ESPN's Clown Show NBA Coverage, Featuring Stephen A. Smith and Kendrick Perkins Being Wrong About Almost Everything
The NBA Finals were a treat, culminating in a performance for the ages by Giannis Antetokounmpo. However, ESPN's NBA Finals coverage was often nothing more than a clown show, from the Rachel Nichols/Maria Taylor controversy to the futile and failed attempts of Stephen A. Smith and Kendrick Perkins to utter a remotely intelligent sentence.
Smith's loud and tired act has gone on for too long, and his shortcomings have been well documented here and elsewhere. It is sad that ESPN has sunk to branding a specific edition of SportsCenter with Smith's name, but this is not surprising, as I explained several years ago: "ESPN either hires people who are buffoons and instructs them to act like
buffoons or ESPN hires people who used to be real journalists and pays
them a lot of money to act like buffoons." Smith leads the pack in the first category.
Perkins is a former player who should know something about the NBA, and once in a while he makes sense, but he understands that he is being paid to provide headline-grabbing hot takes, not to provide intelligent analysis. Jalen Rose did a great job of listing just a few of Perkins' hot takes gone wrong about the Milwaukee Bucks and the 2021 NBA Finals:
Young folks like this that have been doing this job, like five years, they get one or two things right, they get one or two catchphrases, then they come over here with their Dr. Seuss lines wearing their 80s pastor suits and think all of their takes are going to be hot. So let me tell you a couple of things that I heard Perk say about this series. Didn't he just slander Coach Bud the entire year about not making adjustments? Hey Perk, the number one adjustment this year was giving the ball to Middleton the last couple of minutes of a game. Jrue Holiday isn't the best two way player in the NBA. Last night you saw the best two way player in the NBA. That's actually Giannis Antetokounmpo. And Khris Middleton is not Batman. That happens to be The Greek Freak. And don't try to flip it and say now he's Superman. You can just say that take was off. By the way, what happened to your guy Deandre Ayton? Is he still David Robinson? I didn't see him. Are the Suns still a dynasty? I don't see that with a 36 year old point guard. So again, it's great to come over here and talk really loud and have all of the catchphrases, but you were so very dead wrong about the Bucks as a guy who said that Giannis should leave Milwaukee. You said Giannis should leave Milwaukee. He stayed and he delivered.
Perkins was indeed "very dead wrong," and his attempt to respond to Rose was pathetic, focusing on Rose's hair line; Rose's joke about "Dr. Seuss lines" was funny, and he followed it with basketball analysis, but Perkins' jokes fell flat and were not followed by any basketball analysis. Rose may be the only ESPN commentator who directly calls out fellow ESPN commentators. As Kwame Brown recently noted, Rose deserves credit for attempting to set Stephen A. Smith straight years ago about using the words "bust" and "scrub" to refer to any NBA player. Rose has sometimes provided mixed or muddled messaging on racial issues but his basketball analysis is generally on point.
In addition to the foolish commentary that has become as much an ESPN trademark as anything else, the network also foisted on the public a soap opera pitting Rachel Nichols versus Maria Taylor. In my recap of game four of the 2021 NBA Finals I briefly addressed the Nichols/Taylor controversy:
Can anyone honestly say that either Nichols or Taylor consistently add
something meaningful and profound to the telecasts? In 20 years, NBA
fans and historians will still be talking about Antetokounmpo,
Middleton, Booker, and Paul, but it is doubtful that many people will
remember or care who served as the pregame and halftime host for
ESPN/ABC's Finals coverage. It is worth noting that Taylor, ESPN/ABC's
newly anointed NBA Finals studio host,
was the only one out of 100 media award voters who did not select
Anthony Davis for the All-NBA Team after the 2019-20 season (Davis made
the First Team after receiving 79 First Team votes and 20 Second Team
votes). Taylor's excuse for leaving one of the NBA's top five players
completely off of her ballot for the NBA's top 15 players is that she
forgot about him. Anyone can make a mistake, and one hesitates to make
extreme and/or absolute statements, but it must be asked: How can a
media member who "forgets" about one of the league's elite players be
elevated to a job that makes her the face of ESPN/ABC's pre-game and
halftime NBA Finals coverage?
Nichols is not bad at what she does, and she is better than Taylor, but both of them are quite replaceable. For those who are unaware of the basic facts of the controversy, a private phone conversation that Nichols had with one of LeBron James' advisors was recorded--unbeknownst to Nichols, which is illegal in Florida (where Nichols was staying at the time she participated in the phone call)--and then excerpts of that recording were intentionally leaked by at least one ESPN staffer who did not approve of what Nichols said. Nichols asserted that it is written into her contract that she will be the pregame and halftime host for the NBA Finals, and she declared that if ESPN wants to prove its wokeness by expanding Taylor's role then it should find a way to do so without violating that contractual obligation. Nichols praised Taylor's work and at no time asserted that Taylor is not qualified to be the pregame and halftime host; Nichols just claimed that ESPN has no contractual right to give those assignments to Taylor.
