20 Second Timeout

Lenny Wilkens' Remarkable Legacy as Player, Player-Coach, and Coach

Lenny Wilkens, the only person who earned recognition as both one of the NBA's 50 greatest players and one of the NBA's 10 greatest coaches, passed away yesterday at the age of 88. He coached the Seattle SuperSonics to the 1979 NBA title, and he ranks third all-time on the NBA's regular season wins list with 1332, trailing only Gregg Popovich (1390) and Don Nelson (1335). Wilkens became the all-time wins leader in 1994 after he surpassed Red Auerbach, who had held the record (938) since the 1960s. Wilkens was the NBA's all-time wins leader from 1994-2010, when Nelson broke his record. Wilkens won the NBA's Coach of the Year award in 1994, and he finished in the top five in seven other seasons (1971-72, 1978-80, 1989, 1992). He led five different franchises to at least one playoff appearance (Seattle, Cleveland, Atlanta, Toronto, New York), winning at least 50 games in a season nine times with three different teams (Seattle, Cleveland, Atlanta).

Wilkens' coaching career was so long and successful that it is easy to forget how great he was as a player. He excelled at Providence, twice leading the Friars to the NIT during an era when the NIT was much more prestigious than it is now. Wilkens won the 1960 NIT MVP even though Providence lost to Bradley in the championship game. The St. Louis Hawks selected him sixth overall in the 1960 NBA Draft. As a rookie, Wilkens ranked fourth on the team in scoring (11.7 ppg) and fifth in assists (2.8 apg) as the Hawks reached the NBA Finals for the second year in a row and third time in four seasons. The Celtics defeated the Hawks 4-1 to claim their third straight NBA title en route to winning a record eight consecutive NBA championships and 11 championships in Bill Russell's 13 season career.

Wilkens averaged 18.2 ppg and 5.8 apg in his second season, but military service limited him to playing in just 20 games. In 1962-63, his third NBA season, Wilkens earned the first of three straight All-Star selections. Wilkens also made the All-Star team as a Hawk in 1967 and 1968, when he finished second in regular season MVP voting behind Wilt Chamberlain despite not making the All-NBA Team, which featured Oscar Robertson and Dave Bing on the First Team with Jerry West and Hal Greer earning Second Team honors.

On October 12, 1968, the Hawks traded Wilkens to Seattle for Walt Hazzard. Wilkens made the All-Star team in each of his first three seasons with Seattle while ranking second in the league in assists in 1969 (674; league rankings were then determined by totals and not averages, but he also ranked second with 8.2 apg). He led the league in assists in 1970 (683, with a 9.1 apg average that was nearly a full assist per game ahead of Walt Frazier). Wilkens ranked second in assists in 1971 (9.2 apg), the first season when rankings were determined by averages and not totals. He won the 1971 NBA All-Star Game MVP after scoring a game-high 21 points on 8-11 field goal shooting while leading the Western Conference to a 108-107 win over the Eastern Conference back when the All-Star Game was competitive. Wilkens ranked second in the league in assists in 1972 with a career-high 9.6 apg.

Wilkens began his coaching career by serving as Seattle's player-coach from 1970-72. The SuperSonics, a 1967-68 expansion team, won 30 games before acquiring Wilkens, and then won 36, 38, and 47 games during his three seasons as player-coach. Prior to the 1972-73 season, Seattle traded Wilkens and Barry Clemens to the Cleveland Cavaliers for Butch Beard. Seattle plummeted to 26 wins after Tom Nissalke and then Bucky Buckwalter replaced Wilkens as coach.

In his first season with Cleveland, Wilkens earned his ninth and final All-Star selection while averaging 20.5 ppg (the third best scoring average of his career) and 8.4 apg (again ranking second in the league). He also served as a great mentor for Austin Carr, who told me, "Lenny was very instrumental in me becoming a better guard. I was more of a shooting machine when I was in college. I had to learn how to conserve my energy because I had to play a lot of minutes. At the same time, I had to learn how to get the other four guys involved, because I was so used to everything coming to me. Lenny taught me a lot about how to make passes. I had a problem making backdoor passes and Lenny taught me how to do that and when to do it--little things like if I am going to pass the ball but don't quite have the angle, always pass the ball at the guy's head or at his ear, because he has to react to that. That gives you just enough time to get the pass through. I learned those kinds of little things from Lenny that really helped me throughout the rest of my career. Once I started having injuries, I had to start using my mind to stay successful because I lost a step. Once you lose a step in this game, you are in trouble."

Portland acquired Wilkens' rights prior to the 1974-75 season, and he finished his playing career as a player-coach for one year in Portland, averaging 6.5 ppg and 3.6 apg while guiding the squad to a 38-44 record, the best in the franchise's five year history up to that point. Rookie Bill Walton, who would later lead Portland to the 1977 NBA title, played in just 35 games. The 37 year old Wilkens retired as a player and spent one more year as Portland's coach, leading the Trail Blazers to a 37-45 record in 1975-76.

Seattle started the 1977-78 season 5-17 before hiring Wilkens to replace Coach Bob Hopkins. Wilkens led Seattle to a 42-18 record the rest of the way, and the SuperSonics reached the NBA Finals for the first time before losing 4-3 to the Washington Bullets in the NBA Finals. In 1978-79, Wilkens led Seattle to the best record in the Western Conference (52-30) and the second best overall record, trailing only the defending champion Bullets (54-28). In the first NBA Finals rematch since L.A.-New York in 1973, the SuperSonics defeated the Bullets 4-1. Dennis Johnson won the 1979 NBA Finals MVP, while Gus Williams scored a series-high 29.0 ppg on .500 field goal shooting. Williams scored at least 30 points in three of the five Finals games, including a series-high 36 in Seattle's 114-112 game four win.

Jack Sikma played a key role for those strong Seattle teams. I interviewed Wilkens during the 2008 NBA All-Star weekend, and he described Sikma's impact: "Jack never shied away. He stepped up. That is why we drafted him. We felt that he was a guy who could contribute and who would be consistent and when I took over as the coach of the Sonics I started him. He had been coming off of the bench. He made free throws at crucial times and was always in the game. When you have success early in your career it makes you that much more confident."

Paul Silas, who had previously been a key player for Boston's championship teams in 1974 and 1976, provided defense, rebounding, and veteran savvy for Seattle. Wilkens told me how important Silas was for young Sikma's development: "Paul was aggressive and he could play. Any time that I thought that another veteran team was trying to take advantage of Jack, I'd insert Paul. He was a wise veteran; he knew what to do and how to do it. That helped give Jack a reprieve, a chance to catch his breath before he had to go back in the game. In practice, Paul would go against Jack. I would match them up because I wanted Jack to learn from one of the best. Paul was huge in that respect."

Wilkens coached Seattle until the end of the 1984-85 season, and then he moved back to Cleveland, where he had enjoyed success as a player late in his career. Wilkens coached the Cavaliers from 1986-1993, highlighted by 57 win seasons in 1988-89 and 1991-92. In the latter season, the Cavaliers reached the Eastern Conference Finals for just the second time in franchise history before falling 4-2 to the Chicago Bulls, who then won the second of their sixth NBA titles in the 1990s. Brad Daugherty made the All-Star team five times with Wilkens coaching him in Cleveland, and Mark Price earned three All-Star selections plus three All-NBA Team selections during those years (Price earned his final All-Star selection and final All-NBA Team selection in 1993-94 after Mike Fratello replaced Wilkens).

Wilkens coached the Atlanta Hawks to a 57-25 record in 1993-94, tied with the New York Knicks for first in the Eastern Conference and tied with the 1986-87 Hawks for the best regular season record in franchise history; that mark stood until the 2014-15 Hawks went 60-22. Wilkens led the Hawks to the second round of the playoffs four times in seven years after the Hawks advanced that far just three times in the previous 13 seasons.

Wilkens' coaching career concluded with two playoff appearances in three seasons in Toronto, and one playoff berth in two seasons in New York.

In addition to his NBA coaching career, Wilkens was an assistant coach for Chuck Daly with the legendary Olympic gold medal winning 1992 Dream Team, and he was the head coach for Team USA’s 1996 gold medal winning squad.

Wilkens is one of five people inducted in the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame as a player (1989) and as a coach (1998); the others on this special list are John Wooden (1960, 1973), Bill Sharman (1976, 2004), Tommy Heinsohn (1986, 2015), and Bill Russell (1975, 2021). Other honors that Wilkens received include being inducted in the FIBA Hall of Fame, the U.S. Olympic Hall of Fame, the College Basketball Hall of Fame, and the Providence Hall of Fame. He also appears on the Cleveland Cavaliers' Wall of Honor.

After hearing that Wilkens passed away, Indiana coach Rick Carlisle said, "I ended up following [Wilkens] as president [of the National Basketball Coaches Association]. He did a lot of things to further the profession; the pension, benefits, coaching salaries rose significantly during his time. He was a great representative to the league office, advocating for coaches and the things that coaches experience that a lot of people didn't know about. Lenny was a great communicator with things like that. The thing that I'll always remember, he was such a great gentleman, and such an eloquent human being, along with being a super competitive coach. He is still way up there in all-time victories. Very, very special man. He'll be missed, but he'll be remembered." 

