20 Second Timeout

NBA Stat Padding is Not New, and Calls Into Question the Accuracy and Relevance of "Advanced Basketball Statistics"

Tom Haberstroh's June 20, 2024 article about NBA stat padding focuses on discrediting Michael Jordan's statistics for steals and blocked shots that helped Jordan win the 1988 Defensive Player of the Year award, but Haberstroh ignores two larger issues:

1) NBA stat padding is not limited to just Jordan or just steals and blocked shots, nor is NBA stat padding a relic from the 1980s, as Haberstroh suggests. 

2) To the extent that raw boxscore numbers are inaccurate, the "advanced basketball statistics" derived from those boxscore numbers are inaccurate and thus irrelevant.

Haberstroh's laser focus on Michael Jordan's 1987-88 statistics is understandable because the NBA and its media partners are in the entertainment business, and it is not good for ticket sales, merchandise sales, or broadcast ratings to assert that the greatest player of all-time played in the 1980s or 1990s (and forget about the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s); the NBA and media members like Haberstroh benefit from promoting the narrative that the greatest player of all-time is playing right now. LeBron James has openly lamented that the one trophy missing from his extensive trophy case is the Defensive Player of the Year award, so it is not surprising that--since it is unlikely that James will ever win that award now at his advanced age--Haberstroh seeks to elevate James by diminishing Jordan. Brian Windhorst and Dave McMenamin have made a lot of money crafting narratives for James, so Haberstroh is just running a play from their already successful playbook. When McMenamin cites an anonymous source within the Lakers organization, do you think that his source is LeRoy the ball boy or LeBron the self-proclaimed "King"? McMenamin did not obtain his current position by advancing narratives favored by LeRoy the ball boy, because LeRoy the ball boy has no power. 

Writing an article discrediting Jordan for winning the one award missing from James' trophy case is a proven way to obtain access to "anonymous" sources, and to lay the groundwork for book deals, podcasts, and more. 

How do I know what motivated Haberstroh to write his article? I can't read Haberstroh's mind, but I can read his words, and he framed his article not around a narrative focused on improving NBA stat keeping--indeed, he even asserted that there is no problem now (i.e., we should have full faith in all of LeBron James' numbers, including his likely inflated assists)--but rather declaring in his opening sentence, "It may be the most consequential Defensive Player of the Year award in NBA history." Haberstroh understood the assignment: Jordan has something that James does not have but very much wants, so that 1988 Defensive Player of the Year award must be discredited by any means necessary. Haberstroh makes it clear that his mission is not to set the record straight overall about NBA stat keeping, but just to discredit one player's statistics to undermine one specific award from 36 years ago. The subtitle of his article--"Has LeBron James Been Chasing a Ghost?"--further emphasizes Haberstroh's agenda; writers generally do not write the headlines for their articles, but in this instance the headline accurately reflects Haberstroh's theme and purpose.

Haberstroh is not doing investigative reporting about NBA stat keeping in general, even though he mentions the topic in his article, nor is he examining why individual scoring numbers have soared in recent seasons. That is why we are still waiting for Haberstroh, Windhorst, McMenamin or any of the other well-known NBA reporters/commentators to do an in depth video analysis showing that the scoring totals of many current NBA players are inflated by their deployment of a host of illegal moves, including palming, traveling, and flopping/flailing. It is instructive to contrast the step back move used by Larry Bird, Dell Curry and Adrian Dantley with what is called a step back move in today's game, but such an analysis does not mesh with the NBA's preferred narrative.

Even though Haberstroh clearly states his agenda, that does not mean that his basic premise about Jordan's steals and blocked shots being inflated by home team statisticians is wrong--but instead of focusing just on Jordan to elevate James, let's look at the larger issues. There is good reason to believe that NBA stat padding extends well beyond just Jordan's steals and blocked shots in the 1987-88 season, and the problem is not just that statisticians favor the home team's players. 

An assist is supposed to be a pass that leads directly to a basket, but I charted assists in a number of games for several years and found that Chris Paul's gaudy assist totals are inflated (for more details, see A Brief History of NBA Stat Padding after the end of this article). Inflating Paul's assist totals affects not just Paul but it alters the NBA's official record book rankings of players, and it also renders meaningless the highly touted "advanced basketball statistics" that are treasured by "stat gurus." If assists are being handed out more often than they should be, then the vaunted "advanced basketball statistics" for assists per 36 minutes, assists per 100 possessions, and any player ranking formulas relying on assist numbers are skewed. Further, if Haberstroh is correct that steals and blocked shots numbers are easy to manipulate as well, then those inaccurate boxscore numbers further skew the "advanced basketball statistics." 

On March 31, 2009, I addressed this issue in If Some of the Numbers are Bogus Then How "Advanced" are "Advanced Stats"? My consistent position for over 20 years is that there is some value in raw boxscore numbers, and there is some value in the intelligent use of certain "advanced basketball statistics," but the best way to evaluate players and teams is detailed skill set analysis based on a combination of in person observation, film review, and consideration of the opinions of qualified observers (i.e., reviewing what coaches, scouts, other players, and competent analysts say). As Haberstroh noted in his article, even if Jordan's 1987-88 statistics were inflated, qualified observers at that time such as Pat Riley and Bob Ryan considered Jordan to be an elite defensive player. Similarly, even though it is obvious that Chris Paul's assist totals are inflated, I would still argue that Paul is an elite playmaker based on analyzing his skill set: he makes great reads, he has the ability to deliver a variety of kinds of passes even under pressure, and he understands the right pass to make depending on how the defense is deployed and who is the intended recipient of the pass.

Detailed skill set analysis is not easy, nor does it mesh with our current culture dominated by screaming hot takes delivered in 30 seconds or less, but if you love basketball and respect basketball history then detailed skill set analysis is the best way to evaluate players and teams.

A Brief History of NBA Stat Padding

Charting Chris Paul's Assists Versus the Golden State Warriors (November 1, 2013)

Charting Assists for Chris Paul and Jason Kidd (April 12, 2009)

Rick Barry Interview (February 13, 2009)

Paul and West Lead Hornets to 116-105 Win Over Lakers (January 7, 2009)

Charting Assists for Chris Paul and Tony Parker in New Orleans' 90-83 Victory Over San Antonio (December 18, 2008)

Smooth All-Around Performance by Paul Lifts Hornets Over Heat (November 9, 2008)

Manu is the Man as Spurs Eliminate Hornets (May 20, 2008)

David West Dominates as Hornets Throttle Spurs, 101-82 (May 4, 2008)

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Chris Paul, LeBron James, Michael Jordan

posted by David Friedman @ 12:33 PM

5 comments

NBA Institutes Harsher Penalties for Load Management

Today the NBA's Board of Governors unanimously approved a new Player Participation Policy that will replace the Player Participation Policy implemented prior to the 2017-18 season. The new policy is a six page document, but the short version is that the NBA has defined a "star" as any player who has been selected as an All-Star or as an All-NBA Team member within the past three seasons, and the NBA has set forth conditions such that teams will face financial penalties if star players are held out of games without having a documented injury. The policy includes numerous exceptions, so it will be interesting to see if teams attempt to find ways to avoid consequences for resting their star players. While this policy focuses on punishing teams, it should be noted that the new Collective Bargaining Agreement stipulates that players who appear in fewer than 65 games will be ineligible for several major awards, including regular season MVP; the NBA expects and hopes that the possibility of losing the opportunity to receive individual awards will motivate star players to earn the money that they are paid from their guaranteed contracts.

There is no credible evidence that load management works in terms of increasing a team's chances for playoff success. There is also no credible evidence that load management enhances player safety, and NBA Commissioner Adam Silver admitted this during his press conference announcing the new policy: "I said this before, if the science were clearer that players should be resting, we would be favoring it," Silver said. The NBA has been damaged by "stat gurus" who use "advanced basketball statistics" to promote load management, tanking, and the notion that the only good shots are dunks and three pointers; it is past time that the league office reassert authority over the game. The limitations of "advanced basketball statistics" have been glaringly apparent for quite some time, but the "stat gurus" who make money off of their proprietary numbers have been quite effective in squelching informed discussion about their biased and flawed thinking.

The NBA was a much better and more entertaining league when load management and tanking did not exist, because players used to consider it a badge of honor to play all 82 games. It is sad that the NBA has to keep changing policies and rules to force healthy players to play, but this is symptomatic of a larger societal problem: too many people have an inflated sense of entitlement. Playing in the NBA is a privilege, not a right, and responsibilities are attached to that privilege for each NBA player--responsibilities to the league, to the sponsors and media outlets that fund the league, to the team that pays you, to your teammates, and to the fans. Instead of taking those responsibilities seriously, too many players act as if they are entitled to receive generational wealth in exchange for minimal effort. 

This sense of entitlement permeates Team USA, and goes a long way toward explaining Team USA's frequent failures in FIBA events: USA Basketball often acts as if Team USA is entitled to win as opposed to behaving as if building a winning team is a serious responsibility; it is often evident that either the coaching staff is not familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of opposing teams or that the players ignore the defensive game plan; superstar players feel entitled both to be selected to Team USA and also to skip some events (such as the FIBA World Cup) without losing their roster spots; American NBA players struggle to adjust to FIBA's physical play and to adversity in general, because in the NBA they are pampered every step of the way on and off of the court.

It has been five years since an American-born player won the NBA regular season MVP--and that player (James Harden) is vastly overrated by "stat gurus" and by media members who lack the intellectual rigor (or the courage) to push back when Daryl Morey made the ludicrous, demonstrably false assertion that Harden is a better scorer than Michael Jordan. Commentators like J.J. Redick and Amin Elhassan made ignorant, derogatory statements about the players who built the league, when the reality is that today's players would likely struggle if they were teleported into previous eras: are we supposed to believe that coddled American players who cannot win a medal in the FIBA World Cup would fare well versus Bill Russell, Wilt Chamberlain, and other all-time greats? The excess dribbling and showboating that is praised today would have been received quite differently in decades past: referees would not have tolerated much of the nonsense that is permitted today, and any player showboating his way into the paint would be more likely to be counting his missing teeth than counting on being rewarded with two free throws.