I have not read Nichols' contract, but assuming that she knows what is in her contract and that she stated those terms accurately, she has every legal right to feel wronged if her employer essentially demotes her without cause and in violation of a signed agreement. Nichols also has every right to feel violated that her private phone call was recorded without her knowledge and then broadcast to the public without her consent. All of that being said, there is not a little irony that Nichols is facing the cancel culture after she has been so outspoken and politically slanted during many of her basketball broadcasts. Self-proclaimed "progressives" now portray Nichols as a hypocrite, as someone who claims to be down with the cause but is really more focused on herself. Nichols opened herself up to such criticism by portraying herself in a certain fashion and then daring to utter private remarks that do not live up to others' expectations of her. It is never pretty when self-proclaimed "progressives" turn on their own, as we have seen throughout history (perhaps most notably in the Soviet Union, where a person could be a hero one day and literally cut out of state-controlled newspaper headlines the next day).
The problem--which neither Nichols nor Taylor nor most people who have commented about this acknowledge--is that once you accept the view that hiring practices should be based on any form of proportional representation as opposed to solely based on qualifications then you are going to open the door to resentment, to assumptions that certain people are not qualified for the positions they have, and to a host of other problems. ESPN spends more time and energy trying to act "woke" than it does trying to fill positions based on merit, and that is a bigger issue than Nichols' privately expressed resentment of ESPN's assignment shuffling.
Taylor took great offense to what Nichols said, and Taylor subsequently refused to appear on camera with Nichols. Nichols, who is often outspoken about being woke and certainly does not need a weather report to understand which way the wind is blowing, offered a public apology to Taylor that Taylor neither acknowledged nor accepted. Taylor probably correctly assumed that the apology was not sincere, because if Nichols were given truth serum she would most likely not think it necessary to apologize for privately griping that her employer is violating her contract. We are just watching an elaborate song and dance: Nichols' apology was a necessary damage control move, and Taylor's non-acceptance of the apology was an expected response from someone who feels entitled to be aggrieved despite being elevated to a position contractually promised to another person who has more seniority and experience on the NBA beat.
ESPN removed Nichols from its Finals coverage for a day or two, and then figured out how to ease her back in without having her ever appear on the same show as Taylor. Even though Taylor won the battle to be the pregame and halftime host, it was obvious that this would be her last assignment with ESPN. After the NBA Finals ended, ESPN and Taylor announced that they have mutually agreed to part ways. Taylor will no doubt grab adoring headlines--and huge dollars--regardless of where she goes next.
No one would dream of putting together an NBA team based on some kind of proportional ethnic representation of the U.S. or world population, and it does not make any sense to put together any organization with such proportional ethnic representation as the goal. I don't care if the pregame/halftime host is White, Black, Asian, male, female, heterosexual, homosexual, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or belongs to any other racial group, gender, sexual orientation, and/or religion. All I care about is that the pregame/halftime host understands NBA basketball, and can be a "traffic cop" for the other participants in the broadcast. Bob Costas and Ernie Johnson are the gold standard for the past 30 years, if not all-time. We all know that Nichols and Taylor are nowhere near that level, and it is a reasonable assumption that ESPN bypassed more qualified candidates to put first Nichols and then Taylor in the role--and even if Nichols and Taylor are the best that ESPN has, the focus on "representation" will always leave lingering doubts about how they achieved prominence.
When the focus shifts from creating equal opportunities to creating equal outcomes, we all lose.
I cannot wait until the current NBA media contracts expire, and I hope that TNT will cover the NBA Finals under the next deal.
Just to put a bow on all of this, it should be mentioned that some ESPN basketball commentators/analysts are first rate, including Jeff Van Gundy, Mark Jackson, Tim Legler, and Jalen Rose. Hubie Brown's role has been reduced, but in his prime he was the absolute best, and he is still top notch even now. That is not an exhaustive list of qualified ESPN broadcasters, but the problem is that the unqualified ones are often provided the most attention, air time, and compensation.
Labels: ESPN, Giannis Antetokounmpo, hot takes gone wrong, Jalen Rose, Kendrick Perkins, Khris Middleton, Maria Taylor, Milwaukee Bucks, NBA, Rachel Nichols, Stephen A. Smith
posted by David Friedman @ 2:31 AM
Oklahoma City Versus Memphis Preview
Western Conference Second Round
#4 Oklahoma City (55-27) vs. #8 Memphis (46-36)
Season series: Memphis, 3-1
Memphis can win if…Zach Randolph and Marc Gasol control the paint, Mike Conley harasses Russell Westbrook into some inefficient shooting performances and Shane Battier (and Memphis' other wing defenders) hold Kevin Durant to under 25 ppg/.450 field goal shooting.
Oklahoma City will win because…Kendrick Perkins, Serge Ibaka, Nick Collison and Nazr Mohammed form a big, mobile and versatile frontcourt rotation that matches up very well with the Grizzlies' power forwards/centers. Ron Artest's physical defense in the first round of the 2010 playoffs slowed down Durant but Durant lit up the Denver Nuggets for 32.4 ppg on .471 field goal shooting in the first round of this year's playoffs and Durant is likely to post similar numbers against whoever Memphis throws at him. Conley did a credible job versus Tony Parker as the Grizzlies pulled off the rare first round upset of a number one seed but Westbrook is bigger, stronger and more athletic that Parker.