There have been greater players than Wilkens, and greater coaches, but no one matches Wilkens' combined resumes as both an elite player and an elite coach. As Carlisle noted, Wilkens had a very positive impact on the sport because of the effective way that he communicated with players, fellow coaches, and the league office. 

Labels: Atlanta Hawks, Brad Daugherty, Cleveland Cavaliers, Dennis Johnson, Gus Williams, Jack Sikma, Lenny Wilkens, Mark Price, Paul Silas, Portland Trail Blazers, Seattle Supersonics, St. Louis Hawks

posted by David Friedman @ 2:36 PM

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Paul Silas Excelled as a College Player, as an NBA Player, and as an NBA Coach

Paul Silas, who made significant contributions as a college basketball player, as an NBA player, and as an NBA coach, passed away today at the age of 79. Silas is a member of the College Basketball Hall of Fame, and he is one of a handful of players who averaged at least 20 ppg and at least 20 rpg in a Division I career; that group includes Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Famers Bill Russell, Julius Erving, and Artis Gilmore. 

During his 16 season NBA playing career, Silas earned two All-Star selections (1972, 1975), and he made the All-Defensive Team five times, including two First Team selections (1975, 1976). Silas ranked in the top 10 in rebounding four times, and he led the NBA in offensive rebounds (365) in the 1975-76 season. He played all 82 games in six seasons, and he played at least 80 games in each of his final 10 seasons! I rarely use exclamation points, but those durability statistics deserve emphasis, because "load management" was a foreign concept to Silas, and to many other players from his era who took pride in playing in as many games as possible: those players tried to figure out how to stay on the court as opposed to looking for excuses to justify not playing.

Silas played an important role on three championship teams, including the first two Boston championships of the post-Bill Russell era (1974, 1976), and the only championship in Seattle SuperSonics/Oklahoma City Thunder franchise history (1979). 

Near the end of his playing career, Silas called coaching "The toughest job I've ever come in contact with," and he stated that he did not want or expect to become a coach. Silas also explained his philosophy about competition: "What separates the winners from the losers is your mental attitude. Except for a very few, like Jabbar, we're all on the same keel. The only thing I care about is winning and what my players feel about me. You see, winning takes care of everything. To win, you have to die to win. That's barring nothing. Whatever it takes." 

Silas' aversion to coaching proved to be short-lived. He retired as a player after the 1979-80 season, and he coached the San Diego Clippers to a 36-46 record in the 1980-81 season. The Clippers have had good teams for the past decade, so younger fans may not remember or know that the Clippers did not make the playoffs from 1977-91; the franchise's problems could not be blamed on a particular coach. Unfortunately for Silas, his losing record during a three year stint with the Clippers may have made it difficult for him to get his next head coaching job. From 1986-99, Silas served as an assistant coach for several NBA teams (New Jersey Nets, New York Knicks, Phoenix Suns, Charlotte Hornets). 

Silas became the Hornets' coach during the lockout-shortened 1999 season. The Hornets missed the playoffs in 1999, but they made the playoffs in each of the next four seasons. Silas was fired after the 2002-03 campaign despite the team's 47-35 record. The Hornets did not match that win total until 2007-08, which was also the next time the team made the playoffs.

The Cleveland Cavaliers hired Silas prior to the 2003-04 season, and he was LeBron James' first NBA head coach. The Cavaliers went 35-47 during James' rookie season, and they had a 34-30 record in James' second season when new owner Dan Gilbert fired Silas. The Cavaliers went 8-10 down the stretch with Brendan Malone serving as the interim head coach.

Silas' coaching career did not end on a high note--he returned to Charlotte during the 2010-11 season, but was fired after Charlotte posted the worst winning percentage in NBA history (.106) in the lockout-shortened 2011-12 season. Charlotte's top three scorers were Gerald Henderson (15.1 ppg), Corey Maggette (15.0 ppg), and rookie Kemba Walker (12.1 ppg). With all due respect to those players, that is not a trio capable of leading an NBA team very far, and it is not surprising that with that talent level the team ranked 30th (last) in scoring and 27th in points allowed. 

Silas was well-respected as a coach, and he was a better coach than his record might suggest, because his record is more of a reflection of the talent level and overall organization stability that he dealt with as opposed to any deficiencies as a motivator or strategist. Silas was known for his intelligence and leadership as a player, and he did not lose those skills when he became a coach.

Silas is one of the first coaches who I interviewed during the period when I regularly covered NBA games as a credentialed reporter. He was Cleveland's coach at that time, and I was neither a Cleveland beat reporter nor a well-known national media member, but the first time I reached out to the Cavaliers to set up a one on one interview he welcomed me into his office, and he was very gracious with his time and with the information that he provided.

I incorporated Silas' insights into several of the feature articles and player profiles that I wrote in the early 2000s. For example, Silas played against future Hall of Famer Bob Dandridge in the NBA Finals in 1978 and 1979. Here is Silas' analysis of Dandridge's game:

He was a great shooter, especially mid-range, and he could get his shot off on almost anybody. He really understood how to play. When they needed a hoop--even when he was playing with Milwaukee and Oscar and those guys--he shined. Of course, with Washington he was one of the focal points of that team. He just had the uncanny ability of making big shots at the right time. He talked the game and understood it and imparted that (to his teammates). He was very, very smart about the game and how he fit within the scheme and how he wanted everybody else to fit.

That interview is very memorable for me, because it helped me understand why so many articles include incorrect quotations and false information; when I first asked Silas to describe Dandridge, Silas said that Dandridge was "a talker." I am a generation younger than Silas, and I could have just ran with the notion that Dandridge was a trash talker, which would be a natural way to understand what Silas said--but I had done my research about Dandridge, and I was under the impression that Dandridge was very soft-spoken. Something did not add up, so I asked a follow up question to clarify what Silas meant by "talker." The above quote explaining that Dandridge "talked the game and understood it and imparted that (to his teammates)" only came about because (1) I asked the follow up question and (2) Silas was a patient interview subject who was happy to provide more details. Unfortunately, it is very easy to find examples of interviews that went downhill because of the interviewer's lack of knowledge/lack of skill combined with the interview subject's lack of patience. I have also seen examples of reporters deliberately asking a slanted question to a player, and then literally running to the opposing team's locker room to tell another player "Player X said this" without mentioning that Player X did not say that out of the blue but rather in response to a specific question.

Interviews should be about sharing information and spreading knowledge. That is how I have always approached interviews, and Silas was one of my favorite interview subjects.

Perhaps the most special exchange that I had with Silas was when we talked about the 1972 NBA-ABA All-Star Game. Silas played for the NBA in that legendary contest, and he shared with me his recollections of the most famous play from that game: Julius Erving's free throw line dunk (yes, Erving dunked from the free throw line not only in dunk contests, but--at least once--in an actual game). I am forever grateful to Silas, Erving, and Mel Daniels for sharing with me their memories of that spectacular sequence:

Silas will never forget a particular fourth quarter play from the 1972 game: "The one defining moment was, I had the ball and Doc stole the ball from me and went down and slammed this thing harder than I had ever seen anybody slam the ball in my life." Prior to the game Silas knew little about Erving: "Zelmo Beaty, who I had played with in St. Louis and Atlanta, had jumped leagues and when I saw him he was telling me about Doc--that he wasn't a good shooter but he just went by everybody. He just took up the slack, penetrated around and dunked on everybody. And I'm wondering how that happened. How could it happen? He developed a consistent shot, but it took time for him to do that. He was special."

Daniels had seen some great dunks before, including one by Hawkins over Daniels' Minnesota Muskies' teammate Sam Smith in the 1968 ABA playoffs, but nothing quite like Erving's flight in the 1972 Supergame: "He leapt from behind the free throw line, hung in the air for two or three seconds it seemed and dunked it. It was an absolutely amazing dunk and you had to see it to really appreciate it. Telling you about it does not do it the justice it deserves."

Erving recalls, "I stole the ball and got Oscar Robertson and Archie Clark caught back on defense and Archie went for the steal, which made me pick the ball up. I was around the top of the key, coming in transition…I took a step and a half and went airborne from somewhere around the foul line, just inside the foul line. I noticed Oscar Robertson was there and just looking at me like, 'What does this kid think he is going to do?' He figured that I was going to come out of the air before I made it to the basket, but I got all the way to the basket and I dunked the ball and the ball bounced up into his hands and there was a certain expression on his face at the time--as well as Archie's--almost like it was a moment. And I just ran back downcourt, but later on a lot of people talked about that play."

In many ways Erving's dunk symbolizes the ABA and the Supergames in one spectacular athletic flourish--it was amazing and yet no footage of it exists. Fortunately, Erving's free throw line dunk to win the 1976 ABA Slam Dunk contest was captured for posterity.