Commissioner Silver and the team owners have the right idea that load management is a pox on the game, but the rot that has set in to the sport is so deeply rooted that I fear it will be difficult to fix.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Adam Silver, load management

posted by David Friedman @ 11:49 PM

15 comments

Harden's Concert Tour Begins

Last night, the Philadelphia 76ers took a 2-0 lead in their first round series versus the outmatched Brooklyn Nets. The Nets play hard and they may win a game after the series shifts to Brooklyn for the next two games, but the Nets do not have enough size or talent to beat the 76ers four times.

James Harden is a very forward-thinking person. He knows that his "concert tour" is projected to begin in the second round--most likely versus the Boston Celtics--so he is already preparing now for his inevitable playoff choking. Harden is averaging 15.5 ppg on .324 field goal shooting versus Brooklyn, with 11 field goals made and nine turnovers committed. Harden achieved his full second round form in game two, with eight points, seven assists, five turnovers, and 3-13 field goal shooting. Nearly twice as many turnovers as field goals made will be a difficult standard to maintain, but I believe that Harden can do it. In 14 playoff games as a 76er, Harden has shot 75-192 (.391) from the field while committing 59 turnovers--but in his six most recent playoff games as a 76er, Harden has made 32 field goals and committed 30 turnovers, so if he can muster just two more turnovers than field goals made in game three at Brooklyn then he will have accomplished a seven game postseason stretch--the equivalent of a full playoff series--during which he had the same number of field goals made and turnovers committed.

I am not sure what a "stats guru" who specializes in "advanced basketball statistics" concludes from such numbers, but the rest of us who are not baffled and blinded by nonsense understand what we are witnessing during Harden's playoff career.

Joel Embiid is the dominant player in this series. The Nets are double-teaming him, and that is opening up easy opportunities for his teammates, although Harden is finding it easier to commit turnovers than make open shots. As I predicted, Tyrese Maxey (23.0 ppg on .516 field goal shooting) is picking up the slack while Harden does his usual disappearing act, and that will be sufficient to dispatch the Nets without too much difficulty.

The real fun begins when the 76ers face the Celtics. In Harden's first two second round appearances after moving to the Eastern Conference, he has averaged 15.2 ppg on .374 field goal shooting; he has a good chance of "beating" those numbers (but not in the way that 76ers fans hope) versus the Celtics' stifling defense.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Brooklyn Nets, James Harden, Joel Embiid, Philadelphia 76ers, Tyrese Maxey

posted by David Friedman @ 3:31 PM

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Ja Morant is Great, but the Memphis Grizzlies are not a One Man Team

I love Ja Morant's game: he is explosive, he is versatile, and he is an unselfish player who revels in his teammates' success. Morant deserves the headlines and the highlights--he is not only a spectacular player, but he is a very effective player who is posting career-high numbers in scoring (27.4 ppg, matching last season's average), assists (7.9 apg), and rebounding (5.8 rpg). The 6-3 point guard who is a fan favorite because of his amazing dunks is leading the Grizzlies in scoring and assists while ranking third in rebounding.

However, it should be noted that the Grizzlies' success is based upon the often underrated factors that generally are the foundation for team success in basketball: they rank first in defensive field goal percentage, first in rebounding, and second in point differential. 

In my 2022-23 Western Conference Preview, I ranked the Grizzlies as the second best team in the West, declaring, "Some teams rise up for one fluky season only to fall back into the pack--Portland, Atlanta, and New York are three recent examples of this--but the Grizzlies look like a team built for sustained high level success."

As I noted last season, the Grizzlies "are an old-school type of team that rejects the notion that you have to take and make a lot of three pointers to be successful." In 2021-22, the Grizzlies finished with the second best record in the Western Conference (56-26) while ranking 17th in three point field goal percentage, 23rd in three point field goals made, and 23rd in three point field goals attempted, and this season they currently have the second best record in the Western Conference--29-13, just half a game behind the 30-13 Denver Nuggets--while ranking 18th in three point field goal percentage, 19th in three point field goals made, and 18th in three point field goals made. 

You could say that the "analytics revolution" emphasizing--among other things--high volume three point shooting has not found its way to Memphis, but the reality is that the Grizzlies took a stab at using "advanced basketball statistics," and rapidly descended from the 2013 Western Conference Finals to missing the playoffs in 2018 as "stat guru" John Hollinger feuded with Coach Lionel Hollins (who the Grizzlies then fired right after the team's 2013 Western Conference Finals appearance) before distinguishing himself from the pack by destroying Memphis' roster.

Despite the media hype touting the value of "advanced basketball statistics," there are limitations to a narrow, mathematical approach to a complex subject that defies simple mathematical modeling/projections. Or, put another way, Economics is Not a Science, Nor is Basketball Statistical Analysis. I must emphasize that I do not "hate" statistical analysis; I oppose poorly done statistical analysis in general, and I specifically reject the notion that statistical analysis is as applicable to basketball--a free flowing game of near constant motion--as it is to baseball, a game of "discrete, one on one actions: the pitcher throws the ball, the batter swings and, if he makes contact, a fielder attempts to catch the ball."

Is there value in looking at the performance of various five player lineups, at a player's shooting percentages from various spots on the court, and at other statistics not found in a traditional box score? Of course there is--but those data points are only meaningful when considered in a larger context of other data points, combined with the "eye test" observations of competent coaches and scouts. The notion that you can understand basketball without even watching the game--or the even more radical notion that the "eye test" is so biased that you are better off not watching the game and relying entirely on "objective" numbers, as some "stat gurus" insist--is foolish.

After their detour into "stat guru" purgatory, the Grizzlies have emerged as a team that is intelligently run, with a well-balanced roster that plays smart, hard-nosed basketball. There is nothing wrong with enjoying Morant's dunks and sensational moves--he is one of my favorite players to watch--but basketball purists can also enjoy Memphis' emphasis on defense and rebounding, which have been the cornerstones for team success throughout basketball history.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Ja Morant, John Hollinger, Memphis Grizzlies

posted by David Friedman @ 11:44 AM

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Nuggets Fail Math and Common Sense

Basketball 101 question: Your team has the ball on a four on one fast break down by two points with less than six seconds remaining in the game. The correct play is:

A) All four players stand behind the three point line until one of them shoots a three pointer, because three points are worth more than two points.

B) The ballhandler drives to the hoop and either scores a layup or, if the lone defender stops him, passes the ball to a cutting teammate who scores a layup.

The Denver Nuggets faced this one question quiz versus the Washington Wizards on Thursday night. The Nuggets chose answer A, and they lost the game by two points. TNT's Charles Barkley said that if brains were dynamite then the Nuggets couldn't blow up a hat, which is a fitting description of that play; I am not sure why someone would want to use dynamite to blow up a hat, but I am sure that if brains were dynamite there was not a lot of explosive brain power displayed by those four Nuggets.

"Stat gurus" seem to think that they discovered a great hidden truth that three points are more than two points, and that shooting 40% from three point range is mathematically equivalent to shooting 60% from two point range. There is no doubt that the three point shot can be a lethal offensive weapon, particularly the corner three point shot where the three point line is closer to the hoop than in any other location. Why shoot a 22 foot two point shot from the top of the key when you can shoot a 22 foot three point shot from the corner?

However, the three point shot is not the secret to world peace, cold fusion, and quantum computing; it is not the correct answer to every question or problem. There are many situations when--based on time, score, and/or matchups--it makes much more sense to attempt a two point shot than it does to attempt a three point shot. 

Anyone can make a bad play. Anyone can miss a shot. You can go through old highlights and find bad plays and missed shots by some of the greatest players of all-time. The point is that Denver's bungled fast break is a microcosm of some of the flawed thinking that has become widespread in the modern NBA; those four players have been conditioned to believe that the three point shot is always the best shot no matter what, to the point that their minds are shut off from basic math and common sense. 

To a lesser degree, we see this kind of flawed thinking on a regular basis during NBA games. 

When making comparisons between today's NBA and the NBA from 20, 30, or 40 years ago, the most important factors are not measurable physical abilities or even skill set comparisons. Players who know how to play are going to consistently beat players who don't know how to play, unless the disparity in physical talent is so great that any mental advantage is nullified (and if you think that the physical talent today is far superior to the physical talent in the 1980s and 1990s then you need to watch highlights not only of Julius Erving and Michael Jordan but also players who had tremendous athletic ability even though they are not household names now).

The great teams from the past would have a field day right now. How many points do you think that the 1980s Showtime Lakers would score against small ball lineups featuring players who jack up three pointers and are unwilling or incapable of defending the paint? Yes, there are some great individual players today, and the top teams are worthy of respect, but the overall level of play--not the amount of highlights or athleticism, but the caliber of play--has regressed. I say that not based on overreacting to one play, but based on citing that play as an example of the kind of mindset that has taken over the league now, a mindset that purports to be analytical but is in fact rigid and not based on an understanding of basketball fundamentals. 

Was the three point shot underutilized at one time? Almost certainly. Players who can reliably shoot 35% or better from three point range should take advantage of that skill set, and the three point shot should never have been relegated to just being a last second shot when a team is trailing by three points; there is a place for the three point shot within the regular offense, and some of the teams that first realized that were quite successful, including the back to back champion Houston Rockets in the mid-1990s. 