Other things to consider: Memphis won the regular season series 3-1 but Perkins did not play in any of those games. The Thunder now have all of the requisite parts to win a championship; the only thing that they lack is collective playoff experience (Perkins has championship experience from playing with the 2008 Boston Celtics but collectively the Thunder's current rotation with Perkins starting at center has not even been together for half a season).
TNT's Charles Barkley predicted that Memphis would beat San Antonio and he was right that the Grizzlies' frontcourt was too big for the Spurs to contain but I still think that Memphis' victory is surprising, if not shocking. Granted, the Spurs have an aging nucleus and each of their three top players experienced some kind of injury in the last month or so but the Spurs were the best and most consistent team in the NBA from October until the end of March; this is just the fourth time that an eighth seed defeated a number one seed since the creation of the current playoff format in 1984 and there were extenuating circumstances for at least two of the previous upsets: in the lockout-shortened 50 game 1999 season the 27-23 New York Knicks were only six games behind the 33-17 Miami Heat, while in the 2007 season the Golden State Warriors used a gimmicky small lineup and rode a wave of great three point shooting to knock off the shell-shocked Dallas Mavericks, a team that seemed to be psyched out before the series began when Dallas Coach Avery Johnson changed a starting lineup that had gone 37-6 during the regular season (the Mavericks finished 67-15 overall). This season was not distorted by a lockout, the Grizzlies did not use any gimmicks and the Spurs did not change their lineup (with the exception of Manu Ginobili missing game one); the Grizzlies just systematically outplayed a 61 win team whose core players helped the Spurs win the 2003, 2005 and 2007 NBA championships. Dirk Nowitzki and the Mavericks have been viewed with a somewhat jaundiced eye since their 2007 loss to Golden State, so I wonder how the Spurs' loss will affect the way that the Spurs are perceived; the Mavs in general and Nowitzki in particular have received a bum rap and I do not think that it would be right to just bash the Spurs--an aging team that has a championship pedigree--but it also would not be right to act as if the Spurs' loss is anything other than a very surprising and very disappointing ending for a team that had to be considered a legit championship contender based on their track record and based on how well they played over the course of the 2010-11 season.
Labels: Kendrick Perkins, Kevin Durant, Marc Gasol, Memphis Grizzlies, Oklahoma City Thunder, Russell Westbrook, Zach Randolph
posted by David Friedman @ 2:00 AM
Trade Deadline Deals Show How LeBron's "Decision" is Reshaping the NBA
LeBron James' infamous "Decision" is reshaping the NBA and may ultimately result in a lockout that could cancel at least part of the 2011-2012 season. This is not about whether James was (1) right that his best option was to leave Cleveland for Miami and/or (2) whether James handled the free agency process appropriately; I already
addressed both of those issues soon after James commandeered an hour of ESPN's schedule to, among other things, shred whatever remained of Jim Gray's journalistic integrity. No, this is about all the dominoes that have inevitably crashed down since last summer when LeBron James and Chris Bosh joined forces with Dwyane Wade to form a trio that looks so powerful on paper that the normally analytical Jeff Van Gundy temporarily lost his mind and predicted a 75-7 season for the Heat (who are currently 43-16 and on pace to finish with the 60 victories that I predicted they would collect). Technically, Amare Stoudemire's decision to leave Phoenix to go to New York preceded James' "Decision" by a few days but there are many reasons that James' action has become a capitalized buzzword (not the least of those reasons being that the Heat are legitimate title contenders while the Knicks, despite all of the media buzz, are barely above .500 at the moment); Stoudemire's choice was less shocking to the NBA's system because Phoenix was not willing to give Stoudemire a max deal--fearing that his knees may not be a good long term investment--so it was not a big surprise when Stoudemire went for the cash (though Knicks' fans who expected to receive LeBron James as their Christmas in July present may have been surprised to find Stoudemire in their stockings).
The current NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is set up to encourage each superstar to re-sign with the team that drafted him; that team can offer such players both the most money and the longest term deal. Until last summer, no elite free agent had spurned that extra cash and extra security to go elsewhere. On paper, the system seemed ideal: players had the right to seek greener pastures, which thereby provided owners a significant incentive to build a solid enough organization/roster so that their star players would not want to leave. In the "bad old days" before free agency, teams essentially owned players for life after drafting them but the current CBA balanced players' rights with owners' (and fans') desires to not lose cornerstone players.
Throughout his tenure in Cleveland, James enjoyed being coy about his intentions, never indicating whether he planned to stay or go (and ultimately alienating fans in cities across the country who became convinced that James was just flirting with those other towns but really planned to commit to them). While it could be argued that this provided great incentive to ownership/management to spend money to build a strong team it could also be argued that this discouraged other free agents from signing with the Cavs in prior seasons and that it led to a short term plan centered on acquiring veteran players as opposed to a long term plan that would have created a better roster eventually but may not have led to an immediate championship; the way things turned out, the Cavs made it to the 2007 NBA Finals, rebooted their team and made it to the 2009 Eastern Conference Finals (after posting the league's best regular season record) and then rebooted their team again before posting the league's best regular season record in 2010 only to fall short in the Eastern Conference semifinals. The Cavs basically catered to every great and small whim that James ever expressed and then they offered him the max deal for max years, never dreaming of or planning for the possibility that he might actually bolt town. Some might argue that James, Wade and Bosh unselfishly left money on the table in order to try to build a championship team in Miami but the reality is that they gave up little if any real dollars when one factors in the taxes they saved (Florida does not have a state income tax) and the extra endorsements that they likely will receive from playing in the Miami market--and that is the brilliance of what Pat Riley pulled off: he figured out how to bring three max players into the fold for less than max dollars in a way that those players still essentially received max dollars. Also, this may sound flippant but the reality is that if the number one goal for any of these free agents was truly to win a championship then they would have accepted the midlevel exception (or some similar deal) to join forces with Kobe Bryant in L.A.; winning a championship may be a goal for some or all of these guys but getting paid is the first goal and being "the Man" is a secondary goal (at least for James and Stoudemire; Bosh seems to understand and accept that he is not, in fact, "the Man").