Silas' name often came up when I interviewed other players and coaches, and it was very obvious that Silas was highly respected around the league. Jack Sikma told me how much Silas helped him when Sikma was a young player and Silas was a savvy veteran: 

"Paul had a great effect helping me to become successful, both on the court and off of it--his approach to the game, how tough you have to be, how relentless you have to be, how focused you have to be," Sikma remembers. "Not just Paul, but the other veterans on the team kind of saw what could maybe happen (with my game) and were always encouraging me--but also challenging me. We always practiced really hard. We were a bunch of young guys trying to get it together. During those practice sessions I got a lot of input from Paul Silas, both verbally and physically"--Sikma chuckles as he says this--"about how to play the game. John Johnson, Fred Brown, Dennis Awtrey--all the guys who had been in the league for awhile--were really helpful and encouraging and challenged us every day."

One of my earliest memories about Silas is a statement of his that I read about when I was a kid. Silas' 1972-73 Boston Celtics went 68-14--including 32-8 on the road (the team played 39 home games, 40 road games, and three games on a neutral court)--and Silas talked about how the best sound that a road team hears is silence as the home fans leave after watching their team lose. Silas relished going into opposing arenas and figuring out how to win, and that tenacity is one reason why his teammates loved him and his opponents respected him. True competitors want to face the best opposition under the most trying circumstances--and then prevail, because that is the best way to measure who you are.

Rest in peace, road warrior/respected teammate Paul Silas.

Labels: Bobby Dandridge, Boston Celtics, Cleveland Cavaliers, Jack Sikma, Julius Erving, LeBron James, Mel Daniels, Paul Silas, Seattle Supersonics

posted by David Friedman @ 11:30 PM

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How Many NCAA Division I Players Have Career Averages of at Least 20 PPG and at Least 20 RPG?

One would think that the title question could be answered by consulting the Official NCAA Records Book. However, different answers are provided in different editions, without an explanation for the changes.

On page nine of the Official 1993 NCAA Basketball book, under "General" there is a list of six Division I players who averaged at least 20 ppg and at least 20 rpg during their varsity careers:

Walt Dukes, Seton Hall, 1952-53 (23.5 points and 21.1 rebounds)

Bill Russell, San Francisco, 1954-56 (20.7 points and 20.3 rebounds)

Paul Silas, Creighton, 1962-64 (20.5 points and 21.6 rebounds)

Julius Erving, Massachusetts, 1970-71 (26.3 points and 20.2 rebounds)

Artis Gilmore, Jacksonville, 1970-71 (24.3 points and 22.7 rebounds)

Kermit Washington, American, 1971-73 (20.1 points and 20.2 rebounds)

The introductory material in this book notes that Division I individual rebound statistics have been tracked since 1950-51, and that freshmen became eligible for varsity play starting in 1973 (which is one reason why none of the players listed above had four year Division I careers; also, Erving played two years at the varsity level before signing with the Virginia Squires, while Gilmore played two years of junior college ball before transferring to Jacksonville).

On page 9 of the Official 1998 NCAA Men's Basketball Records Book, under "General" there is a list of the Division I players who averaged at least 20 ppg and at least 20 rpg during their varsity careers. Walter Dukes' name is missing (most sources give his first name as Walter, not Walt), while the other five players and their statistics are listed the same way that they are listed above. The introductory material regarding individual rebound statistics and varsity play is unchanged. Both books list Dukes as the record holder for total single season rebounds (734 in 1953).

NCAA Basketball's Finest, an official NCAA book from 1991, lists Dukes as a participant in two varsity seasons at Seton Hall, with the same scoring and rebounding averages displayed above. However, research from other sources indicates that Dukes had a three year varsity career (1951-53), and that over that three year span he did not maintain a 20-20 career average. Is the answer that simple, namely that the authors of the 1993 record book were not aware that Walter Dukes, one of the premier college players of his era, played three varsity seasons? It is odd that the NCAA would list Dukes as a record holder, and then just remove his name without any explanation. I do not have a complete collection of NCAA record books, so perhaps an explanation was provided in an edition that I do not have.

Labels: Artis Gilmore, Bill Russell, Julius Erving, Kermit Washington, Paul Silas, Walter Dukes

posted by David Friedman @ 8:37 PM

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Tommy Heinsohn Explains the "Secret Weapon" That Helped the Celtics Win so Many Championships

Tommy Heinsohn won eight championships as a player for the Boston Celtics before leading the franchise to two titles as head coach. He is one of just four people--John Wooden, Bill Sharman and Lenny Wilkens are the others--enshrined in the Basketball Hall of Fame as both a player and a coach. During his September 2015 speech after being enshrined in the Basketball Hall of Fame as a coach, Heinsohn provided some insights about why the Boston Celtics were so successful for so long. It all started with Red Auerbach, who built the Celtics into a powerhouse in the 1950s and 1960s.


Heinsohn has worked as a broadcaster for decades now and he says that when he meets with coaches before games they will often say that they want to push the pace but Heinsohn believes that most coaches do not understand what that means. Heinsohn is appalled when he sees a big guy retrieve the ball after a made basket and walk out of bounds to pass the ball into play; he trained all of his players--even his big guys--to be able to bring the ball up the court and initiate the offense. The point was to get the ball in play and up the court as fast as possible before the defense can get set.

Heinsohn admits that when he became a coach he did not see a reason to deviate much from Auerbach's approach. The Boston teams that Heinsohn coached were small but they were tough, they rebounded ferociously and they ran the court relentlessly. His 1972-73 team went 68-14 in the regular season featuring a lineup of 6-9 center Dave Cowens, 6-7 power forward Paul Silas, 6-5 small forward John Havlicek, 6-5 shooting guard Don Chaney and 6-3 point guard Jo Jo White. The undersized Celtics led the league in rebounding and might have won the championship if Havlicek had not injured his shoulder during the playoffs. In 1973-74, that same group posted a 56-26 record (second best in the NBA), led the league in rebounding and beat the 59-23 Milwaukee Bucks in seven games to win the Celtics' first championship of the post-Bill Russell era. The 1974-75 Celtics tied with the Washington Bullets for the best record in the NBA (60-22), finished second in the league in rebounding and lost to the Bullets in the Eastern Conference Finals. In 1975-76, the Celtics replaced Chaney with Charlie Scott, a 6-5 shooting guard who won the 1972 ABA scoring championship (34.6 ppg) before making the All-Star team three years in a row as a Phoenix Sun. The Celtics went 54-28--the second best record in the NBA behind only the defending champion Golden State Warriors--and led the league in rebounding en route to claiming their second title in three years.

The Golden State Warriors who won last year's NBA title and who are running roughshod over the league so far this season are not doing much that is new and they certainly are not in any way vindicating either "analytics" (an example of the result of blindly following "analytics" can be found in Philadelphia) or Mike D'Antoni (whose teams did not focus enough on defense and rebounding). It does not take fancy calculations and an M.B.A. to figure out how to build a winning basketball team. Red Auerbach proved that more than 50 years ago, Tommy Heinsohn reaffirmed this in the 1970s and Heinsohn's Hall of Fame speech is a nice, brief tutorial for anyone who did not know or who needed a refresher course.

Labels: Boston Celtics, Charlie Scott, Dave Cowens, Don Chaney, Jo Jo White, John Havlicek, Paul Silas, Tommy Heinsohn

posted by David Friedman @ 4:09 PM

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Wayback Machine, Part VI: The 1980 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball

Dennis Johnson made his name--and earned his way to the Basketball Hall of Fame--primarily because of his suffocating defense but the front cover photo of the 1980 edition of the Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball shows Johnson shooting a jumper over the outstretched arm of Washington's Phil Chenier. Larry Bird called Dennis Johnson the best teammate he ever had but before Johnson played a key role alongside Bird on Boston's 1984 and 1986 championship teams he helped lead the Seattle SuperSonics to the NBA Finals in 1978 and 1979. Johnson shot 0-14 from the field in Seattle's game seven loss to Washington in the 1978 NBA Finals but he bounced back to earn Finals MVP honors as Seattle defeated Washington in five games to win the 1979 NBA championship. The CHPB back cover photo features Houston's Moses Malone, who had just won the first of his three regular season MVPs.

The 1980 CHPB included 320 pages, the largest edition yet. In addition to the usual features--22 team profiles, lists of the 1979 NBA statistical leaders, a complete schedule, a list of all-time NBA records, a list of all 202 players selected in the 1979 NBA Draft and a "TV/Radio roundup"--the CHPB contained five feature stories: Dan Lohwasser's "Phil Ford: The Greening Of a Star," Myron S. Waldman's "How Bill Bradley Shoots In the U.S. Senate," Leonard Koppett's "Bring Back the Zone," Steve Ellis' "SuperSonic Silas: Grandpa of the NBA" and Joe Gergen's "The All-Time All-Star Game."

Steve Hershey and Darrell Simmons co-wrote the "Inside the NBA" article, predicting that Washington and Seattle would meet in the NBA Finals for the third straight year, with Seattle claiming back to back titles. Instead, rookie Earvin "Magic" Johnson teamed with veteran Kareem Abdul-Jabbar to lead the L.A. Lakers to the championship over Julius Erving and the Philadelphia 76ers, who made it to the NBA Finals for the second time in Erving's four NBA seasons. The Lakers defeated the SuperSonics in the Western Conference Finals, while the Washington Bullets lost in the first round after going 39-43 in the regular season. The 76ers overwhelmed Rookie of the Year Larry Bird's Boston Celtics 4-1 in the Eastern Conference Finals; the teams would face each other in that round in three of the next five years as Julius Erving versus Larry Bird became the sport's best rivalry in the early 1980s (Bird and Magic did not meet in the NBA Finals until 1984 and their teams only played each other twice during the regular season).