However, the correction has become an over-correction, and blind adherence to purported analytics has led to questionable decision making not just on one play but throughout the course of many games.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Denver Nuggets

posted by David Friedman @ 1:42 AM

2 comments

The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part IV

In The One Number That Explains the NBA's Three Point Revolution, Ben Cohen arbitrarily asserts that the one magic number is 40%. Until the 2017 NBA season, no team had attempted at least 40% of its field goals from beyond the three point arc. Last season, nine teams exceeded the threshold Cohen deems to be significant, and in the early portion of this season nearly 40% of shot attempts in the NBA are three pointers. It is undisputed and obvious that the number of three pointers attempted by NBA teams has been increasing at a rapid rate for quite some time, but Cohen does not even attempt to explain why 40% is more significant than 35% or any other number. This is not like breaking the sound barrier, or approaching the speed of light, two numbers that have physical significance in terms of the experience of an object moving at those speeds. 

Cohen then jumps from his arbitrarily selected number to a broad conclusion unsupported by evidence: "The result is that it's increasingly difficult to beat a barrage of 3-pointers with anything but three pointers. There's almost no way to keep up otherwise." If that statement were true, then all that a team would have to do to win an NBA title--or at least contend for an NBA title--is to make more three pointers than all of the other teams.

However, the numbers show that three of the teams that advanced to the NBA's version of the Final Four--the Conference Finals round--last season did not finish in the top 10 in three pointers made per game. The L.A. Lakers--who won the 2020 championship and look like they have a good chance of winning the championship this season as well--ranked 24th in three pointers made per game last season. The Miami Heat, who lost to the Lakers in the NBA Finals, ranked sixth in three pointers made per game last season. The other Eastern Conference Finalist, the Boston Celtics, ranked 12th, and the Western Conference Finalist Denver Nuggets ranked 24th. 

Cohen's statement is thus demonstrably false; the NBA's top four playoff finishers last season figured out how to outscore and outperform teams that shot more three pointers than they did. Moreover, the teams that shot the most three pointers were not a particularly successful group. The Houston Rockets ranked first and they lost in the second round. The Dallas Mavericks, whose chief "stat guru" is quoted by Cohen, ranked second and they lost in the first round. The Milwaukee Bucks ranked third and they lost in the second round despite having the services of the reigning two-time regular season MVP. The Toronto Raptors ranked fourth and they lost in the second round. The New Orleans Pelicans ranked fifth and did not qualify for the playoffs. The Utah Jazz ranked seventh and they lost in the first round. The Minnesota Timberwolves ranked eighth and they had the second worst record in the Western Conference. The Brooklyn Nets ranked ninth and they lost in the first round. The Portland Trail Blazers ranked 10th and they lost in the first round. Thus, the 10 teams that made the most three pointers per game last season included two teams that did not even make the playoffs, four first round losers, three second round losers, and one NBA Finalist.

In the 2020 playoffs, the Heat, Celtics, Nuggets, and Lakers finished 8th-11th respectively in three pointers made per game among the 16 postseason qualifiers. 

The explosion in three point shooting does not correlate with winning, let alone cause winning. A large number of NBA teams have hired "stat gurus" who think similarly and who have similar cognitive biases, and this is one reason why so many teams are shooting so many three pointers. Every team is shooting a lot of three pointers, and many teams are shooting more three pointers than they probably should, but just shooting a lot of three pointers has no demonstrable positive impact on winning. 

It is smart for a team to acquire three point shooters to spread the floor, creating space for drivers and post up players, but it is not smart to abandon whole swaths of the court by deeming any shot taken from those areas to be inefficient. There is no doubt that during the first few years after the NBA added the three point shot teams took a while to figure out how to leverage the rule to their advantage, but the notion that all a team has to do to win is shoot more three pointers is incorrect. 

As is often the case, the very people who claim to be making data driven conclusions are in fact ignoring what the data shows, because the "stat gurus" not only often misinterpret the numbers but they do not understand--or simply disregard--factors that are not easily quantifiable. For example, it takes a lot of energy for three point shooters to fire up a high volume of shots while also having to run up and down the court and guard opposing players, who are often bigger (teams that shoot a lot of three pointers are often playing some version of "small ball"); if I play one on one against a bigger player who I cannot guard in the paint, I may win some games just by making so many three pointers that he cannot make enough two pointers to keep up. However, unless I am in much better condition than that bigger player, the physical demands of guarding that player and fighting that player for rebounds will wear out my legs, which will in turn lower my shooting percentage. If I cannot compensate by getting some easy baskets and/or getting enough defensive stops, my three point efficiency is going to decrease while my larger opponent is still going to be able to make a high percentage of his inside shots. The NBA game is more sophisticated than recreational league basketball, but the fundamental principles remain true: a strategy that is too heavily reliant on three point shooting is a high variance strategy that is unlikely to produce sustained success.

Don't misunderstand: I love the three point shot, as anyone who has played basketball with or against me will readily attest. The three pointer is without question a valuable weapon, because of the simple fact that each three pointer made is worth 50% more than each two pointer made--but that one simple fact is not all you need to know to win a championship--particularly at the highest levels of the game; at lower levels of the game a lesser team that shoots a lot of three pointers may outduel a more talented team that is not as technically efficient defensively as they could or should be, in part because the games do not last 48 minutes and the seasons do not last 82 games plus four rounds of best out of seven playoff series. 

Many commentators keep pushing the narrative that basketball has entered a new golden age of small ball and three pointers, blissfully ignoring that the Lakers won the championship with a classic, old school recipe: (1) a big man who dominates defensively, rebounds well, and can score at will in the post, (2) a versatile "midsize" player who can score, rebound, pass, and defend, and (3) a collection of role players who collectively provide defense, rebounding, and timely scoring. 

Winning teams play consistent defense, they control the paint at both ends of the court, and they outrebound their opponents. A team that does not do those things well is not going to have much success; if a team excels tremendously in one or two categories then it may survive a slight weakness in another category, but just jacking up three pointers with little regard for defense, paint presence, and rebounding is not a championship recipe, as repeatedly demonstrated by the Houston Rockets during the Daryl Morey/James Harden era.

Previous articles in this series:

The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot

The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part II 

The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part III

Labels: "stat gurus", Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, L.A. Lakers, three point shot

posted by David Friedman @ 10:38 PM

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The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part III

Here is a quote from 16 years ago about the three point shot: "It was a great weapon when the players shot eight or nine times a game. Now it's way overused." Care to guess which former player turned TV commentator made that remark? The answer is none other than Steve Kerr, owner of the highest career regular season career three point shooting percentage in ABA/NBA history (.454), and the current coach of the Golden State Warriors--one of the teams most identified with the recent vast increase in the usage of the three point shot.

I first wrote about the evolution of the usage of the three point shot for NBCSports.com in March 2007, and then I posted an updated version of that article at 20 Second Timeout a few months later. The American Basketball Association (ABA) is associated with the three point shot and deserves credit for popularizing it, but it should be noted that the ABA did not invent the three pointer; it had been used in the American Basketball League (ABL) in the early 1960s, and there are reports that the three point shot was used experimentally in a college game (Columbia versus Fordham) in 1945. Some ABA teams incorporated the three point shot into their regular offense, but not all ABA teams did so, and overall the ABA teams did not shoot nearly as many three pointers as NBA teams currently shoot.

The three point shot disappeared from the professional basketball landscape for three seasons after the ABA/NBA merger in 1976, but then the NBA brought it back for the 1979-80 season. For the first part of the decade, most NBA teams only shot three pointers to beat the shot clock, or to beat the buzzer at the end of a quarter, or when they were down by three points with little time remaining in the game. By the end of the 1980s, many teams began to use the three pointer as part of their offense. The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (instead of 23 feet nine inches everywhere but the baseline corners) for the 1995-97 seasons, which led to a spike in three point usage that continued even after the league restored the original three point line in 1997-98.

In December 2016, I revisited the evolution of the usage of the three point shot. The growing acceptance of "advanced basketball statistics" had resulted in a significant increase in the usage of the three point shot, and that trend has continued in the past several seasons. NBA teams averaged a then-record 9.7 three point field goals made per game during the 2016-17 season, and that number increased to 12.1 three point field goals made per game during the suspended (but hopefully not concluded) 2019-20 season, so now is a good time to examine how the usage of the three point shot has continued to evolve.

As discussed in the two previous articles in this series, the three point shot has evolved from a rarely used novelty, to an occasionally used weapon, to a minor part of the offensive game plan, to a major part of the offensive game plan, to a central part of the offensive game plan. To understand the distinction between the latter two concepts, think back to the Houston Rockets with Hakeem Olajuwon, or the Orlando Magic with Shaquille O'Neal; the three point shot was a major part of the offensive game plan, but the primary focus was to first get the ball to the big man, and then shoot three pointers if the opponent double-teamed the big man. In contrast, now many teams are actively hunting three point shots while openly disdaining even wide open two point shots.

One might assume that adding a point per shot for long field goal attempts would increase overall scoring, particularly as the three point shot gained greater acceptance, but history shows otherwise. NBA teams averaged 110.3 ppg in 1978-79, the year before the league added the three point shot. Scoring held steady during the 1980s, and then declined throughout the 1990s. By 1995-96, scoring had fallen under 100 ppg (99.5 ppg) for the first time since 1956-57. NBA scoring reached its modern nadir in the lockout-shortened 1999 season (91.6 ppg), and did not recover to the 100 ppg level until the 2008-09 season, by which time the league had passed rules restricting defensive contact on the perimeter; these rules opened up the game, made it much more difficult to guard players on the perimeter, and--among other things--played a major role in helping Steve Nash to become a two-time regular season MVP. Scoring regressed slightly in the early part of the next decade, but has been on an upward progression for several years, peaking at 111.4 ppg in the 2019-20 season.

Having a three point shot rule does not, in and of itself, increase or decrease team scoring; scoring is impacted by many different factors, including other rules changes, new coaching philosophies, and skill set evolution (or decline, depending on your perspective).