Forget how the media hyperventilated about all of this, with Cleveland media members shamelessly ripping James after seven years of (wrongly) elevating him far above Kobe Bryant (James only passed Bryant, as a regular season performer, quite recently and never by the margin that his sycophants suggested), while national media members breathlessly declared that the Heat would instantly become one of the greatest teams ever and "stat gurus" asserted that the Heat would actually win 90 out of 82 games due to the combined "advanced statistical" prowess of James, Wade and Bosh; disregard all of the hype and all of the nonsense: James' "Decision" was an Earth shattering event for the powers that be in the NBA and a massive paradigm shift whose implications are only now being fully appreciated. Owners looked at what James did and became terrified that their own star players might leave; star players looked at what James did and began plotting how to arrive at their dream destinations. The perfect storm that produced the Cavs' epic collapse this season (a subject worthy of full length treatment in a separate article) added fuel to the fire; no owner wanted to end up like Dan Gilbert--jilted and howling at the moon with his franchise's value plummeting with each double digit loss--and no star player wanted to replace James as Public Enemy Number One.
The dominoes began to fall. While many people point to the "Melo-drama" saga as perhaps the first reaction to the implications of James' "Decision," it would be more accurate to say that Orlando's
desperate midseason trades were that first domino: the Magic dealt two starters (former All-Stars Vince Carter and Rashard Lewis), arguably the best backup center in the league (Marcin Gortat) and their best perimeter defender (Mickael Pietrus) because they were already concerned that if they did not make a serious NBA Finals push this season then Dwight Howard may walk when his contract expires. Much like James' refusal to commit to Cleveland influenced the Cavs to seek short term roster solutions instead of developing their roster with a long range view, the Magic went for broke because they lacked confidence in the team's ability to win a title right now. I understand the bind that the Magic are in and I don't blame General Manager Otis Smith for rolling the dice but I also predicted that those deals were more likely to remove Orlando from championship contention than they were to vault Orlando past Miami and Boston--and that is exactly what has happened: the Magic are 21-13 since remaking their roster (just 8-7 in the past month) and they look like they are competing not for an NBA Finals berth but rather to avoid first round elimination. Hedo Turkoglu seems to be past his prime and/or satisfied with his big contract, Gilbert Arenas was always overrated and is now a shell of his former self and even Jason Richardson--the best player the Magic acquired--has hardly set the world on fire. The Magic have the second highest payroll in the league (behind only the two-time defending champion L.A. Lakers) but, even more ominously, Arenas is not only their highest paid player this season but is slated to be their highest paid player through the 2013-14 season. How thrilled do you think Howard is about that? The problem is not just that Arenas makes more than Howard: the problem is that Arenas is a non-productive player who is taking up salary cap space that could have potentially been used much more effectively. Arenas' advocates--and he inexplicably has many of them, ranging from fawning media members to "stat guru" fanboys like Neil Paine--will no doubt argue that Arenas was a great player before suffering knee injuries but (1) that is irrelevant to the Magic, who cannot put Arenas in a "hot tub time machine" to fix his knees and (2) Arenas was never as productive as his fans/"stat guru" admirers insisted, a point that I
established definitively when I refuted Paine's tendentious assertion that Arenas was once an elite player; the truth is that even when Arenas was in his prime he had no discernible impact in the standings: the Wizards were roughly a .500 team when he played and they were roughly a .500 team when he didn't play.
The Magic saw what happened with LeBron James and Cleveland and were so terrified that they decided that making Arenas their highest paid player is a risk worth taking if it even slightly increases the probability that Howard might stay in Orlando. How crazy is that? Arenas is averaging 7.8 ppg with the Magic, while denting rims across the country with his .234 three point shooting, .698 free throw shooting and his .336 overall field goal percentage. Remember, the Magic owe Arenas more than $60 million through 2014, there is no way that they will be able to trade him and the only way that Arenas fails to receive that money from Orlando is if there is a lockout or if he actually fires his guns in the locker room (just bringing them into the locker room in Washington apparently was not enough to get his contract voided). No, the Magic will not be winning a championship any time soon but someone should turn Coach Stan Van Gundy's "Wired" segments into a reality TV show; that show, along with the inevitable "stat guru" articles trying to explain that Arenas really was an elite player once despite all rational evidence to the contrary, will provide some great unintentional comic relief.