Here are some interesting notes, quotes and quips from the 1980 CHPB:

1) Phil Ford made the All-NBA Second Team and won Rookie of the Year honors in 1978-79 but he was never selected as an All-Star nor did he make the All-NBA team again in his seven year career. After averaging at least 15.9 ppg and at least 7.4 apg in each of his first three seasons, his numbers dropped precipitously and he bounced around to New Jersey, Milwaukee and Houston. In 1980, though, Ford seemed like a star on the rise and much of Lohwasser's article dealt with what is now a little known chapter in a largely forgotten career: when the Kansas City Kings drafted Ford he initially refused to report to training camp, questioning the propriety of the draft system and threatening to play pro ball in Italy or even to become a graduate assistant at North Carolina, where he had excelled as a college player (winning the Wooden Award in 1978 and being selected to the All-America Team three times). When the second overall selection in the draft declares that he may not sign with the NBA team that picked him that is big news but--unlike Spencer Haywood, whose case went to the U.S. Supreme Court and paved the way for players to jump straight from high school to the pros--Ford eventually backed down. He signed a five year contract with the Kings, reportedly for $200,000 per season. After Ford's fantastic rookie campaign, Kansas City Coach Cotton Fitzsimmons--who won the Coach of the Year award--called Ford the best point guard in the NBA and possibly "the best of his era." In 1980-81, Ford was averaging career highs in scoring (17.5 ppg) and assists (8.8 apg) when he suffered an eye injury that required season-ending surgery. He returned to action in time to play in five of Kansas City's 15 playoff games but he never regained his previous form.

2) Bill Bradley, the 35 year old recently retired New York Knick, was the youngest U.S. Senator when Myron S. Waldman profiled him for a Newsday article that was reprinted in the CHPB. Waldman reported that of the 12 pictures hanging in Bradley's outer office only one depicted Bradley as a Knick. "You don't forget about it," Bradley said of his NBA career. "I did it for 10 years. I loved it. I had a wonderful experience. It was living life at its fullest--for those years. Just as this is living life at its fullest at this time."

3) Leonard Koppett was presented the highest honor for a media member by both the Baseball Hall of Fame (the J.G. Taylor Spink Award) and the Basketball Hall of Fame (the Curt Gowdy Media Award). His brief CHPB bio noted that he had covered the NBA "since its inception." Koppett explained that the NBA had never allowed zone defenses because of the prevalence of the stall in the collegiate game: a team that gained the lead late in a game would either stall on offense or sink into a zone on defense, so that the trailing team would be forced to foul on defense or shoot long jumpers on offense. The introduction of the 24 second shot clock eliminated the stall from the NBA but Koppett noted that the rule prohibiting the zone stayed in place because the owners felt that zone defenses would still slow the game down too much. According to the official rules history posted at NBA.com, Koppett is not quite correct about the NBA never allowing zone defenses; the NBA briefly allowed zone defenses before banning them on January 11, 1947, roughly midway through the league's first season. However, Koppett is on target regarding the larger issue of why the NBA did not permit zone defenses to be used.

Fast forward to the late 1970s; with attendance declining and interest in the NBA waning, the league's owners and executives debated how to make the sport more popular and exciting. The NBA instituted the three point shot (borrowed from the ABA, which in turn had borrowed the idea from the ABL) and tweaked the scheduling format to increase the frequency of intra-conference play (which was supposed to heighten interest in local/regional rivalries) but some critics suggested that allowing zone defenses would add a strategic element to the game. Koppett largely agreed with this contention, though he noted that some people argued that zone defenses would stifle the creative drives to the hoop of players like Julius Erving and David Thompson. Koppett acknowledged that this might happen but he still favored the change because he believed that a more team-oriented game would be more popular than a star-driven game. Three decades later, the NBA is much more financially secure but it still seeks to find the right balance between promoting individual stars and promoting team-oriented play.

Koppett noted that in 1978-79 fewer than 200 illegal defenses were called in more than 900 games, which meant that the zone was either rarely attempted and immediately punished or else it was commonplace and rarely policed. In either case, Koppett and others felt that the rule was vaguely written and thus difficult to enforce. The NBA achieved great popularity in the 1980s and 1990s without getting rid of the illegal defense rule, though the rule was clarified in 1981-82--and that was an important move because many coaches had become very adept at playing disguised zones. In 2001-02, the NBA replaced the illegal defense rule with a defensive three seconds rule, prohibiting a defender from remaining in the lane for more than three seconds unless he was guarding a player but otherwise permitting a team to use any defensive alignment.

The three point shot has evolved from a seldom-used gadget to an integral part of NBA offensive strategy; shooting long jump shots is a typical strategy to defeat a zone but it is not clear how much of the evolution of the usage of the three point shot has to do with changes in defensive rules/philosophies nor is it clear that this evolution has made the game better and/or more exciting. Since Koppett--who passed away in 2003--advocated allowing the zone more than two decades before the NBA made this change, it would be interesting to know what he would have thought of the current state of the NBA game.

4) Paul Silas may be best known to younger NBA fans as LeBron James' first NBA coach and as the coach of the 2012 Charlotte team that posted the worst record in league history but he is also a two-time All-Star and a five-time member of the All-Defensive Team. Silas averaged more than 20 ppg and more than 20 rpg in his collegiate career, joining Bill Russell, Julius Erving, Artis Gilmore and Kermit Washington in the very elite Division I 20-20 club. One of the few--and biggest--mistakes that Red Auerbach made was not retaining the services of Silas, the rebounder/defender/enforcer for Boston's 1974 and 1976 championship teams who then helped Seattle reach two NBA Finals and win one championship. Steve Ellis quoted Silas' philosophy of competition: "What separates the winners from the losers is your mental attitude. Except for a very few, like Jabbar, we're all on the same keel. The only thing I care about is winning and what my players feel about me. You see, winning takes care of everything. To win, you have to die to win. That's barring nothing. Whatever it takes."

Silas starred for Boston but in Seattle he played a reduced yet still very important role--and he not only contributed on the court but also as a mentor for young All-Star center Jack Sikma. Ellis noted that three-time champion Silas was the ring leader among active NBA players and that he only trailed recently retired eight-time champion John Havlicek on the league's career games played list.

Silas' all-time NBA team included Bill Russell, Oscar Robertson, Jerry West, Bob Pettit and Elgin Baylor.

Although Silas the player deservedly had a reputation as a great student of the game, he did not want or expect to become a coach, calling it "The toughest job I've ever come in contact with." Ironically, Silas would get his first NBA head coaching job in 1980, right after he finished his playing career in Seattle.

5) Joe Gergen penned an entertaining fantasy centered around the premise of George Mikan and Wilt Chamberlain selecting all-time All-Star teams to face each other in a battle for the ages; Mikan would have his pick of the pre-1970 greats, while Chamberlain would choose post-1970 players. That arbitrary dividing line does not entirely make sense since most of Chamberlain's career happened prior to 1970 but Gergen should be granted some poetic license here; he made Mikan and Chamberlain his protagonists because they were the two dominant scorers of their respective eras but he wanted his All-Star Game to represent a battle between the old and the new. Red Auerbach coached George's Giants, with John Kundla and Joe Lapchick serving as his assistants; Red Holzman led Wilt's Stilts, assisted by Tommy Heinsohn and Kevin Loughery.

Gergen significantly expanded the normal All-Star rosters, allotting 20 players to each team:

George's Giants

Guards

Bob Cousy
Bob Davies
Sam Jones
Slater Martin
Dick McGuire
Bill Sharman
Bobby Wanzer

Centers

Neil Johnston
Ed Macauley
George Mikan
Bill Russell

Forwards

Paul Arizin
Joe Fulks
Bob Pettit
Dolph Schayes
Maurice Stokes
Jack Twyman
George Yardley

Swingmen

Jim Pollard
Frank Ramsey

Wilt's Stilts

Guards

Walt Frazier
George Gervin
Hal Greer
Earl Monroe
Oscar Robertson
Jerry West
Lenny Wilkens

Centers

Kareem Abdul-Jabbar
Wilt Chamberlain
Willis Reed
Bill Walton

Forwards

Rick Barry
Elgin Baylor
Dave DeBusschere
Julius Erving
Elvin Hayes
Moses Malone
David Thompson

Swingmen

Billy Cunningham
John Havlicek

At the time Gergen wrote his story, the four highest career scoring averages among the players chosen all belonged to members of Wilt's team: Chamberlain (30.1), Abdul-Jabbar (28.6), Baylor (27.4) and West (27.0). Then came the Giants' Pettit (26.4), followed by the Stilts' Erving (26.2), Barry (25.9), Thompson (25.8) and Robertson (25.7). One could quibble with some of the positional designations--Moses Malone as a forward?--as well as some of the generational designations--Baylor and several others had their best seasons before 1970--but, again, some poetic license should be granted. It is interesting to note that except for the 6-4 Sam Jones every guard on the Giants' squad was 6-1 or shorter, while every guard on the Stilts' team was 6-2 or taller except for the 6-1 Wilkens.