There is also not a direct correlation between shooting a lot of three pointers and winning championships. The Golden State Warriors made five straight Finals appearances from 2015-19, winning titles in 2015 and 2017-18, but during that time they only once led the league in three pointers made--2016, the year that they lost to Cleveland in the Finals. The Warriors ranked second in three pointers made in 2015, fourth in 2017, eighth in 2018, and third in 2019. Here are the rankings for three point shots made by NBA championship teams since I wrote my first article about the evolution of the usage of the three point shot:

2008: Boston (eighth)
2009: L.A. Lakers (17th)
2010: L.A. Lakers (13th)
2011: Dallas (eighth)
2012: Miami (20th)
2013: Miami (third)
2014: San Antonio (12th)
2015: Golden State (second)
2016: Cleveland (second)
2017: Golden State (fourth)
2018: Golden State (eighth)
2019: Toronto (eighth)

During the 2019-20 season, the Milwaukee Bucks rank fourth in three pointers made, while the Toronto Raptors rank fifth, the Boston Celtics rank 13th, the L.A. Clippers rank 18th, the Denver Nuggets rank 24th, and the L.A. Lakers rank 25th. The three teams that have made the most three pointers--Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans--are unlikely to win the 2020 championship (assuming that the season is completed), and most of the rest of the top 10 teams are championship long shots at best (Miami, Minnesota, Utah, Portland, Brooklyn).

Even the championship winners/championship contenders that shoot a lot of three pointers are not teams that are built around three point shooting the way that the current Rockets are. The Golden State Warriors utilized the three point shot as a very effective offensive weapon, but the foundation for their championship success was their tremendous defense: the Warriors ranked first in defensive field goal percentage in 2015 and 2017 before slipping just slightly to third in 2018. Their 73-9 team in 2016 that lost in the NBA Finals ranked third in defensive field goal percentage.

In order to win games during which their shooting touch deserts them, a legitimate championship contender must be able to rely on consistently great defense.

While there is not much correlation between the three point shot rule and team scoring, or shooting a lot of three pointers and winning a championship, the increase in the usage of the three point shot has dramatically changed the shot charts for the league's most prolific individual scorers. During the first decade that the NBA used the three point shot, even the top scorers did not shoot a high volume of three pointers. Alex English, the NBA's leading scorer of the 1980s, scored 21,018 points during that decade while making just 16 three pointers. The next two players on that list made even fewer three pointers; Moses Malone scored 19,082 points in the 1980s while making three three pointers, and Adrian Dantley scored 18,157 points in the 1980s while making six three pointers. Only four of the decade's top 10 scorers made at least 100 three pointers during the 1980s, headlined by Larry Bird and Mark Aguirre; Bird ranked fourth in scoring (17,899 points) while making 455 three pointers, and Aguirre ranked eighth in scoring (14,488 points) while making 255 three pointers. Bird ranked second in the 1980s in three pointers made, trailing only Dale Ellis (472).

Only 11 players made at least 200 three pointers during the 1980s--but 12 players made at least 200 three pointers during the 2018-19 season! Each of the league's top 10 scorers during the 2019-20 season is averaging at least one three pointer made per game, and seven of those 10 players are averaging at least two three pointers made per game. Four of the top five scorers are averaging at least three three pointers made per game, led by James Harden, who ranks first in both scoring (34.4 ppg) and three point field goals made (271). Harden's Rockets have gone all-in with small ball, relying on volume three point shooting to overcome their lack of size/lack of rebounding, but after experiencing initial success the Rockets sputtered recently.

Was Kerr's assessment 16 years ago correct? Since there are no live NBA games now or for the foreseeable future, there is plenty of time to watch classic games from the 1980s and 1990s, and then compare those games--in terms of quality of play, and in terms of entertainment value--with the games that we have been watching recently. I am not opposed to the three point shot--I love the ABA, and I love shooting three pointers when I play pickup or rec league ball--but I prefer to watch basketball players and teams that utilize all areas of the court on offense, as opposed to basketball players and teams that jack up three pointers regardless of time, score, matchups or momentum because the "stat gurus" made the supposedly revolutionary discovery that three is more than two. I cannot say that there is a "right" number of three pointers per game (even though the "stat gurus" think that they can), but both in terms of winning championships and in terms of entertainment value I do not think that 30, 40, or 50 three point shot attempts per team per game--numbers that we are seeing on a regular basis in today's game--is optimal.

Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot

Most Three Pointers Made

Year/League..Team..3 FGM..Player (team)..3 FGM

1967-68/ABA..Pittsburgh..243..Les Selvage (Anaheim)..147
1968-69/ABA..Kentucky..335..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..199
1969-70/ABA..Kentucky..330..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..198
1970-71/ABA..Indiana..306..George Lehmann (Carolina)..154
1971-72/ABA..Indiana..220..Glen Combs (Utah)..103
1972-73/ABA..Indiana..172..Bill Keller (Indiana)..71
1973-74/ABA..San Diego..216..Bo Lamar (San Diego)..69
1974-75/ABA..Indiana..224..Bill Keller (Indiana)..80
1975-76/ABA..Indiana..250..Bill Keller (Indiana)..123

1979-80/NBA..San Diego..177..Brian Taylor (San Diego)..90
1980-81/NBA..San Diego..132..Mike Bratz (Cleveland)..57
1981-82/NBA..Indiana..103..Don Buse (Indiana)..73
1982-83/NBA..San Antonio..94..Mike Dunleavy (San Antonio)..67
1983-84/NBA..Utah..101..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..91
1984-85/NBA..Dallas..152..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..92
1985-86/NBA..Dallas..141..Larry Bird (Boston)..82
1986-87/NBA..Dallas..231..Larry Bird (Boston)..90
1987-88/NBA..Boston..271..Danny Ainge (Boston)..148
1988-89/NBA..New York..386..Michael Adams (Denver)..166
1989-90/NBA..Cleveland...346..Michael Adams (Denver)..158
1990-91/NBA..Portland..341..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..172
1991-92/NBA..Milwaukee..371..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..162
1992-93/NBA..Phoenix..398..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)/Reggie Miller (Indiana)..167
1993-94/NBA..Houston..429..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)..192
1994-95/NBA*..Houston..646..John Starks (New York)..217
1995-96/NBA*..Dallas..735..Dennis Scott (Orlando)..267
1996-97/NBA*..Miami..678..Reggie Miller (Indiana)..229
1997-98/NBA..Seattle..621..Wesley Person (Cleveland)..192
1998-99/NBA^..Houston..336..Dee Brown (Toronto)..135
1999-00/NBA..Indiana..583..Gary Payton (Seattle)..177
2000-01/NBA..Boston..592..Antoine Walker (Boston)..221
2001-02/NBA..Boston..699..Ray Allen (Milwaukee)..229
2002-03/NBA..Boston..719..Ray Allen (Milwaukee-Seattle)..201
2003-04/NBA..Seattle..723..Peja Stojakovic (Sacramento)..240
2004-05/NBA..Phoenix..796..Kyle Korver (Philadelphia)/Jason Richardson (Phoenix)..226
2005-06/NBA..Phoenix..837..Ray Allen (Seattle)..269
2006-07/NBA..Phoenix..785..Arenas (Washington)/Bell (Phoenix)..205
2007-08/NBA..Orlando..801..Jason Richardson (Charlotte)..243
2008-09/NBA..New York..823..Rashard Lewis (Orlando)..220
2009-10/NBA..Orlando..841..Aaron Brooks (Houston)..209
2010-11/NBA..Orlando..770..Dorell Wright (Golden State)..194
2011-12/NBA^^..Orlando..670..Ryan Anderson (Orlando)..166
2012-13/NBA..New York..891..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..272
2013-14/NBA..Houston..779..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..261
2014-15/NBA..Houston..933..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..286
2015-16/NBA..Golden State..1077...Stephen Curry (Golden State)..402
2016-17/NBA..Houston..1181..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..324
2017-18/NBA..Houston..1256..James Harden (Houston)..265
2018-19/NBA..Houston..1323..James Harden (Houston)..378

* The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (prior to and subsequent to these three seasons the three point arc was 22 feet in the corners and 23 feet nine inches elsewhere).

^ Season shortened to 50 games by a lockout.

^^ Season shortened to 66 games by a lockout.

Bold indicates an ABA/NBA record.

Labels: "stat gurus", Alex English, Golden State Warriors, Houston Rockets, James Harden, Larry Bird, Mike D'Antoni, Stephen Curry, Steve Kerr, three point shot

posted by David Friedman @ 1:05 AM

10 comments

Fun With NBA Finals Field Goal Percentages

Do you remember the NBA Finals when one of the team's guards just kept shooting and shooting despite his low field goal percentage, instead of passing to the team's dominant big man who had a high field goal percentage?

Here are some field goal shooting numbers from that NBA Finals:

"Gunner" guard: 72-160 (.450)
Dominant big man: 70-112 (.625)

You might think that after losing that championship series the "Gunner" guard would have learned something, but the next time that team made it to the NBA Finals the field goal percentages and field goal attempts of the "Gunner" guard and the Dominant big man were separated by an even larger margin:

"Gunner" guard: 38-117 (.325)
Dominant big man: 39-65 (.600)

Surely the guard must have learned from that experience, right? Nope, the next time that team made it to the NBA Finals here is how those two players shot:

"Gunner" guard: 42-95 (.442)
Dominant big man: 22-42 (.524)

Quick, call Mike Wilbon or Jon Barry or Bill Simmons to revisit their numerous anti-Kobe Bryant screeds; that "Gunner" guard is Kobe Bryant, right?

Wrong!