On to the next "Decision" domino. The main storylines this season should have been the Lakers trying to threepeat (and trying to accomplish the
even rarer feat of reaching the NBA Finals for the fourth straight time, something that has only been achieved by the Showtime Lakers, the Bird-McHale-Parish Celtics and Bill Russell's dynastic Celtics), the Spurs potentially making a run at 70 wins, the reloaded Celtics attempting to reach the Finals for the third time in four years and Miami's newly assembled trio battling to compete with the three aforementioned established powers--but instead we have been saturated with "Melo-drama."
Denver offered Carmelo Anthony a contract extension but Anthony refused to sign, made it known privately (more or less) that he would like to play for the New York Knicks and thus issued an ultimatum to Nuggets' management (but retained plausible deniability because he never uttered his ultimatum publicly): trade me now or lose me for nothing later (like Cleveland lost James). Anthony saw that James' approach--being coy and not making his intentions clear to his team or his fans--may have been good for ESPN's ratings but it was terrible for James' image, so Anthony tried to make a smoother version of James' power play, though Anthony did utter his share of tone deaf statements (capped off when Anthony said "I have to take my hat off to myself" because he was so proud of how he handled the challenge of deciding where he is going to live for the next few years while making tens of millions of dollars playing basketball).
Anthony essentially held at least three franchises (Denver, New York, New Jersey) hostage for months and took away attention from what really matters--great players playing basketball at a high level. Technically, Anthony did not do anything wrong and yet it mystifies me that anyone can believe that this is a sustainable business model for the NBA. The Nuggets finally ended the "Melo-drama" by shipping Anthony (plus Chauncey Billups and other considerations) to New York in exchange for several quality players plus some draft picks; in a heartfelt press conference, Denver General Manager Masai Ujiri explained how wrenching it was to trade hometown hero Billups and candidly said that the Nuggets were "killed" in the deal, a historically accurate sentiment based on the majority of previous trades consisting of stars being exchanged for solid players. The ironic thing is that I am far from convinced that the Knicks have suddenly become a legitimate contender nor am I sure that the Nuggets really got "killed" (though Ujiri was right to lament the way things went down and was also probably firing a shot across the bow in anticipation of the upcoming CBA showdown this summer); not only do I not see the Knicks winning the East any time soon I suspect that they will lose in the first round of the playoffs (unless they luck out and run into the Magic, perhaps), while the Nuggets--relieved of the huge dark cloud hanging over their heads--will probably move up in the West standings, though they too are likely first round fodder (which is no different than their fate during most of Anthony's Denver career).
The next domino seemingly took everyone by surprise but actually makes a lot of sense in light of everything that preceded it: as soon as the Nets lost out on Anthony they made a deal to acquire Deron Williams, who--as Kevin McHale astutely noted--is actually a better all-around player than Anthony. Williams had some undefined role in Utah Coach Jerry Sloan's sudden midseason retirement and Williams sent strong signals that he--like James, Anthony and possibly Howard--intended to head elsewhere when his current contract ends. The Jazz, mindful of what happened to Cleveland (collapse), Orlando (panicky deals that seemingly are backfiring like an exploding cigar) and Denver (enervating drama) tried to avoid the dreaded horsemen of Collapse, Panic and Drama by shipping Williams out in exchange for an All-Star point guard (Devin Harris), a promising young player (Derrick Favors) and three first round picks. Historically speaking, the Jazz got "killed" (to borrow Ujiri's terminology) because they lost one of the top 10-15 players in the league but in today's crazy NBA world they made out pretty well: they obtained two players who can help them now plus three draft picks that will hopefully either provide an infusion of youthful talent or else be useful in future trades. By acting so quickly the Jazz also prevented Williams from hijacking the season and circumvented any attempts he might have made to choose his destination a la Carmelo Anthony.
The next domino was smaller but perhaps even more surprising: the Boston Celtics, believing that they will not be able to re-sign Kendrick Perkins when his contract expired after this season, traded the starting center from their 2008 championship team (plus reserve guard Nate Robinson) to Oklahoma City for Jeff Green and Nenad Krstic. The Celtics added versatility and shooting but they lost a key part of the physical presence that defined their team's identity; Perkins and Kevin Garnett set hard (semi-legal) screens, grabbed tough rebounds in traffic and patrolled the paint defensively, making life easier for perimeter All-Stars Paul Pierce, Ray Allen and Rajon Rondo. Without Perkins' bulk and toughness, Garnett will not be as daunting a presence (Garnett has shown that he likes to pick on smaller, younger players, while Perkins has shown that he will get in anyone's grill). Perkins is not a superstar--or even an All-Star--but the first thing I thought of when I heard about this trade is the infamous (for Boston fans) Paul Silas fiasco. Red Auerbach did not make many bad moves during his long, distinguished career as a coach and executive but he often said that his biggest mistake was trading Silas to Denver in 1976 instead of meeting Silas' contract demands; Auerbach admitted that he failed to realize Silas' true value. Silas eventually landed in Seattle, where he provided toughness in the paint, mentored a young