Naturally, all of the players were "restored to their prime" (in Gergen's words) for the February 14, 1981 showdown at the Basketball Hall of Fame. Gergen provided a detailed and very entertaining recap of the game, incorporating many real life quirks and throwing in some humorous twists on actual situations (i.e., Chamberlain fouled out of the All-Time All-Star Game after never fouling out of a game during his NBA career). The Stilts prevailed 142-136 in triple overtime. Abdul-Jabbar scored a game-high 16 points and he had eight rebounds. Schayes led the Giants with 15 points.

6) The L.A. Lakers were an efficient offensive team even before Magic Johnson joined the squad; in 1978-79, seven of the Lakers' top eight scorers shot at least .500 from the field, topped by Abdul-Jabbar's .577 mark (second in the league behind Cedric Maxwell's .584). Abdul-Jabbar was under fire from the media for only winning one championship in his 10 year career and the 1980 CHPB dismissed the Lakers as a team that had settled into being "always a contender but rarely a champion." Little did the author of those words suspect that the Lakers would not only win the 1980 championship but also capture titles in 1982, 1985 and 1987-88 to become the team of the decade and the first franchise to win back to back rings since Russell's Celtics in 1968-69. Johnson's rookie profile called him "the most exciting player to come into the league in years" but also questioned how well he would fit in with Norm Nixon, the Lakers' other guard.

7) Robert Parish averaged 17.2 ppg and ranked seventh in the league with 12.1 rpg in his third season with Golden State but his CHPB profile was hardly a ringing endorsement of his prospects: "Developed slowly and still thinks he's a perimeter shooter...Has erased all the question marks but don't look for him at the All-Star Game." Parish, who became a Hall of Famer and was selected as one of the NBA's 50 Greatest Players, made the first of his nine All-Star appearances in 1981 and he finished fourth in the MVP voting in 1982.

8) Jabari Parker is currently one of the most highly touted high school players in the country. His father Sonny averaged 9.9 ppg during his six NBA seasons, including a career-high 15.2 ppg in 1978-79. Sonny Parker's CHPB profile said that he "has the ability to take smaller guards inside or drive past most forwards."

9) Bob Dandridge, a 31 year old 10 year veteran, said that his only personal goal was to set the NBA record for seasons played. He was coming off of arguably the best season of his career and he had just earned his first (and only) All-NBA Second Team selection (beating out, among others, Julius Erving) but after playing 78 games that season his career lasted just 79 more games over the next three seasons.

10) Many members of the media had already decided that regardless of Erving's production he was not living up to the expectations he built as a three-time ABA MVP and two-time ABA champion. Despite increasing his scoring, rebounding and assist averages, Erving did not make the All-League Team for the first time in his professional career; his 1978-79 averages--23.1 ppg, 7.2 rpg, 4.6 apg--would represent a career year for many All-Stars so it is hard to understand why Erving received such criticism. His field goal percentage dipped to a career-low .491 but that was only marginally worse than his previous shooting percentages--the consistent Erving shot between .496 and .512 in his first seven seasons--and it is important to note that he switched to guard for extended periods of time after All-Star Doug Collins got hurt. Erving averaged 25.4 ppg, 7.8 rpg and 5.9 apg in the playoffs while shooting .517 from the field, so the popular notion that he was a declining player looks patently absurd when viewed objectively.

Erving's CHPB profile again inexplicably took potshots at his defense, a slur that I refuted in Wayback Machine, Part V: The 1979 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball. At least Erving's profile concluded with this accurate assessment: "Took more heat than he deserved for Philly's failure...Still one of league's most exciting performers." The "failure" in question consisted of losing a tough seven game Eastern Conference semifinal series to the San Antonio Spurs while an injured Collins--the team's second best player--watched in street clothes. Erving, playing out of position at guard, scored 34 points on 11-16 field goal shooting in 46 minutes in Philadelphia's 111-108 game seven loss. He also had eight assists, five rebounds, three blocked shots and two steals.

11) Kobe Bryant's father Joe "Jellybean" Bryant, a teammate of Erving's, received less than flattering reviews: "An erratic reserve who moves like Doctor J one night and Doctor Welby the next...A typical 76er--good offense, bad defense, big ego."

12) Moses Malone emerged as a dominant player in 1978-79, winning the first of his six rebounding titles (17.6 rpg) and averaging a then-career high 24.8 ppg (fifth in the league). Malone's CHPB profile summarized his playing style: "If anyone doesn't understand what a physical basketball player is, just show a brief film clip of Malone at work...He may go up for a rebound some night and come back down with someone's head." Malone spent the first two seasons of his career in the ABA after jumping straight from high school to the professional ranks and he played for three teams before establishing himself as an All-Star in Houston.

Wayback Machine, Part I looked at the 1975 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball

Wayback Machine, Part II looked at the 1976 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball

Wayback Machine, Part III looked at the 1977 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball

Wayback Machine, Part IV looked at the 1978 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball

Wayback Machine, Part V looked at the 1979 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball

Labels: Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball, Dennis Johnson, Julius Erving, Leonard Koppett, Moses Malone, Paul Silas, Phil Ford, Zander Hollander

posted by David Friedman @ 7:35 AM

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Trade Deadline Deals Show How LeBron's "Decision" is Reshaping the NBA

LeBron James' infamous "Decision" is reshaping the NBA and may ultimately result in a lockout that could cancel at least part of the 2011-2012 season. This is not about whether James was (1) right that his best option was to leave Cleveland for Miami and/or (2) whether James handled the free agency process appropriately; I already addressed both of those issues soon after James commandeered an hour of ESPN's schedule to, among other things, shred whatever remained of Jim Gray's journalistic integrity. No, this is about all the dominoes that have inevitably crashed down since last summer when LeBron James and Chris Bosh joined forces with Dwyane Wade to form a trio that looks so powerful on paper that the normally analytical Jeff Van Gundy temporarily lost his mind and predicted a 75-7 season for the Heat (who are currently 43-16 and on pace to finish with the 60 victories that I predicted they would collect). Technically, Amare Stoudemire's decision to leave Phoenix to go to New York preceded James' "Decision" by a few days but there are many reasons that James' action has become a capitalized buzzword (not the least of those reasons being that the Heat are legitimate title contenders while the Knicks, despite all of the media buzz, are barely above .500 at the moment); Stoudemire's choice was less shocking to the NBA's system because Phoenix was not willing to give Stoudemire a max deal--fearing that his knees may not be a good long term investment--so it was not a big surprise when Stoudemire went for the cash (though Knicks' fans who expected to receive LeBron James as their Christmas in July present may have been surprised to find Stoudemire in their stockings).

The current NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is set up to encourage each superstar to re-sign with the team that drafted him; that team can offer such players both the most money and the longest term deal. Until last summer, no elite free agent had spurned that extra cash and extra security to go elsewhere. On paper, the system seemed ideal: players had the right to seek greener pastures, which thereby provided owners a significant incentive to build a solid enough organization/roster so that their star players would not want to leave. In the "bad old days" before free agency, teams essentially owned players for life after drafting them but the current CBA balanced players' rights with owners' (and fans') desires to not lose cornerstone players.

Throughout his tenure in Cleveland, James enjoyed being coy about his intentions, never indicating whether he planned to stay or go (and ultimately alienating fans in cities across the country who became convinced that James was just flirting with those other towns but really planned to commit to them). While it could be argued that this provided great incentive to ownership/management to spend money to build a strong team it could also be argued that this discouraged other free agents from signing with the Cavs in prior seasons and that it led to a short term plan centered on acquiring veteran players as opposed to a long term plan that would have created a better roster eventually but may not have led to an immediate championship; the way things turned out, the Cavs made it to the 2007 NBA Finals, rebooted their team and made it to the 2009 Eastern Conference Finals (after posting the league's best regular season record) and then rebooted their team again before posting the league's best regular season record in 2010 only to fall short in the Eastern Conference semifinals. The Cavs basically catered to every great and small whim that James ever expressed and then they offered him the max deal for max years, never dreaming of or planning for the possibility that he might actually bolt town. Some might argue that James, Wade and Bosh unselfishly left money on the table in order to try to build a championship team in Miami but the reality is that they gave up little if any real dollars when one factors in the taxes they saved (Florida does not have a state income tax) and the extra endorsements that they likely will receive from playing in the Miami market--and that is the brilliance of what Pat Riley pulled off: he figured out how to bring three max players into the fold for less than max dollars in a way that those players still essentially received max dollars. Also, this may sound flippant but the reality is that if the number one goal for any of these free agents was truly to win a championship then they would have accepted the midlevel exception (or some similar deal) to join forces with Kobe Bryant in L.A.; winning a championship may be a goal for some or all of these guys but getting paid is the first goal and being "the Man" is a secondary goal (at least for James and Stoudemire; Bosh seems to understand and accept that he is not, in fact, "the Man").