The "Gunner" is Jerry West, who fired a lot of blanks while playing alongside Wilt Chamberlain in the NBA Finals in 1970, 1972 and 1973 as the L.A. Lakers lost two out of three of those series to the New York Knicks. Chamberlain was the MVP of the 1972 series that the Lakers won; the Lakers lost in seven games in 1970 and in five games in 1973. It should be noted that West, in his first season playing with Chamberlain, won the first Finals MVP award in NBA history in 1969, shooting .490 from the field as the Lakers lost to the Boston Celtics in seven games. West is still the only player from the losing team to win the Finals MVP.

Kobe Bryant went 5-2 in the NBA Finals, winning two Finals MVPs. Jerry West went 1-8 in the NBA Finals, winning one Finals MVP. Yet, West is immortalized as "Mr. Clutch," while Bryant is the pinata for "stat gurus" and self-proclaimed basketball experts who blame Bryant for the titles he did not win but are reluctant to give him much credit for the titles he won. To be fair, West's clutch reputation was formed early in his career, when he had many scintillating playoff series, during which time he posted these Finals scoring/field goal shooting numbers as his Lakers lost five times to the Celtics:

1962: 31.1 ppg .456 Boston d. L.A., 4-3
1963: 29.5 ppg .490 Boston d. L.A., 4-2
1965: 33.8 ppg .424 Boston d. L.A., 4-1
1966: 33.9 ppg .515 Boston d. L.A., 4-3
1968: 31.3 ppg .486 Boston d. L.A., 4-2

West's earlier numbers duly noted, it should also be noted that his low Finals field goal percentages relative to his teammate Chamberlain were not in any way construed to harm West's "Mr. Clutch" reputation or legacy. The media understood that West performed well overall given the roster construction of the Lakers and their opponents, the style of play, the matchups and other factors--and the media understood that West was playing through significant injuries in the 1972 Finals, the one Finals in which he shot poorly by any standard.

The disparate "conventional wisdom" narratives about Bryant and West demonstrate why statistics should not be taken out of proper context and why it is misleading to try to summarize a player's legacy in a soundbite. Ironically, and in direct contrast to the popular narrative about the Shaquille O'Neal-Kobe Bryant duo, one contemporary narrative regarding the Chamberlain-West dynamic blamed Chamberlain, not West! For example, after the Lakers lost to the Knicks and a hobbled Willis Reed in game seven of the 1970 Finals, Bill Russell criticized Chamberlain for not exploiting Reed's lack of mobility; Russell--who was surrounded by Hall of Fame scorers throughout his great career and thus never carried a significant scoring burden--stated that he would have been insulted if a player as limited as the injured Reed had the temerity to play against him. Chamberlain was deeply hurt by Russell's remarks, which led a to rift between the two men that was not resolved for quite some time.

I am not aware of quotes, comments, articles or TV clips that suggested that West shot too much and/or that West should have fed the ball to Chamberlain more frequently. West was praised for carrying such a heavy offensive load, and his numerous losing trips to the Finals were portrayed with much pathos and sympathy. Chamberlain, who went 2-4 in the NBA Finals, was often portrayed as a loser--even though he won twice as many titles as West, and even though he won his first title without West after beating Russell's Celtics, a team that West never defeated in a playoff series. So, while the media gave a fair--or even lenient--appraisal of West, Chamberlain was portrayed much more harshly. Chamberlain lamented, "Nobody loves Goliath" and one might also wonder if there was at least some racial/racist component at work.

The nuanced reality is that West was not a gunner--at least in terms of the negative connotations associated with that word--and neither was Bryant. The incorrect assumption that often leads to flawed conclusions is that if Player A has a much higher field goal percentage than his teammate Player B then Player A should shoot less often and Player B should shoot more often. Superficially, that may sound reasonable and mathematically sound, but the problem is that it is not necessarily true that Player B can or will maintain his current field goal percentage if his shot attempts increase. A rhythm jump shot by Jerry West or Kobe Bryant with the team having proper floor balance to either go for the offensive rebound or retreat into a good defensive position may very well be a better option than trying to force the ball into a crowded paint area; forcing the action can lead to turnovers or contested shots that fuel the opposing team's transition game. Jeff Van Gundy often says that one should not judge the correctness of a play or a shot attempt based on the outcome; a good shot is a good shot even if it does not go in, while a bad shot is a bad shot even if the ball swishes through the hoop.

The previous paragraph is more baffling to many "stat gurus" than the bizarre implications of quantum mechanics are to physicists. "Stat gurus" are convinced that Kobe Bryant's best option was to pass to any teammate of his who had a higher field goal percentage, from the sublime (Shaquille O'Neal) to the ridiculous (Kwame Brown). It is interesting that even as "stat gurus" are now deriding the post up shot as one of the lowest percentage shots they still cannot resist hammering Bryant for his supposed basketball sins (a recent story suggested that the key for Jayson Tatum's success this season will be to unlearn everything that Bryant taught him last year, which sounds like a satirical piece from the Onion but was meant to be taken seriously, though Tatum has publicly rejected the article's anti-Bryant premise).

Why shouldn't West have passed to Chamberlain every time? Why shouldn't Bryant have passed to O'Neal every time? (If you don't understand why Bryant should not have passed to Kwame Brown every time, it is surprising you made it this far into the article without your brain exploding). There are a host of reasons that could apply: if the big man is too fatigued to obtain prime post position (or if a sagging defense is preventing him from doing so early enough in the shot clock) then the offense--mindful of the ticking 24 second shot clock--cannot wait forever; if the big man received the ball in the paint, was trapped and then passed the ball to the open man then that open man may be looking at the highest percentage shot his team will get on that possession; injuries, foul trouble and matchups may also be factors that work against just pounding the ball inside every time down the court. An open shot early in the shot clock may be a better option than a contested shot later in the shot clock.

Does this mean that every shot that West and Bryant took was optimal? Of course not. Basketball is a free-flowing game of continuous action played under duress; only in a computer simulated game is it possible for every player to make optimal choices all of the time.

"Stat gurus" are correct that it makes sense to track five on five actions and determine which plays are the most successful over a large sample size. That kind of analysis, done properly, can influence lineup changes and matchups; that is "advanced basketball analysis" at its finest (one example of which is the Dallas Mavericks' insertion of J.J. Barea into their 2011 championship rotation; his individual statistics were not gaudy, but the five on five data indicated that the team performed better overall when he was on the court).

When you read or hear stories about teams utilizing "advanced basketball statistics," keep in mind that the smart teams are not using these numbers to "prove" that LeBron James is better than Michael Jordan or other nonsensical, headline grabbing declarations that "stat gurus" and their media buddies like to propagate; smart teams utilize analytics as one tool to figure out how to optimize their team's performance in various five on five situations. The "stat guru" who proclaims that James is better than Jordan or Pau Gasol is better than Kobe Bryant is just trying to commercialize his "unique analytics" to line his own pockets; meanwhile, the "stat guru" who you have never heard of is working behind the scenes for an NBA team looking for exploitable competitive advantages.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Jerry West, Kobe Bryant, L.A. Lakers, Shaquille O'Neal, Wilt Chamberlain

posted by David Friedman @ 1:32 AM

2 comments

Houston Rockets Abort Ill-Conceived Carmelo Anthony Experiment

Who could have imagined that Carmelo Anthony would not be a good fit for the Houston Rockets? Only anyone who understands basketball via skill set analysis and informed observation, as opposed to relying on "advanced basketball statistics" or reputation or hype or the endorsements of some of Anthony's NBA buddies (including Chris Paul, who has recently said that Anthony is not just a teammate but rather he is "family").

Carmelo Anthony has demonstrated throughout his NBA career that he is a poor leader--he has enjoyed his best individual and team success when paired with one or more stronger personalities who ran the locker room--and that he has a limited skill set: at his best, he was a very potent one on one scorer from certain areas of the court, but he has always been a poor defender, a reluctant passer and an inconsistent rebounder who is more interested in offensive rebounding than defensive rebounding. None of the above factors suggests that Anthony in his prime could be the best player on an NBA championship team, and those issues have been compounded in recent seasons by the undeniable fact that Anthony retains unrealistic beliefs about his current capabilities even as his one dimensional skill set displays continuous, significant decline.

The above paragraph is what an "old school" scouting report summary of Anthony's game would look like. In my 2018-19 Western Conference Preview, I wrote, "Anthony has a career-long pattern of rarely advancing very far in the playoffs; he is a shoot-first (and second and third) player whose efficiency is declining and whose willingness/ability to contribute in other areas decreases each year. Even if they had stood pat, the Rockets would probably not have won 65 games again; that was an aberration and they are due to regress to the mean. Adding Anthony, though, will probably subtract about 10 wins, while also making this team a less potent playoff force."

The Rockets started the season 4-6 as Anthony averaged career-lows in scoring (13.4 ppg), free throw percentage (.682), assists (.5 apg) and steals (.4 spg) while shooting just a bit above his career low field goal percentage of .404 from last season (.405 this season). The supposed immense challenge of playing alongside Russell Westbrook was the excuse widely provided for the failure of the Carmelo Anthony experiment in Oklahoma City last season, even though last season just continued the steady downward statistical progression that Anthony has suffered for several seasons. This season in Houston would be different, we were sagely informed, because James Harden and Chris Paul would be willing and able to get the ball to Anthony where he can be most effective. Left out of that "analysis," however, was an answer to the obvious question: Where, exactly, is an over the hill, step slow, one dimensional gunner "most effective"?

This is just one illustration of the difference between Real Basketball Analytics and what often is portrayed as basketball analytics. If you have watched Anthony play throughout his career and if you understand basketball then you can see that even Anthony in his prime probably would not have been a great fit for Mike D'Antoni's offense that is predicated on the point guard monopolizing the ball and everyone else being ready to shoot when/if the point guard passes the ball; prime Anthony was at his best when he could go one on one but that is not an option for forwards in D'Antoni's offense.