Jack Sikma and helped the Sonics reach the NBA Finals in 1978 and 1979 (Seattle won the 1979 title). Meanwhile, the Celtics, who won two championships in Silas' four years with the team, became a doormat until the arrival of Bird (and later McHale and Parish) revived the franchise. The Perkins-Silas comparison is not perfect--no comparison is--but the similarities are eerie: both players were traded because of financial (not performance) issues, both players had played key (but intangible) roles for championship teams and both players went from a veteran Boston team to the same young, aspiring Western Conference franchise (the Oklahoma City Thunder used to be the Seattle SuperSonics). The main difference is that Silas was a wily veteran near the end of his career while Perkins is a young veteran just entering his prime but it will be interesting to see what impact this trade has on both franchises in the next five years. Perkins could turn out to be the final piece in the Thunder's championship puzzle (not necessarily this season but soon) and he could also turn out to be Danny Ainge's biggest regret. Lakers Coach Phil Jackson delivered the best zinger, wryly noting, "Doc (Rivers) had touted the fact that the (Boston) starting five had never lost a playoff series. I'm sure most everybody has heard it in the NBA, that this starting five has never lost a playoff series. Well, they go down without ever having lost a playoff series." Ainge, seeking to avoid the aforementioned deadly horsemen of Collapse, Panic and Drama, perhaps believes that Green's versatility and Krstic's shooting will make up for Perkins' size/toughness but it is very bold to tinker with the starting lineup of a one-time champion/two-time Finalist that is contending for the best record in the East. Perhaps Ainge has more moves up his sleeve but it sure looks like the Celtics should have let things ride with Perkins, tried to win the 2011 title and then dealt with Perkins' contract at a later date; if I were Ainge, I'd rather win a championship even if it meant losing Perkins for nothing later then trade Perkins now just for the sake of getting a leg up on the inevitable rebuilding project after Allen, Garnett and Pierce retire.
The footnote to the Boston situation is that a major reason that the Celtics felt comfortable trading Perkins is that they believe that Shaquille O'Neal can take his place as a 20-25 mpg physical force in this year's postseason; this is the same O'Neal whose departure from Cleveland is never mentioned when people talk about the Cavs' collapse sans James. I will discuss this in greater detail in a separate article but the fact that arguably the best team in the East has installed O'Neal as their starting center (and the other top team in the East, Miami, has used Zydrunas Ilgauskas--Cleveland's backup center last season--as their starting center in most of their games) is a not so subtle indication that it is foolish to pretend that Cleveland only lost one important player this season. Another fun fact worth pondering is that this season the Miami "Superfriends" are likely going to combine to produce fewer wins than James and the Cavs totaled in either of the previous two seasons; I still say that it would not surprise me at all if James never wins more regular season games in his best season with Miami than he did as a Cavalier and I just cannot fathom the supposed logic that suggests "James plus trash equals 66 and 61 wins but James plus two top 15 players equals 60 wins or less"--if James really won all those games by himself in Cleveland then he should indeed be able to win 90 games out of 82 in Miami as the "stat gurus" predicted; since James and the Heat are not quite as good as so many people expected it would be reasonable to at least consider the possibility that defensive-minded coaching and a solid, deep supporting cast may have had something to do with Cleveland's record the past two seasons. Yes, I am fully aware that James and the Heat will be judged not by regular season wins but by playoff success (or failure); I have made that exact point many times--and I am also not convinced that the Heat are a lock to have more playoff success in the next four seasons than the Cavs did in the previous four (two trips to the Eastern Conference Finals and one trip to the NBA Finals).
Time will tell the significance of the Perkins deal and time will enable us to make sensible evaluations of James' supporting casts in Cleveland and Miami--but the Orlando, Denver, Utah and (to a lesser extent) Boston dominoes will shape the NBA for years to come on the court and also will likely culminate in the final domino this summer: a lockout that continues until the owners and players agree to fundamentally restructure the league's failing business model.
Labels: Boston Celtics, Carmelo Anthony, Cleveland Cavaliers, Denver Nuggets, Deron Williams, Kendrick Perkins, LeBron James, Miami Heat, Oklahoma City Thunder, Orlando Magic, Paul Silas, Utah Jazz
posted by David Friedman @ 4:56 AM
The Difference Between Measuring Defense in Basketball and Baseball
The April 6, 2009 issue of
Sports Illustrated contains an article by Albert Chen titled
Baseball's Next Top Models; Chen describes how baseball teams are using advanced statistics to ascertain which players are the best fielders at each position. The Tampa Bay Rays won the 2008 American League championship largely because they tremendously improved their defense by using advanced statistics as the basis for various personnel moves and for deciding how to most effectively deploy the players on their roster to maximize their defensive skills (for instance, they moved Akinori Iwamura from third base to second base not only because his defensive statistics are better at the latter position but also to make room for Evan Longoria to be called up as the new third baseman). Baseball statisticians have access to data that pinpoints where every single batted ball went and whether or not the fielder converted that play into an out. Although there are at least 10 players on a baseball field at any given time (one pitcher, eight fielders, one batter--assuming that there are no men on base), virtually everything that happens when the ball is in play can be broken down into a series of discrete, one on one actions: the pitcher throws the ball, the batter swings and, if he makes contact, a fielder attempts to catch the ball. Therefore, if one gathers together a large enough sample size of data, it is possible to create reliable models regarding pitchers, batters and fielders.