Forget how the media hyperventilated about all of this, with Cleveland media members shamelessly ripping James after seven years of (wrongly) elevating him far above Kobe Bryant (James only passed Bryant, as a regular season performer, quite recently and never by the margin that his sycophants suggested), while national media members breathlessly declared that the Heat would instantly become one of the greatest teams ever and "stat gurus" asserted that the Heat would actually win 90 out of 82 games due to the combined "advanced statistical" prowess of James, Wade and Bosh; disregard all of the hype and all of the nonsense: James' "Decision" was an Earth shattering event for the powers that be in the NBA and a massive paradigm shift whose implications are only now being fully appreciated. Owners looked at what James did and became terrified that their own star players might leave; star players looked at what James did and began plotting how to arrive at their dream destinations. The perfect storm that produced the Cavs' epic collapse this season (a subject worthy of full length treatment in a separate article) added fuel to the fire; no owner wanted to end up like Dan Gilbert--jilted and howling at the moon with his franchise's value plummeting with each double digit loss--and no star player wanted to replace James as Public Enemy Number One.

The dominoes began to fall. While many people point to the "Melo-drama" saga as perhaps the first reaction to the implications of James' "Decision," it would be more accurate to say that Orlando's desperate midseason trades were that first domino: the Magic dealt two starters (former All-Stars Vince Carter and Rashard Lewis), arguably the best backup center in the league (Marcin Gortat) and their best perimeter defender (Mickael Pietrus) because they were already concerned that if they did not make a serious NBA Finals push this season then Dwight Howard may walk when his contract expires. Much like James' refusal to commit to Cleveland influenced the Cavs to seek short term roster solutions instead of developing their roster with a long range view, the Magic went for broke because they lacked confidence in the team's ability to win a title right now. I understand the bind that the Magic are in and I don't blame General Manager Otis Smith for rolling the dice but I also predicted that those deals were more likely to remove Orlando from championship contention than they were to vault Orlando past Miami and Boston--and that is exactly what has happened: the Magic are 21-13 since remaking their roster (just 8-7 in the past month) and they look like they are competing not for an NBA Finals berth but rather to avoid first round elimination. Hedo Turkoglu seems to be past his prime and/or satisfied with his big contract, Gilbert Arenas was always overrated and is now a shell of his former self and even Jason Richardson--the best player the Magic acquired--has hardly set the world on fire. The Magic have the second highest payroll in the league (behind only the two-time defending champion L.A. Lakers) but, even more ominously, Arenas is not only their highest paid player this season but is slated to be their highest paid player through the 2013-14 season. How thrilled do you think Howard is about that? The problem is not just that Arenas makes more than Howard: the problem is that Arenas is a non-productive player who is taking up salary cap space that could have potentially been used much more effectively. Arenas' advocates--and he inexplicably has many of them, ranging from fawning media members to "stat guru" fanboys like Neil Paine--will no doubt argue that Arenas was a great player before suffering knee injuries but (1) that is irrelevant to the Magic, who cannot put Arenas in a "hot tub time machine" to fix his knees and (2) Arenas was never as productive as his fans/"stat guru" admirers insisted, a point that I established definitively when I refuted Paine's tendentious assertion that Arenas was once an elite player; the truth is that even when Arenas was in his prime he had no discernible impact in the standings: the Wizards were roughly a .500 team when he played and they were roughly a .500 team when he didn't play.

The Magic saw what happened with LeBron James and Cleveland and were so terrified that they decided that making Arenas their highest paid player is a risk worth taking if it even slightly increases the probability that Howard might stay in Orlando. How crazy is that? Arenas is averaging 7.8 ppg with the Magic, while denting rims across the country with his .234 three point shooting, .698 free throw shooting and his .336 overall field goal percentage. Remember, the Magic owe Arenas more than $60 million through 2014, there is no way that they will be able to trade him and the only way that Arenas fails to receive that money from Orlando is if there is a lockout or if he actually fires his guns in the locker room (just bringing them into the locker room in Washington apparently was not enough to get his contract voided). No, the Magic will not be winning a championship any time soon but someone should turn Coach Stan Van Gundy's "Wired" segments into a reality TV show; that show, along with the inevitable "stat guru" articles trying to explain that Arenas really was an elite player once despite all rational evidence to the contrary, will provide some great unintentional comic relief.

On to the next "Decision" domino. The main storylines this season should have been the Lakers trying to threepeat (and trying to accomplish the even rarer feat of reaching the NBA Finals for the fourth straight time, something that has only been achieved by the Showtime Lakers, the Bird-McHale-Parish Celtics and Bill Russell's dynastic Celtics), the Spurs potentially making a run at 70 wins, the reloaded Celtics attempting to reach the Finals for the third time in four years and Miami's newly assembled trio battling to compete with the three aforementioned established powers--but instead we have been saturated with "Melo-drama."

Denver offered Carmelo Anthony a contract extension but Anthony refused to sign, made it known privately (more or less) that he would like to play for the New York Knicks and thus issued an ultimatum to Nuggets' management (but retained plausible deniability because he never uttered his ultimatum publicly): trade me now or lose me for nothing later (like Cleveland lost James). Anthony saw that James' approach--being coy and not making his intentions clear to his team or his fans--may have been good for ESPN's ratings but it was terrible for James' image, so Anthony tried to make a smoother version of James' power play, though Anthony did utter his share of tone deaf statements (capped off when Anthony said "I have to take my hat off to myself" because he was so proud of how he handled the challenge of deciding where he is going to live for the next few years while making tens of millions of dollars playing basketball).

Anthony essentially held at least three franchises (Denver, New York, New Jersey) hostage for months and took away attention from what really matters--great players playing basketball at a high level. Technically, Anthony did not do anything wrong and yet it mystifies me that anyone can believe that this is a sustainable business model for the NBA. The Nuggets finally ended the "Melo-drama" by shipping Anthony (plus Chauncey Billups and other considerations) to New York in exchange for several quality players plus some draft picks; in a heartfelt press conference, Denver General Manager Masai Ujiri explained how wrenching it was to trade hometown hero Billups and candidly said that the Nuggets were "killed" in the deal, a historically accurate sentiment based on the majority of previous trades consisting of stars being exchanged for solid players. The ironic thing is that I am far from convinced that the Knicks have suddenly become a legitimate contender nor am I sure that the Nuggets really got "killed" (though Ujiri was right to lament the way things went down and was also probably firing a shot across the bow in anticipation of the upcoming CBA showdown this summer); not only do I not see the Knicks winning the East any time soon I suspect that they will lose in the first round of the playoffs (unless they luck out and run into the Magic, perhaps), while the Nuggets--relieved of the huge dark cloud hanging over their heads--will probably move up in the West standings, though they too are likely first round fodder (which is no different than their fate during most of Anthony's Denver career).

The next domino seemingly took everyone by surprise but actually makes a lot of sense in light of everything that preceded it: as soon as the Nets lost out on Anthony they made a deal to acquire Deron Williams, who--as Kevin McHale astutely noted--is actually a better all-around player than Anthony. Williams had some undefined role in Utah Coach Jerry Sloan's sudden midseason retirement and Williams sent strong signals that he--like James, Anthony and possibly Howard--intended to head elsewhere when his current contract ends. The Jazz, mindful of what happened to Cleveland (collapse), Orlando (panicky deals that seemingly are backfiring like an exploding cigar) and Denver (enervating drama) tried to avoid the dreaded horsemen of Collapse, Panic and Drama by shipping Williams out in exchange for an All-Star point guard (Devin Harris), a promising young player (Derrick Favors) and three first round picks. Historically speaking, the Jazz got "killed" (to borrow Ujiri's terminology) because they lost one of the top 10-15 players in the league but in today's crazy NBA world they made out pretty well: they obtained two players who can help them now plus three draft picks that will hopefully either provide an infusion of youthful talent or else be useful in future trades. By acting so quickly the Jazz also prevented Williams from hijacking the season and circumvented any attempts he might have made to choose his destination a la Carmelo Anthony.