What the Rockets need alongside Harden and Paul are rugged individual defenders who can make spot up three pointers and who are satisfied with Harden and Paul getting most of the shots, money and glory (Harden and Paul also need a big man who will set screens, rebound and be content to score 10-15 ppg on lob passes, a role more than ably filled by Clint Capela).

The Rockets have parted ways with Anthony but have not cut or traded him. Anthony is in some kind of humiliating basketball limbo as he and the Rockets try to find a way out of this mess that salvages his dignity and marketability. This reminds me of the story that Kenny Smith tells about his rookie year with the Sacramento Kings. Smith recalls that Coach Bill Russell said to sit next to him on the bus and not alongside some of the team's veterans because the veterans are losers. Smith asked Russell why he did not trade those players and Russell stated--loudly enough for the players to hear--that he had tried to trade them but no one wanted them. The Rockets would surely trade Anthony for a bag of potato chips and a copy of an "advanced basketball statistics" book by some "stat guru" but no one wants to give up anything for Anthony. It is not clear what, if any, market exists for Anthony as a free agent if the Rockets just waive him, which they probably will have to do at some point when they need that roster spot.

Anthony's minutes are now going to Gary Clark, a rookie free agent who is on a two-way contract. Yes, Anthony has been replaced by a minor league player--and the Rockets have gone 3-1 with Clark/sans Anthony, with double-digit wins against Indiana, Denver and Golden State. Anthony was not the only problem for Houston during the first 10 games--Chris Paul got suspended, James Harden missed three games due to injury and the Rockets' defense suffered as a result of the loss of free agents Trevor Ariza and Luc Mbah a Moute--but he was, predictably, a major problem and it was equally predictable that subtracting him from the lineup would add wins to the team's record.

In the NBA, skill set analysis matters, chemistry matters and coaching matters. Championship teams understand those factors and make decisions accordingly. Teams that do not take those factors into account may have some regular season success but will not advance to the NBA Finals, let alone win a championship.

Getting rid of Anthony was a necessary move for the Rockets but their organizational mindset and decision making process is not conducive to building a championship team. What was the point of the Rockets signing Anthony despite his flaws and limitations, then denying that they were going to cut him after just 10 games only to then issue a press release stating that they were going to "part ways" with Anthony and that the two sides are "working toward a resolution"? The Rockets do not look or act like a franchise poised to contend for a title.

It is also telling that the Rockets act as if the only reason that they did not win it all last year was Chris Paul's injury. The problems with that way of thinking are (1) it is predictable that Paul will get injured during the playoffs, (2) injuries are part of the game for all teams and (3) even without Paul the Rockets had halftime leads against Golden State in games six and seven only to fall apart and lose both times--which was also predictable given Houston's high variance style of play. On the rare occasions that the New England Patriots lose, Coach Bill Belichick does not offer excuses. He says that the team must do better in every area, starting with coaching. That kind of realistic self-assessment is never heard from the Rockets.

To cite just one more example of Houston's organizational miscues, Chris Paul is overpaid now relative to his size, frequent injuries and skill set but his contract is going to be an absolute disaster for the Rockets as he ages, gets injured more frequently and loses skills (particularly speed and quickness) for which he is not going to be able to compensate in other areas.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", Carmelo Anthony, Chris Paul, Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, James Harden

posted by David Friedman @ 1:11 AM

11 comments

Westbrook Saves Thunder With Historic Triple Double

Russell Westbrook just produced the highest scoring triple double in NBA history, pouring in 57 points as he led the Oklahoma City Thunder to a 114-106 overtime victory versus the Orlando Magic. The Thunder trailed by 21 points midway through the third quarter before mounting the biggest comeback in Oklahoma City history and thereby clinching a playoff berth in the first season of the team's post-Kevin Durant era.

Westbrook added 13 rebounds and 11 assists in his 38th triple double of the season; with eight games to go, Westbrook needs three triple doubles to tie Oscar Robertson's single season record. Westbrook is also on track to join Robertson as the only players to average a triple double for an entire season. The Thunder are 31-7 this season when Westbrook posts a triple double and 43-31 overall, which is another way of saying that Westbrook's supporting cast is so weak that his team needs him to put up historically great numbers every game just to have a chance to win--but when Westbrook does put up historically great numbers, the Thunder almost always win.

Westbrook scored 26 points in the fourth quarter and overtime, including 19 points in the final 7:45 of regulation--capped off when he grabbed a defensive rebound, dribbled up court and calmly sank a 31 foot three pointer over two defenders to send the game to overtime.

Such game-saving heroics are nothing new for Westbrook, who scored 13 points in the final three minutes on Monday night to rescue the Thunder versus the Dallas Mavericks. Westbrook is the antithesis of players who pad their numbers without affecting the outcome of the game; his tremendous statistical production actually changes the outcome of the game. Several players are performing at an MVP level in 2016-17 but Westbrook is authoring a historic season that would lead to a landslide MVP victory if anyone else posted such numbers.

By the end of the Thunder's victory over the Magic, the Orlando fans serenaded Westbrook with "MVP" chants. Of course, media members never fail to find ways to attack Westbrook; one game recap noted that Westbrook was "hardly flawless" before opining, "Defeat is inevitable if he goes it alone. The only way the Thunder can change their destiny is to change their approach to the game. That starts with Westbrook. If he's really the NBA MVP, let's see him make his teammates better when the games matter the most."

I predicted the publication of that kind of trash almost three years ago to the day when I wrote, "One player seems poised to fill both of (Kobe) Bryant's roles--best guard in the NBA and vastly underrated superstar: Russell Westbrook." Keep in mind that when I made that declaration, many "experts" questioned if Westbrook could even play the point guard position, let alone become the best guard in the league. Those same "experts" criticized Westbrook for supposedly not deferring enough to Kevin Durant but it now looks like perhaps the Thunder would have been better served if Durant had deferred to Westbrook in the clutch.

When crime strikes Gotham City, the Bat Signal alerts Batman to spring into action; is there a "Daft Signal" that alerts "stat gurus" and their media acolytes to spring into action when Kobe Bryant (in previous seasons) or Russell Westbrook has a great game? I mean, the nets were still figuratively scorching from Westbrook's 57 points and the first words that come to mind for some fool who is actually paid to cover NBA games is that Westbrook was "hardly flawless"?

If you watch a player drop 57-13-11 while almost single-handedly erasing a 21 point deficit and "hardly flawless" is the best description you can muster then you need to have your eyes checked, your brain examined and your game credentials revoked. Sure, everyone is entitled to his/her opinion but when you are being paid to accurately report/commentate and you are simply unwilling or incapable of performing that task at a minimally acceptable level then it is time to seek out another line of work.

On the other hand, here is an article that every MVP voter should be required to read: Sam Anderson's February 1, 2017 in depth profile titled The Misunderstood Genius of Russell Westbrook.

Here is Anderson's take on Westbrook's playing style:

Rebounding has always been one of Westbrook’s superpowers. He is athletic enough to leap through vast spaces, strong enough to bully people in close combat and, most important, persistent enough to get himself, with unholy urgency, to the places around the rim most likely to yield rebounds. I have seen Westbrook streak in from a distant corner of the floor to tip in a missed 3-pointer off the glass--a hurtling, perfectly timed run that looked almost like a center fielder's sprinting back to leap and steal a home run just as it cleared the wall.

That was the prelude to Anderson's account of Westbrook's 27 point, 17 rebound, 14 assist performance in Madison Square Garden versus the Knicks early in this season. Here are some more nuggets from Anderson about that contest:

Even with his triple-double secured, Westbrook would not stop rebounding. My favorite of the night was his 14th: he drove, drew three defenders, passed to a teammate for a wide-open jump shot and ended up deep out of bounds. Instead of just hanging out there, admiring his handiwork, Westbrook turned, tracked the shot with his eyes, saw that it was falling short and, at precisely the moment the ball hit the front of the rim, exploded into the air with shocking intensity. It did not look like a normal professional basketball player trying to get his hand on a ball to extend a possession late in the third quarter of the 19th game of the season. It looked like a man in the middle of a winner-takes-all dunk contest against the Devil himself to prevent the incineration of planet Earth. It looked as if Westbrook were insulted by the very concept of distance, and so he annihilated it, soaring and spearing the ball out of the air from between two waiting Knicks. Spike Lee, courtside, was standing to celebrate the initial missed shot, but when Westbrook came flying in to seize it, he clutched his head in exasperation and hopelessness and despair.

Westbrook does not possess Bryant's size or finely tuned footwork, nor is Westbrook's defense as good as Bryant's--but Westbrook has a similar competitive spirit, a similar work ethic and a similar ability to lift a limited team to solid playoff status. Westbrook has also demonstrated that he can perform at an All-NBA level for a perennial championship contender, as he did for the past six years when the Thunder advanced to the Western Conference Finals four times. I will say the same thing about Westbrook now that I did about Bryant circa 2006, when Bryant's critics loudly declared that he would never win a championship without Shaquille O'Neal: if Westbrook is provided with even a reasonably complete supporting cast, he is capable of leading his team to a championship.

Labels: "stat gurus", Kobe Bryant, Oklahoma City Thunder, Orlando Magic, Russell Westbrook

posted by David Friedman @ 1:17 AM

19 comments

The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part II

Charles Barkley recently made some very derogatory comments about the Golden State Warriors and he reiterated his contention that jump-shooting teams are not built to win championships. As the father of a wonderful young daughter, I echo Rachel Nichols' eloquent statement that "girlie" or "girl" should never be used as a synonym for, as she put it, something that is "weak" or "lame."

Moving past Barkley's ill-advised method of delivering his message, is there any truth to Barkley's assertion about jump-shooting teams purely from the standpoint of strategically analyzing basketball? I have discussed this subject a number of times in a variety of contexts. For instance, I wrote The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot for NBCSports.com nearly 10 years ago and then a few months after publication (during which time NBCSports.com was torn down and then rebuilt without maintaining links to prior content) I updated the article and posted it at 20 Second Timeout.

