior to the Doncic-Irving duo, and because Boston has the league's best, most versatile starting lineup. Doncic is a great player, and Irving has flashes of greatness, but Tatum and Brown are bigger and more athletic while also being much more committed to playing elite defense. Regardless of what the talking heads say--and fail to say--the reality is that Tatum and Brown are getting the job done at both ends of the court, while Doncic and Irving have to battle to get off quality shots before being hunted on defense.
Even without Porzingis, the Celtics do not look like a team that will make history by blowing a 3-0 NBA Finals lead--and the Mavericks do not look like a team capable of beating the Celtics four straight times.
Jerry West passed away Wednesday morning at the age of 86. Younger fans may not understand why West's silhouette has been embedded in the NBA's official logo for over 50 years, but even a brief review of West's accomplishments makes it clear that West is not only one of the greatest basketball players ever but one of the most important people in basketball history.
West earned induction in the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in three separate roles: as a player (1980), as a member of the Team USA squad that won the gold medal in the 1960 Olympics (2010), and as a contributor (2024, in what will now be a posthumous honor). He was one of 11 players selected to the NBA's 35th Anniversary Team (1980). West was also selected to the NBA's 50 Greatest Players List (1996), and the NBA's 75th Anniversary Team (2021).
West made the All-Star team in each of his 14 seasons, he earned 10 All-NBA First Team selections (tied for fourth all-time behind only LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, and Karl Malone), he won the 1970 scoring title, he won the 1972 assist title, and he made the All-Defensive Team in each of the first five seasons that honor was presented at the end of his career (1969-73). West was the third player to surpass the 25,000 point plateau, and he retired with the third highest regular season scoring average (27.0 ppg), trailing
only Wilt Chamberlain and Elgin Baylor. West finished second in regular season MVP voting four times in an era when only one non-center (Oscar Robertson, 1964) won an MVP between 1957 and 1981.
West finished his playing career with a 1-8 NBA Finals record, but he
earned the nickname "Mr. Clutch" because of his tremendous performances
in the biggest games. West declared, "If it comes down to one shot, I like to shoot the
ball. I don't worry about it. If it doesn't go in, it doesn't go in." West holds the career NBA Finals scoring record
(1679 points), ahead of LeBron James (1562), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (1317),
and Michael Jordan (1176). West has the third highest career NBA Finals scoring average (30.5 ppg), trailing only Rick Barry (36.3 ppg) and Michael Jordan (33.6 ppg). West won the inaugural NBA Finals MVP award in 1969, and he remains the only player to earn that honor as a member of the losing team.
Robertson and West ranked 1-2 (in whatever order you prefer) all-time among guards until well into the 1980s when Magic Johnson and Michael Jordan made their marks.
Baylor and West were known as "Mr. Inside and Mr. Outside," and they are still one of the greatest duos in NBA history. West was a big-time scorer while playing alongside Baylor, but when Baylor missed all but five minutes of the 1965 playoffs West took his game to a record-setting level, averaging 46.3 ppg on .453 field goal shooting as the Lakers won 4-2 versus the Baltimore Bullets in the Western Division Finals. West then scored 33.8 ppg versus the Boston Celtics in the NBA Finals, but Bill Russell and a lineup filled with other Hall of Famers crew beat the Lakers, 4-1. Russell's Celtics were West's greatest nemesis, defeating West's Lakers six times in the NBA Finals.
Chamberlain joined Baylor and West for the 1968-69 season, but by that stage of their careers those three players were rarely fully healthy at the same time. The otherwise incredibly durable Chamberlain missed 70 games during the 1969-70 season because of a knee injury, and during the trio's four seasons together with the Lakers, Baylor played in 76, 54, two, and nine games before retiring early in that fourth season. Without Baylor, but alongside Chamberlain and Gail Goodrich, West finally won an NBA title in 1972 as a key member of one of the NBA's greatest single season teams; the Lakers won a still-record 33 straight regular season games before storming through the postseason with a 12-3 mark, including a 4-1 rout of a New York Knicks team that won NBA titles in 1970 and 1973.
West is a member of my basketball Pantheon, and is without question one of the top five guards of all-time, along with fellow Pantheon members (listed chronologically) Oscar Robertson, Magic Johnson, Michael Jordan, and Kobe Bryant.
West, Johnson, and Hakeem Olajuwon are the only players to win an NBA
Finals MVP, an NCAA Tournament Most Outstanding Player award, and an
Olympic gold medal.
How great was West? Picture Stephen Curry with an excellent vertical
leap and elite defensive skills--or, as West put it, "A wolf who ate
dogs":
I described West's 2011 book West by Westas "a unique contribution to sports literature: it is not an autobiography
or even an 'as told to' story; West writes (p. XII), 'the approach that I
have taken, in collaboration with Jonathan Coleman, is one that is
built on deep reportage...nothing less than a full-scale attempt to
bring forth the truth, to rely not just on my recollection of things,
but to do something more ambitious: investigate myself, speak with
others, and come to grips with what I find.'" I encourage anyone who is not familiar with West's life and career to read my review--and then to read West's book.
West was an important basketball figure from the late 1950s when he was a collegiate star at West Virginia through 2024 when he served as an executive with the L.A. Clippers until his death. After his playing career ended, he posted a 145-101 record in three seasons as the Lakers coach, including the best record in the league (53-29) in the 1976-77 season. West then moved to the Lakers front office and played a major role in building two of the greatest dynasties of the past 40 years: the Showtime Lakers won five NBA titles in the 1980s, and the Shaq/Kobe Lakers of the early 2000s won three straight championships. West felt disrespected by Lakers Coach Phil Jackson, and West moved on to Memphis, where he built the Grizzlies into a 50 win team in 2004 after the franchise had never won more than 28 games in each of its first eight years of existence. He then worked in the Golden State Warriors front office during that team's 2015 and 2017 championship seasons. West only won the Executive of the Year award twice (1995 with the Lakers, 2004 with the Grizzlies), and I agree with former Utah executive Scott Layden, who declared that the award should be named after West; a strong case could be made that West is the greatest executive in NBA history, if not North American team sports history.
It is a cliche to call a person "unique": few people have qualities
that are unusual or rare, and even fewer people fit the literal
definition of "unique" by being truly "one of a kind."
Jerry West's combined record as a player, coach, and executive is unique: no one else has ever played at an elite level in the NBA, then coached a team to the best record in the NBA, and then built multiple NBA championship teams as an executive.
Jerry West will be deeply missed, but never forgotten.
"A work of art contains its verification in itself: artificial, strained concepts do not withstand the test of being turned into images; they fall to pieces, turn out to be sickly and pale, convince no one. Works which draw on truth and present it to us in live and concentrated form grip us, compellingly involve us, and no one ever, not even ages hence, will come forth to refute them."--Alexander Solzhenitsyn (Nobel Lecture)
"The most 'popular,' the most 'successful' writers among us (for a brief period, at least) are, 99 times out of a hundred, persons of mere effrontery--in a word, busy-bodies, toadies, quacks."--Edgar Allan Poe
"In chess what counts is what you know, not whom you know. It's the way life is supposed to be, democratic and just."--Grandmaster Larry Evans
"It's not nuclear physics. You always remember that. But if you write about sports long enough, you're constantly coming back to the point that something buoys people; something makes you feel better for having been there. Something of value is at work there...Something is hallowed here. I think that something is excellence."--Tom Callahan