The next domino was smaller but perhaps even more surprising: the Boston Celtics, believing that they will not be able to re-sign Kendrick Perkins when his contract expired after this season, traded the starting center from their 2008 championship team (plus reserve guard Nate Robinson) to Oklahoma City for Jeff Green and Nenad Krstic. The Celtics added versatility and shooting but they lost a key part of the physical presence that defined their team's identity; Perkins and Kevin Garnett set hard (semi-legal) screens, grabbed tough rebounds in traffic and patrolled the paint defensively, making life easier for perimeter All-Stars Paul Pierce, Ray Allen and Rajon Rondo. Without Perkins' bulk and toughness, Garnett will not be as daunting a presence (Garnett has shown that he likes to pick on smaller, younger players, while Perkins has shown that he will get in anyone's grill). Perkins is not a superstar--or even an All-Star--but the first thing I thought of when I heard about this trade is the infamous (for Boston fans) Paul Silas fiasco. Red Auerbach did not make many bad moves during his long, distinguished career as a coach and executive but he often said that his biggest mistake was trading Silas to Denver in 1976 instead of meeting Silas' contract demands; Auerbach admitted that he failed to realize Silas' true value. Silas eventually landed in Seattle, where he provided toughness in the paint, mentored a young Jack Sikma and helped the Sonics reach the NBA Finals in 1978 and 1979 (Seattle won the 1979 title). Meanwhile, the Celtics, who won two championships in Silas' four years with the team, became a doormat until the arrival of Bird (and later McHale and Parish) revived the franchise. The Perkins-Silas comparison is not perfect--no comparison is--but the similarities are eerie: both players were traded because of financial (not performance) issues, both players had played key (but intangible) roles for championship teams and both players went from a veteran Boston team to the same young, aspiring Western Conference franchise (the Oklahoma City Thunder used to be the Seattle SuperSonics). The main difference is that Silas was a wily veteran near the end of his career while Perkins is a young veteran just entering his prime but it will be interesting to see what impact this trade has on both franchises in the next five years. Perkins could turn out to be the final piece in the Thunder's championship puzzle (not necessarily this season but soon) and he could also turn out to be Danny Ainge's biggest regret. Lakers Coach Phil Jackson delivered the best zinger, wryly noting, "Doc (Rivers) had touted the fact that the (Boston) starting five had never lost a playoff series. I'm sure most everybody has heard it in the NBA, that this starting five has never lost a playoff series. Well, they go down without ever having lost a playoff series." Ainge, seeking to avoid the aforementioned deadly horsemen of Collapse, Panic and Drama, perhaps believes that Green's versatility and Krstic's shooting will make up for Perkins' size/toughness but it is very bold to tinker with the starting lineup of a one-time champion/two-time Finalist that is contending for the best record in the East. Perhaps Ainge has more moves up his sleeve but it sure looks like the Celtics should have let things ride with Perkins, tried to win the 2011 title and then dealt with Perkins' contract at a later date; if I were Ainge, I'd rather win a championship even if it meant losing Perkins for nothing later then trade Perkins now just for the sake of getting a leg up on the inevitable rebuilding project after Allen, Garnett and Pierce retire.

The footnote to the Boston situation is that a major reason that the Celtics felt comfortable trading Perkins is that they believe that Shaquille O'Neal can take his place as a 20-25 mpg physical force in this year's postseason; this is the same O'Neal whose departure from Cleveland is never mentioned when people talk about the Cavs' collapse sans James. I will discuss this in greater detail in a separate article but the fact that arguably the best team in the East has installed O'Neal as their starting center (and the other top team in the East, Miami, has used Zydrunas Ilgauskas--Cleveland's backup center last season--as their starting center in most of their games) is a not so subtle indication that it is foolish to pretend that Cleveland only lost one important player this season. Another fun fact worth pondering is that this season the Miami "Superfriends" are likely going to combine to produce fewer wins than James and the Cavs totaled in either of the previous two seasons; I still say that it would not surprise me at all if James never wins more regular season games in his best season with Miami than he did as a Cavalier and I just cannot fathom the supposed logic that suggests "James plus trash equals 66 and 61 wins but James plus two top 15 players equals 60 wins or less"--if James really won all those games by himself in Cleveland then he should indeed be able to win 90 games out of 82 in Miami as the "stat gurus" predicted; since James and the Heat are not quite as good as so many people expected it would be reasonable to at least consider the possibility that defensive-minded coaching and a solid, deep supporting cast may have had something to do with Cleveland's record the past two seasons. Yes, I am fully aware that James and the Heat will be judged not by regular season wins but by playoff success (or failure); I have made that exact point many times--and I am also not convinced that the Heat are a lock to have more playoff success in the next four seasons than the Cavs did in the previous four (two trips to the Eastern Conference Finals and one trip to the NBA Finals).

Time will tell the significance of the Perkins deal and time will enable us to make sensible evaluations of James' supporting casts in Cleveland and Miami--but the Orlando, Denver, Utah and (to a lesser extent) Boston dominoes will shape the NBA for years to come on the court and also will likely culminate in the final domino this summer: a lockout that continues until the owners and players agree to fundamentally restructure the league's failing business model.

Labels: Boston Celtics, Carmelo Anthony, Cleveland Cavaliers, Denver Nuggets, Deron Williams, Kendrick Perkins, LeBron James, Miami Heat, Oklahoma City Thunder, Orlando Magic, Paul Silas, Utah Jazz

posted by David Friedman @ 4:56 AM

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Supergames I & II: The 1971 and 1972 NBA-ABA All-Star Games

A slightly different version of this article was originally published in the October 2004 issue of Basketball Digest.

The Forgotten Dream Teams

The 1992 U.S. Olympic “Dream Team” is considered to be the best basketball team ever assembled; ten of its twelve members are on the NBA’s 50 Greatest Players list.

In 1971 and 1972, two ABA All-Star teams comprised mostly of unheralded players nearly beat NBA All-Star teams whose rosters contained some of basketball’s most legendary figures—nine of the ten NBA participants in the 1971 NBA-ABA All-Star Game are on the NBA’s 50 Greatest Players list.

The 1992 "Dream Team" is perhaps the most famous basketball squad ever.

Most accounts of basketball history do not mention the NBA-ABA Supergames and very little footage exists of them. This is the story of the two Supergames and the great players who participated in them.

Supergame I: May 28, 1971, Houston Astrodome

NBA and ABA players organized the first Supergame as a fund raiser for the Whitney Young Foundation, an organization that helped prepare underprivileged students for college. The Foundation received the net gate receipts, while the television proceeds were divided between the participating players and each league’s Players Association pension funds. The members of the respective Players Associations selected 11 man rosters from the previous season’s All-Star teams. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar was supposed to play for the NBA, but he got married the day before the game and his roster spot was not filled. Boston Celtics’ legend Bill Russell coached the NBA and Larry Brown helmed the ABA.

Mel Daniels, who won two ABA MVPs and three ABA titles as an Indiana Pacer, recalls that the ABA players looked forward to the game: “We weren’t intimidated by the (NBA) guys. We figured that they did everything that we would do in the locker room in terms of putting on your shoes and your uniform and playing basketball. The climate was that the ABA guys were not as good as the NBA basketball players, so we had a few things on our minds that we had to prove to society, to the basketball world in general, that we were as good as the NBA, if not better.”

The game used NBA rules in the first half (24 second shot clock, no three point shot) and ABA rules in the second half (30 second shot clock, three point shot). Walt Frazier came off the bench to make seven of his eight field goal attempts in the first half and the NBA led 66-64 after Elvin Hayes’ first half buzzer beater. The game went back and forth until the NBA took a 108-98 lead in the fourth quarter. Barry and Charlie Scott rallied the ABA to within a point with 47 seconds left, but Oscar Robertson drained two free throws to put the NBA up 123-120 with 32 seconds left. Frazier closed out the scoring with two more free throws at the 11 second mark. Frazier finished with a game-high 26 points and won a car as the game MVP.

Even after such a strong showing the ABA players still had to fight an uphill battle to receive recognition. Daniels still recalls one slight: “One thing that I remember is that I blocked Elvin Hayes’ shot and the next day in the newspaper it came out that Hayes had blocked my shot.”

Both referees were from the NBA, which makes one statistic from the 1971 game stand out. In the fourth quarter the NBA All-Stars attempted 31 free throws, which would have been an NBA single game regular season record at that time. Despite shooting six for 23 from the field in the final stanza (the ABA went 10-20) the older league outscored the ABA 34-31. The NBA had a bigger, more inside oriented team, but through the first three quarters the NBA’s free throw attempted edge was only 39-32. Moreover, the fourth quarter parade to the free throw line was led not by the NBA’s big men but by guards Oscar Robertson (eight FTA) and Earl Monroe (six FTA) and swingman John Havlicek (all seven of his FTA).

Clearly, the NBA-ABA All-Star Game was much more fiercely contested and much more closely officiated than contemporary All-Star Games are. For example, in the 2004 NBA All-Star Game both teams combined for 32 free throw attempts in the entire game. Daniels says, “This was a serious business. Not only was that game a very serious endeavor, when we started playing exhibition games (against the NBA), those weren’t exhibition games per se. They were played with all the energy and verve of a regular season game.”

Supergame II: May 25, 1972, Nassau Coliseum

The NBA threatened to fine and/or suspend any NBA player who participated in Supergame II, but this did not stop the NBA Players Association from assembling another powerhouse team: seven Hall of Famers, six of whom are on the Top 50 List. Hall of Famer and Top 50 player Jerry West was unable to play because his kids were sick and his spot was filled by his Los Angeles Lakers’ teammate, fellow Hall of Famer Gail Goodrich. Paul Silas replaced injured Hall of Famer Dave DeBusschere. The 1972 ABA team featured three Hall of Famers—Barry, Erving and Dan Issel. Before the game Larry Fleischer, NBA Players’ Association counsel, said the two teams were “the finest collection of basketball talent ever assembled on one floor.” Elgin Baylor coached the NBA and Wilt Chamberlain was the team captain; Al Bianchi and Daniels filled those roles for the ABA.