To best understand my take on the strengths and limitations of the three point shot as a basketball weapon, it would be helpful to provide some historical background, both in terms of the sport of basketball in general and also in terms of how my involvement in the sport as a recreational player informed my perspective about the three point shot.

Let's start with "advanced basketball statistics." Newer visitors to 20 Second Timeout--and perhaps even some of my veteran readers--may wonder why I refer to high profile advocates of "advanced basketball statistics" as "stat gurus." I borrowed that phrase from a line that Mike Lupica delivered a few times many years ago on the "Sports Reporters"; he would refer to someone who is supposed to be an expert at something as a "guru" and then he would say, "It is time for the guru to start 'guruing.'" I no longer recall who specifically Lupica was talking about but that wry sense of "OK, smart guy, it's about time that you actually prove that you know what you are doing" perfectly captures how I feel about many of the pompous analytics acolytes who act like they know more about basketball than people who have been playing and/or coaching the sport at the highest level for decades. Is there some value in trying to analyze the sport objectively? Of course there is but there should be a sense of humility and an understanding that the numbers don't capture everything about a sport that is played (and coached and officiated) by human beings, not robots.

Dean Oliver and Dan Rosenbaum are two of a handful of people whose basketball statistical work I respect--but far too many "stat gurus" are less concerned with objective truth than they are with making a name for themselves by proving that their pet theories are some kind of basketball gospel. Those self-serving, self-interested and self-satisfied "stat gurus" have had a pernicious effect on the way that the game is played, analyzed and discussed. Those "stat gurus" act like no one effectively utilized basketball statistics until they came along. I've got news for them: Dean Smith was using plus/minus back in the 1970s, if not earlier; Hubie Brown was hired by the Kentucky Colonels--who he led to the 1975 ABA title--because he impressed team management with his intricate understanding of basketball statistics and how those statistics can be used as tools to build a winning team.

"Advanced basketball statistics" are only as meaningful and relevant as (1) the box score numbers upon which they are based and (2) the accuracy of the formulas that are used to slice and dice those box score numbers. I have already demonstrated that assist statistics cannot be fully trusted, which means that any "advanced" formula that places a high value on assists will artificially inflate the value of players who accumulate many assists. There is good reason to question the accuracy/reliability of other box score numbers as well: subjectivity impacts the scoring of rebounds, steals, blocked shots and turnovers.

Hall of Famer/Top 50 player Rick Barry once told me that the only statistic he completely trusted was free throw percentage. Perhaps that seems self-serving of Barry because he owns one of the best career free throw percentages in pro basketball history but his point is that a player can inflate his field goal percentage by only shooting easy shots, rebounds can be padded by tips/taps that are not consistently recorded the same way and so forth. Then there is the reality--acknowledged by Rosenbaum but glossed over by many "stat gurus"--that "advanced basketball statistics" do not accurately measure individual defense. It should be obvious that subjective--but critically important--factors such as leadership, attitude and willingness/ability to play through injuries cannot be measured analytically at all. This is why I roll my eyes when a "stat guru" confidently declares that he can accurately rank every player in the NBA to the second decimal point of his proprietary "advance basketball statistic."

Many "stat gurus" assert that post play and the midrange game are inefficient, while the most efficient basketball shots are three pointers and free throws. The three point shot has evolved from a late game situational shot to a supplementary weapon to the mainstay of many teams' offenses. It should be remembered that even before "advanced basketball statistics" gained widespread influence, teams like the 1990s Houston Rockets and 1990s Orlando Magic utilized a "1 in, 4 out" offense featuring a dominant center surrounded by three point marksmen who punished opponents for double teaming the post. At that time, the three point shot was used to open up the game for the dominant post player but that dominant post player was still the focal point.

Teams that are run by--or at least influenced by--"stat gurus" deemphasize the value of the traditional big man in favor of deploying small lineups, shooting a lot of three pointers and (ideally) drawing a lot of fouls (typically via dribble penetration).

As for my personal involvement in the sport as a player, I have played rec league basketball since I was a kid in the 1970s. The strong suit of my game was always my jump shot (which really is not a traditional jump shot but some hybrid of Michael Cooper's set shot and Larry Bird's two hands behind his head delivery) but I spent my formative years playing without the three point shot. In 1987-88, the 19-9 three point shot was introduced into high school and college basketball. That wonderful arc soon appeared on the courts where I played both pickup ball and rec league ball. In the pickup games, we played to 12 by ones and twos. Under that scoring system, a good three point shooter is more valuable than a good post player; if I made even just 3 of 10 three pointers I scored six points, which is half the amount needed to win the game and a total that a post player could only match by shooting 60% from the field.

I really enjoyed playing 1 on 1 to 12 under that scoring system; I could hit six threes and take out a bigger, stronger opponent who was trying to wear me down one point at a time.

Of course, in league play when threes were not worth twice as much as twos, the math was not quite as favorable for a three point shooter but I did often mention to skeptical teammates that if I could make just one third of my three pointers I was as efficient as a post player who was making half of his shots in the paint. I was often the youngest participant in these games and the older guys who disdained long jumpers (and did not bother to do the simple math) got on my case for shooting so many three pointers. I told them rather bluntly that unless they were shooting 50% in the paint, then my three pointer was a higher percentage shot if I was connecting 33% of the time (and I probably was shooting closer to 40%), without even taking into account that the offensive team was more likely to rebound a long jumper than a missed shot in the paint. In addition, team defense is poorly organized in most rec leagues, so a smart and patient team can easily obtain wide open three point shots, particularly if the league does not use a shot clock.

So, from a young age I understood that in short games scored by ones and twos and in rec league games where post play was erratic and team defense was disorganized the three point shot was a very potent weapon.

Similarly, in the 40 minute college game featuring a short season followed by a one and done playoff system, it is possible to have a lot of success by constructing a good three point shooting team with well conditioned athletes who could beat the defense up and down the floor. Such teams generally play at a fast pace and thrive on shooting three pointers in transition. Rick Pitino has had success with this approach at multiple NCAA Division I schools and Paul Westhead enjoyed success both in NCAA Division I basketball and in the WNBA, where he led the Phoenix Mercury to the 2007 title. Westhead is the only coach to win a championship in both the WNBA and the NBA (1980 L.A. Lakers), though ironically Magic Johnson ran Westhead out of L.A. because Johnson felt that Westhead's offense at that time was too slow and methodical. However, NBA basketball consists of an 82 game regular season followed by four rounds of best of seven playoff series. Each regulation game lasts 48 minutes, not 40. Strategies that work in the college game are not necessarily applicable to the NBA game.

What does all of this have to do with Charles Barkley's comment about jump shooting teams? The NBA does not keep score by ones and twos and NBA defense is infinitely better than rec league defense. The notion that you can win big in the NBA just by shooting a large number of three pointers may make mathematical sense but it does not make real world sense. In that regard, there is some truth to what Barkley said. Take, for example, the Houston Rockets, who are now coached by Mike D'Antoni, whose Phoenix teams led the NBA in three point field goals made for three consecutive seasons (2005-07). The Rockets have a potent offense and are on pace to shatter many three point shooting records but they rank 22nd in defensive field goal percentage after finishing 19th in that category (under Kevin McHale and J.B. Bickerstaff) last season. That is a recipe for elimination early in the playoffs.

The nuance that Barkley is missing when he singles out the Warriors is that the Warriors differentiated themselves from other three-point happy teams (such as D'Antoni's Suns and Rockets) by playing organized, intense and effective defense. In their 2015 championship season, the Warriors led the league in defensive field goal percentage; they ranked third in that category last season and they currently rank second this season despite the loss of Andrew Bogut's rim protection.

Championship teams typically rank in the top five or 10 in defensive field goal percentage. The 2000-02 Shaquille O'Neal-Kobe Bryant Lakers are an interesting example. The Lakers led the league in defensive field goal percentage in 2000 and in 2002. In 2001 they slipped to 11th but still won the title. What happened? Unlike Bryant, O'Neal did not always fully exert himself during the regular season--but O'Neal was capable of playing championship level defense when he felt like it and after coasting through the 2001 regular season he ramped up his effort during the 2001 playoffs, when the Lakers ranked second in defensive field goal percentage. O'Neal decided to "heal on company time" during the 2002-03 season as the Lakers plummeted to 21st in defensive field goal percentage and this time O'Neal was not willing or able to turn it up in the playoffs: the Lakers ranked 15th out of 16 playoff teams in defensive field goal percentage and they lost in the second round to the eventual champion San Antonio Spurs, who ranked second in defensive field goal percentage during the 2003 playoffs and during the 2003 regular season.

In other words, instead of continually bashing the Warriors, Barkley should focus his attention on the Rockets: that is the jump shooting team that will never win a championship (as opposed to the Warriors, a jump shooting team that plays defense and has already won a championship).

There is an important point implied but not explicitly mentioned in Barkley's statement: the three point shot is a high variance shot, as I discussed in The Score, the Key Stat, the Bottom Line: A New 20 Second Timeout Feature, noting that three point field goal percentage can be a misleading statistic: if a player shoots 6-9 from three point range in one playoff game and 1-9 from three point range in the next playoff game that works out to a very good .389 3FG% but his team will likely lose the second game (and may not win the first game, either, if the team is deficient defensively and/or on the boards). In that article, I argued that Gilbert Arenas' three point field goal percentage did not justify his style of play and that a team was not likely to have much playoff success when led by a point guard who is indifferent defensively and who has poor shot selection--even if his overall shooting percentage is not bad, the high variance inherent in shooting a lot of shots from three point range (many of which were bad shots, even if they sometimes connected) is a recipe for disaster for that point guard and his team.