Obviously, basketball is a much more fluid and complex sport than baseball, at least in terms of constructing meaningful statistical models: even during an "isolation" play ostensbily involving only one ballhandler and one defender the other eight players on the court all have the potential to affect what will happen--the other four defenders may end up trapping and rotating, while the other four offensive players (depending on their size and skill sets) may be called upon to set a screen, cut to the hoop, spot up for an open jump shot or grab an offensive rebound. The play may result in an offensive rebound tip dunk or a made three pointer that never would have happened if the original ballhandler had not been talented enough to attract extra defensive attention but in the box score that original ballhandler may either receive credit for nothing (if he passes the ball and the recipient then swings it to a player who ultimately makes a three pointer) or he may even record a negative statistic (a missed field goal attempt) despite the fact that his actions directly led to the opening that created the putback opportunity.
Clearly, it is difficult for basketball statistics to fully capture what happens offensively; progress has been made in this regard but it is far from an exact science--and it is even more challenging to accurately measure basketball defense, particularly on an individual level. A perfect example of why individual basketball defense is tough to quantify took place in the first quarter of Boston's 106-104 game five overtime victory versus Chicago: Kendrick Perkins caught the ball on the left block versus Tyrus Thomas, spun baseline and scored a layup. TNT's Doug Collins noted that Thomas had positioned himself by Perkins' left shoulder (i.e., overplaying Perkins to force him to go to the baseline) because Perkins' best move from that spot is to go to the middle and shoot a jump hook; Thomas was supposed to receive help on the baseline--on an earlier play, help defender Derrick Rose stole the ball so easily from Perkins it looked like Rose was receiving a football handoff--but this time the help never arrived. How would a basketball "stat guru" evaluate that play in terms of Thomas' individual defense? Thomas' defensive rating would indicate that he allowed Perkins to score against him. Plus/minus data would award Perkins a +2 and Thomas a -2 and would also "indict" the other Bulls' defenders who were on the court at that time but would not reveal who was really at fault. A knowledgeable basketball observer would understand--as Collins immediately explained to the viewers--that Thomas did what he was supposed to do but that the help defender never arrived. Multiply this type of scenario over thousands of plays during the course of a season and it is easy to see why someone who watches basketball with understanding may come to a completely different conclusion about a player's value/skill set than someone who relies on nothing but numbers.
What about the success that Houston's General Manager Daryl Morey has had using advanced basketball statistics, as detailed in a
New York Times article that I discussed
here? If basketball statistical analysis is truly science and not pseudoscience, then it has to be based on the principles of
the scientific method:
- Ask a Question
- Do Background Research
- Construct a Hypothesis
- Test Your Hypothesis by Doing an Experiment
- Analyze Your Data and Draw a Conclusion
- Communicate Your Results
One "hypothesis" mentioned in the
New York Times article is that Daryl Morey and his staff of numbers crunchers can use advanced basketball statistics to devise a game plan to slow down Kobe Bryant, the 2008 MVP and a two-time scoring champion. If we consider the four games that Bryant's Lakers played against Morey's Rockets this season to be the "experiment," then the "data" show not only that Bryant's Lakers won all four contests (with a convincing 13.0 ppg differential) but that Bryant averaged 28.3 ppg versus Houston while shooting .530 from the field and .533 from three point range, exceeding his overall regular season averages in all three categories; oddly, Bryant's free throw percentage versus Houston was only .680 (well below his .856 regular season average) but I doubt that even the most ardent advocates of basketball statistical analysis will claim that this is a result of Houston's "free throw defense." So, the results of this "experiment" show that advanced basketball statistics have yet to enable Houston to defend Bryant more successfully than other NBA teams--and this is despite the fact that the Rockets have two of the best one on one perimeter defenders in the NBA (Ron Artest and Shane Battier) plus a 7-6 shotblocking center (Yao Ming).
Don't think that I am picking on Morey or Houston; as I wrote in my PBN article cited above, I appreciate that Morey is fully aware of the current limitations of basketball statistical analysis:
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that Morey is not merely looking at spreadsheets and randomly assigning arcane values to certain combinations of numbers; statistics give him an indication of what to look for when he watches game film but he still has to watch game film to determine why players are putting up the numbers they do and to figure out what exactly those numbers mean.
In other words, Morey appears to understand the limits of a purely mathematical approach to the game and thus uses numbers to confirm what his eyes tell him -- and vice versa. This is a completely different approach from the one taken by far too many stat gurus who are so enamored with their formulas that they dismiss the importance of actually watching games -- perhaps because they are in fact not truly capable of watching basketball games with any real understanding of what is happening on the court.
It is a laudable goal for basketball statisticians to strive to analyze the sport as effectively as baseball statisticians evaluate baseball but when "stat gurus" and their buddies in the writing business act as if basketball has already been "solved" from an analytical/statistical standpoint they are actually hurting their cause more than helping it, because intelligent observers can plainly see that such claims are false. As Cleveland General Manager Danny Ferry
recently told me about basketball statistical analysis, "to just make decisions off of statistics would be a mistake but it can be an important part of the equation in basketball." It would be foolish for an NBA GM to not look at statistical data but it would be even more foolish for him to rely solely or even primarily on such data at this juncture; in the Perkins/Thomas example, it is much more useful for a GM or coach to know that Thomas did what he was assigned to do--and to find out which player missed the help assignment--than to get a spreadsheet filled with numbers detailing how many times Perkins scored in the post with Thomas as the primary defender, because without the proper context that data could be dangerously misleading if it influenced the GM or coach to make a negative evaluation of Thomas' defense.