Erving was not fazed by the prospect of competing against the NBA: “For me, coming off my rookie season, I was kind of feeling my oats and feeling like I could play against anybody, anywhere, at any time. I had played in and around New York in the pro summer leagues, so I had a lot of confidence in my ability.”

The only existing tape of the 1972 game consists of 90 minutes of black and white footage from the TVS national broadcast. There are technical problems throughout the recording, mainly with the audio. Don Criqui handled the play by play, while Hot Rod Hundley and Hall of Famer Cliff Hagan provided color commentary. The ABA ball was used in the first half and the NBA ball was used in the second. The ABA’s three point shot was only in effect in the second half.

Supergame II showcased a defensive intensity that differed completely from the way All-Star Games are generally played: in the first quarter alone Donnie Freeman drew a charge on Archie Clark and the ABA nearly forced a shot clock violation before a foul call bailed out the NBA.

Erving entered the game late in the first quarter with the ABA leading 22-14 and he provided an immediate spark, scoring from the left block after a pass from Gilmore. Later he displayed his open court skills, dribbling between his legs without breaking stride, driving hard to the basket and making a double-clutching shot in traffic.

He seemed to be in two places at once when he stopped a 4-on-2 fast break by the NBA. Erving picked up Robertson at the free throw line, forcing Robertson to dish to Clark on the left baseline for what seemed to be a wide open jump shot. Instead, Erving took a big step to meet Clark, swatted the shot out of midair, recovered the ball in the corner, took a couple dribbles upcourt and whipped an outlet to Daniels, who passed to George Thompson for a layup plus the foul. Thompson’s free throw put the ABA up 47-30 with 7:35 left in the first half.

By the third quarter the NBA closed the score to 60-59 and Criqui noted, “Julius Erving led the ABA to a breakaway in the second quarter—they went up by 19—but he’s been on the bench throughout the later part of the second quarter and has not played here in the third quarter.” With about two minutes left in the third quarter and the NBA leading 81-78, Erving returned to the game. Erving closed the third quarter with a fantastic drive against Hawkins from the right wing, dribbling between his legs, than spinning and going between his legs again. Once Erving got clear of Hawkins he elevated over Bob Lanier and made a bank shot.

Sadly, the fourth quarter footage is missing and presumed to be destroyed. The game closed in dramatic fashion. Barry hit a three pointer with 13 seconds left to cut the NBA lead to one. The ABA fouled Clark, who made the first and missed the second attempt. A wild scramble for the rebound ensued. Barry emerged with the ball and launched a desperation three pointer. His game winning attempt fell short and the NBA won 106-104. Lanier scored 15 points and was selected game MVP.

The Mind Boggling Dr. J Dunk

Silas will never forget a particular fourth quarter play from the 1972 game: “The one defining moment was, I had the ball and Doc stole the ball from me and went down and slammed this thing harder than I had ever seen anybody slam the ball in my life.” Prior to the game Silas knew little about Erving: “Zelmo Beaty, who I had played with in St. Louis and Atlanta, had jumped leagues and when I saw him he was telling me about Doc—that he wasn’t a good shooter but he just went by everybody. He just took up the slack, penetrated around and dunked on everybody. And I’m wondering how that happened. How could it happen? He developed a consistent shot, but it took time for him to do that. He was special.”

Daniels had seen some great dunks before, including one by Hawkins over Daniels’ Minnesota Muskies’ teammate Sam Smith in the 1968 ABA playoffs, but nothing quite like Erving’s flight in the 1972 Supergame: “He leapt from behind the free throw line, hung in the air for two or three seconds it seemed and dunked it. It was an absolutely amazing dunk and you had to see it to really appreciate it. Telling you about it does not do it the justice it deserves.”

Erving recalls, “I stole the ball and got Oscar Robertson and Archie Clark caught back on defense and Archie went for the steal, which made me pick the ball up. I was around the top of the key, coming in transition…I took a step and a half and went airborne from somewhere around the foul line, just inside the foul line. I noticed Oscar Robertson was there and just looking at me like, ‘What does this kid think he is going to do?’ He figured that I was going to come out of the air before I made it to the basket, but I got all the way to the basket and I dunked the ball and the ball bounced up into his hands and there was a certain expression on his face at the time—as well as Archie’s—almost like it was a moment. And I just ran back downcourt, but later on a lot of people talked about that play.”

In many ways Erving’s dunk symbolizes the ABA and the Supergames in one spectacular athletic flourish—it was amazing and yet no footage of it exists. Fortunately, Erving’s free throw line dunk to win the 1976 ABA Slam Dunk contest was captured for posterity.

SUPERGAME I and II Boxscores:

NBA-ABA Supergame I Boxscore Fri. May 28, 1971 Houston Astrodome Houston, Texas
NBA
Player	2FGM	2FGA	FTM	FTA	PTS	PF
John Havlicek^*	3	7	4	7	10	4
Dave DeBusschere^*	6	14	5	5	17	5
Nate Thurmond^*	1	5	1	5	3	1
Oscar Robertson^*	4	9	9	14	17	1
Dave Bing^*	2	5	7	12	11	2
Walt Frazier*	11	16	4	5	26	2
Elvin Hayes*	8	20	1	5	17	4
Earl Monroe*	2	5	8	9	12	1
Lou Hudson	2	6	3	3	7	4
Billy Cunningham*	1	5	3	5	5	3
TOTALS:	40	92	45	70	125	27
ABA
Player	2FGM	2FGA	FTM	FTA	PTS	PF
Rick Barry^*	7	17	6	10	20	5
Willie Wise^	6	13	4	5	16	3
Zelmo Beaty^	3	5	4	6	10	3
Larry Jones	6	10	0	0	15	6
Charlie Scott^	5	12	1	3	11	2
Mel Daniels	5	12	5	7	15	1
John Brisker	1	5	6	6	14	3
Roger Brown	3	5	3	5	9	2
Steve Jones	1	3	1	3	6	5
Donnie Freeman	2	6	0	0	4	3
Bill Melchionni	0	1	0	0	0	3
TOTALS:	39	89	30	45	120	36
	1	2	3	4	Tot.
NBA	33	33	25	34	125
ABA	33	31	25	31	120
Three point field goals: NBA: 0-0; ABA: 4-11 (Barry 0-1; L. Jones 1-1; Scott 0-4;
Brisker 2-3; Brown 0-1; S. Jones 1-1)
Fouled out: L. Jones
Attendance: 16,364
NBA-ABA Supergame II Boxscore Thur. May 25, 1972 Nassau Coliseum Uniondale, N.Y.
NBA
Player	FGM	FGA	FTM	FTA	PTS	PF
John Havlicek^*	5	NA	7	9	17	NA
Connie Hawkins^*	2	NA	2	6	6	NA
Wilt Chamberlain^*	2	NA	2	4	6	NA
Oscar Robertson^*	5	NA	4	4	14	NA
Archie Clark^	5	NA	5	7	15	NA
Bob Lanier*	7	NA	1	4	15	NA
Nate Archibald*	4	NA	4	6	12	NA
Bob Love	4	NA	2	2	10	NA
Gail Goodrich*	3	NA	2	3	8	NA
Paul Silas	1	NA	1	2	3	NA
TOTALS:	38	NA	30	47	106	27
ABA
Player	FGM	FGA	FTM	FTA	PTS	PF
Rick Barry^*	4	NA	2	2	11	NA
Dan Issel^*	4	NA	0	0	8	NA
Artis Gilmore^	7	NA	0	5	14	NA
Jimmy Jones^	3	NA	1	2	7	NA
Donnie Freeman^	5	NA	6	7	16	NA
Julius Erving*	5	NA	3	4	13	NA
Ralph Simpson	5	NA	2	4	12	NA
Willie Wise	4	NA	4	5	12	NA
George Thompson	2	NA	3	3	7	NA
Roger Brown	1	NA	0	0	2	NA
Mel Daniels	1	NA	0	0	2	NA
TOTALS:	41	NA	21	32	104	32
	1	2	3	4	Tot.
NBA	21	29	33	23	106
ABA	30	26	25	23	104
Three point field goals: Barry (1)
Fouled out: none
Attendance: 14,086
NOTES:
*: Hall of Fame member
^: Starter
For the 1971 game there is enough information to
list two point field goals made and attempted
(2FGM and 2FGA) separately from three point field
goals made and attempted; for the 1972 game
FGA and individual PF information are unavailable.

When this article appeared in Basketball Digest, two sidebar pieces accompanied it. Here are links to 20 Second Timeout posts that reprint those two articles, plus a followup item relating to the Pistol Pete Maravich book by Wayne Federman and Marshall Terrill:

The ABA's Unsung Heroes

Dr. J and Pistol Pete on the Same Team

"Pete Maravich: The Authorized Biography of Pistol Pete" is Now Available in Paperback

Basketball Digest did not publish my author acknowledgements, so I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Arthur Hundhausen of RememberTheABA.com and John Grasso for providing box scores and background information about both games and Paul Silas, Mel Daniels, Bob “Slick” Leonard, Julius Erving and Rick Barry for contributing their personal recollections.

Labels: Julius Erving, Mel Daniels, Oscar Robertson, Paul Silas, Rick Barry

posted by David Friedman @ 5:54 PM

31 comments