James Harden is similar to Arenas in many ways, though Harden is a better and more consistent player than Arenas was. My prediction for a Harden-led team is the same as my accurate prediction regarding an Arenas-led team: I would be surprised if such a team advances past the second round of the playoffs.

The Rockets' organization has been led for nearly a decade by Daryl Morey, who has been widely praised in the mainstream media as a visionary despite the fact that during his first eight years in Houston the Rockets missed the playoffs three times and only won three playoff series. Last season, the Rockets barely qualified for the playoffs but instead of revising their offense happy/defense optional approach Morey doubled down by hiring D'Antoni. The Rockets might win 50 games this season, as some of D'Antoni's Phoenix teams did. Harden might win the MVP over more deserving players, as D'Antoni's Phoenix point guard Steve Nash did twice. However, it will be surprising if the Rockets advance very far in the playoffs, barring a defensive turnaround similar to the 2001 Lakers (which is highly improbable, to say the least).

Successful NBA teams have judiciously incorporated "advanced basketball statistics" into their programs but teams (like Houston) that have gone all in have not reached the highest level. This is a valid point that Barkley could (and should) make during TNT telecasts.

The Philadelphia 76ers are the poster children for a "stat guru" run amuck or, as I put it a couple years ago, The 76ers Are the Waterloo for "Stat Gurus." Sam Hinkie, a protege of Morey's, instituted an infamous "process" in Philadelphia that came close to ruining a once storied franchise. Hinkie's media buddies still try to paint him as some kind of visionary but he actually is the 21st century Ted Stepien with a much better sense of public relations. In the early 1980s, Ted Stepien tore down the Cleveland Cavaliers to the point that the league had to essentially wrest control of the franchise from him, which is what happened (in a more subtle way) to Hinkie as well. It took Wayne Embry years to undo the damage that Stepien did and by the time Embry turned the Cavaliers into contenders there were no traces left of Stepien's handiwork; it will similarly take years for Bryan Colangelo to salvage the 76ers and by the time they become good again Hinkie's "process" will be a distant, dark memory.

Since the "process" began, the 76ers have never had a winning percentage above .250 and, despite some recent misguided media hype about Hinkie being vindicated, they are currently 5-18 (.217 winning percentage).

One of the many aspects of pro sports that Hinkie fails to understand is that a loser's mentality is contagious and must be purged from an organization if that organization is going to enjoy any success. You cannot turn your franchise into a perennial loser, stockpile some talent and then suddenly become a championship team; the Cleveland Browns' front office has been infiltrated with Hinkie-like thinking and they have turned the Browns into a de facto expansion team on par with the ultimate NFL laughingstock, the 1976 Tampa Bay Buccaneers.

When Mike Ditka was hired as the head coach of the Chicago Bears in 1982, he told his players that he had good news and bad news: the good news was that the Bears would win the Super Bowl within three years but the bad news was that many of them would no longer be on the team by that time. Both predictions came true. No "advanced basketball statistic" blueprint takes the place of a basic understanding of how to build a team that has a championship mindset and championship habits, two traits that are missing in both Houston and Philadelphia.

So, there is some truth to what Barkley said but--because he failed to articulate his message clearly and because he used some unfortunate language that overshadowed his larger point--it is easy to dismiss him as an old school curmudgeon. It is true that teams that rely on jump shooting and do not play excellent defense will not win a championship--but it is not correct to lump the Warriors into a category that should be headlined by the Rockets.

Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot

Most Three Pointers Made

Year/League...Team...3 FGM...Player (team)...3 FGM

1967-68/ABA..Pittsburgh..243..Les Selvage (Anaheim)..147
1968-69/ABA..Kentucky..335..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..199
1969-70/ABA..Kentucky..330..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..198
1970-71/ABA..Indiana..306..George Lehmann (Carolina)..154
1971-72/ABA..Indiana..220..Glen Combs (Utah)..103
1972-73/ABA..Indiana..172..Bill Keller (Indiana)..71
1973-74/ABA..San Diego..216..Bo Lamar (San Diego)..69
1974-75/ABA..Indiana..224..Bill Keller (Indiana)..80
1975-76/ABA..Indiana..250..Bill Keller (Indiana)..123

1979-80/NBA..San Diego..177..Brian Taylor (San Diego)..90
1980-81/NBA..San Diego..132..Mike Bratz (Cleveland)..57
1981-82/NBA..Indiana..103..Don Buse (Indiana)..73
1982-83/NBA..San Antonio..94..Mike Dunleavy (San Antonio)..67
1983-84/NBA..Utah..101..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..91
1984-85/NBA..Dallas..152..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..92
1985-86/NBA..Dallas..141..Larry Bird (Boston)..82
1986-87/NBA..Dallas..231..Larry Bird (Boston)..90
1987-88/NBA..Boston..271..Danny Ainge (Boston)..148
1988-89/NBA..New York..386..Michael Adams (Denver)..166
1989-90/NBA..Cleveland...346..Michael Adams (Denver)..158
1990-91/NBA..Portland..341..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..172
1991-92/NBA..Milwaukee..371..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..162
1992-93/NBA..Phoenix..398..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)/Reggie Miller (Indiana)..167
1993-94/NBA..Houston..429..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)..192
1994-95/NBA*..Houston..646..John Starks (New York)..217
1995-96/NBA*..Dallas..735..Dennis Scott (Orlando)..267
1996-97/NBA*..Miami..678..Reggie Miller (Indiana)..229
1997-98/NBA..Seattle..621..Wesley Person (Cleveland)..192
1998-99/NBA^..Houston..336..Dee Brown (Toronto)..135
1999-00/NBA..Indiana..583..Gary Payton (Seattle)..177
2000-01/NBA..Boston..592..Antoine Walker (Boston)..221
2001-02/NBA..Boston..699..Ray Allen (Milwaukee)..229
2002-03/NBA..Boston..719..Ray Allen (Milwaukee-Seattle)..201
2003-04/NBA..Seattle..723..Peja Stojakovic (Sacramento)..240
2004-05/NBA..Phoenix..796..Kyle Korver (Philadelphia)/Jason Richardson (Phoenix)..226
2005-06/NBA..Phoenix..837..Ray Allen (Seattle)..269
2006-07/NBA..Phoenix..785..Arenas (Washington)/Bell (Phoenix)..205
2007-08/NBA..Orlando..801..Jason Richardson (Charlotte)..243
2008-09/NBA..New York..823..Rashard Lewis (Orlando)..220
2009-10/NBA..Orlando..841..Aaron Brooks (Houston)..209
2010-11/NBA..Orlando..770..Dorell Wright (Golden State)..194
2011-12/NBA^^..Orlando..670..Ryan Anderson (Orlando)..166
2012-13/NBA..New York..891..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..272
2013-14/NBA..Houston..779..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..261
2014-15/NBA..Houston..933..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..286
2015-16/NBA..Golden State..1077..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..402

* The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (prior to and subsequent to these three seasons the three point arc was 22 feet in the corners and 23 feet nine inches elsewhere).

^ Season shortened to 50 games by a lockout.

^^ Season shortened to 66 games by a lockout.

Bold indicates an ABA/NBA record.

Labels: "stat gurus", Charles Barkley, Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, James Harden, Kobe Bryant, L.A. Lakers, Mike D'Antoni, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, Shaquille O'Neal, three point shot

posted by David Friedman @ 3:21 PM

41 comments

"Stat Gurus" Learn Value of the Eye Test

The idea of using "advanced statistics" to better understand a sport and to more accurately evaluate teams and players has its roots in baseball. Bill James and other pioneers came up with numbers and interpretations that went well beyond the box score. There is certainly a place for that kind of creative thinking. However, the "eye test"--firsthand evaluations made by qualified observers--cannot be replaced by just looking at numbers. "Stat gurus" are often quick to dismiss the "eye test" as subjective and outmoded while at the same time ignoring the inherent limitations of their preferred methodologies.

Baseball "stat gurus" are particularly proud of some of the defensive metrics that they have developed. A recent Wall Street Journal article by Andrew Beaton and Michael Salfino termed the quest for accurate defensive numbers "nothing less than the holy grail of baseball statistics." For a while, the "stat gurus" thought that they had solved this problem but now it turns out that some of the much ballyhooed "advanced" defensive statistics are not all that they were cracked up to be, particularly since teams employ defensive shifts so often that it is difficult to precisely determine how much credit a player should receive for a particular defensive play. Beaton and Salfino note that defensive shifts make "it almost impossible to assign proper credit for a great defensive play: Did a player make a play because he has incredible range, or because prescient scouting had him stationed in that area?" Beaton and Salfino conclude, "The result is something that no one would have predicted: Eyeball scouting may be more necessary than ever."

It is obvious that it is important to gather as much useful data as possible and to figure out the best way to interpret that data--but raw numbers (and even "advanced" statistics) cannot take the place of the informed eye. It is like the difference between looking at Cliffs Notes and actually studying the course material; the Cliffs Notes may tell you where to look in a general sense but they do not replace the methodical, step by step learning process. An "advanced" statistic may suggest that a certain baseball player has great defensive range or that a certain basketball player is offensively efficient but it is still essential to watch that baseball player or basketball player in action to place those numbers in context.

Basketball is an inherently more difficult sport to quantify than baseball because basketball involves 10 players moving around at once while baseball is a series of discrete actions. The fact that baseball "stat gurus" are realizing that some of their "advanced" numbers are of limited value should give pause to anyone who blindly relies on "advanced" basketball statistics, particularly regarding defense. If defensive range is hard to quantify in baseball, then it is logical to assume that it is even more difficult to quantify individual defense in basketball; a perimeter player could be horrible defensively and yet his "advanced" numbers may not look bad if he is surrounded by teammates who cover up for his mistakes.

Labels: "advanced basketball statistics", "stat gurus", eye test

posted by David Friedman @ 10:10 AM

7 comments