Labels: basketball statistical analysis, Boston Celtics, Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, Kendrick Perkins, Kobe Bryant, Shane Battier, Tyrus Thomas
posted by David Friedman @ 4:48 AM
Celtics Edge Rockets in an Intriguing Early Season Encounter
The Boston Celtics defeated the Houston Rockets 103-99 in Houston in a game that some people touted as an NBA Finals preview. Obviously, such talk is extremely premature--at this time last year no one could have imagined that the Celtics and the Lakers would meet in the 2008 NBA Finals--but it is still interesting to examine some of the things that this contest demonstrated:
1) Both teams pride themselves on defense and rebounding but the Celtics won in both of those areas, holding Houston to .391 field goal shooting (Boston shot .519 from the field despite off nights from Paul Pierce and Kevin Garnett) and outrebounding the Rockets 46-41. Are the Rockets mentally and physically tough enough to truly contend with the league's elite teams? Every year the Rockets go out of the playoffs in the first round. The addition of Ron Artest is supposed to bolster Houston in this respect but he cannot guard all five players at once--and despite his tough defense his game is not without flaws, either (see below).
2) The Celtics--specifically Kevin Garnett and Kendrick Perkins--set the best illegal screens in the NBA; the Celtics maintained their lead down the stretch by repeatedly running Ray Allen (29 points on 11-15 shooting) off of double baseline moving screens set by Garnett and Perkins. Tracy McGrady did not seem particularly enthusiastic about fighting his way through those screens. Finally, the Rockets switched Artest on to Allen and put McGrady on Pierce. Artest smothered Allen so much that he could barely breathe, let alone touch the ball, though Allen did break free long enough to receive one pass before Artest bulled his way through traffic and forced Allen to give up the ball to an open Garnett, who buried a long jumper to put Boston up 100-95 with :59 left. The Celtics are a big, physical team that pushes, holds and grabs at both ends of the court and it will take a physical, tough-minded team to beat them in a seven game series.
3) Skillful finesse players--particularly frontcourt players--face a major challenge against Boston. We saw Pau Gasol and Lamar Odom all but disappear in the 2008 NBA Finals after being effective throughout the regular season and through the first three rounds of the playoffs, including a victory over the defending champion Spurs. Yao Ming towers over Perkins, yet Perkins pushed him around, blocked several of his shots and put up better box score numbers (15 points on 7-8 shooting, seven rebounds and four blocked shots compared to eight points on 4-14 shooting, seven rebounds and no blocked shots for Yao). Even though Yao struggled at times, when he was out of the game the Rockets looked even worse because then their frontline was simply too small. It will be very interesting to see how the Rockets match up with the Lakers, who will always have a big and skillful center-power forward duo on the court.
4) Ron Artest certainly brings a tough mindset at the defensive end of the court but true toughness is also defined by having a sound decision making process under pressure. Artest shot 3-16 from the field, including 3-10 from three point range. There is no reason that Artest should be firing up 10 three pointers in a game; he'd be far more effective using that big body to set screens for the team's shooters and then crashing the offensive boards--but despite his reputation, Artest has never been a great rebounder for his size or position. He did have seven rebounds against Boston but he has never averaged more than 6.5 rpg in a season during his career and his career average is just 5.1 rpg, a number befitting a shooting guard but not a bruising small forward who is built like a power forward. Artest only participated in the playoffs four times in his first nine seasons and only got out of the first round once, so he has a lot to prove in terms of truly being a difference maker at an elite level.
5) Kevin Garnett is in a perfect situation. He has never truly wanted to assert himself offensively or be the main man down the stretch of ball games and on this team he does not have to shoulder those responsibilities; although he did nail the big jumper off of the feed from Allen, Garnett only had four fourth quarter points and he spent most of the final stanza setting screens for Allen. Garnett is a multi-dimensional player who is a brilliant rebounder and defender and yet in a peculiar way he is also a role player. Can you picture Shaquille O'Neal anonymously setting baseline screens during his prime, let alone being happy with such a task? I know that it is tempting for Celtics' fans to compare Garnett to Bill Russell but Bill Russell was a dominant rebounder (well over 20 rpg) and shotblocker whose presence was felt on almost every possession. Garnett can be dominant in stretches but there are also stretches when you don't even notice that he is on the court. He finished with 14 points on 6-15 shooting--mostly jump shots--and 11 rebounds. He had one blocked shot and a -8 plus/minus rating. If Garnett did not have Ray Allen to score 11 fourth quarter points to secure the win then one could look at Garnett's production and rightly wonder what is so special about his game--but on this team what he provided is just enough and meshes well with what the other players contribute.
6) The difference between Boston and Houston's offensive execution was dramatic. This was not just a matter of one team making shots and the other team missing. The Celtics knew where they wanted the ball to go and how to get it there, while the Rockets often looked disjointed. Of course, Boston is a great defensive team while Houston is still trying to integrate Artest into the game plan but if the Rockets are planning on getting out of the West--let alone winning a title--then they will have to make some big strides on offense. Tracy McGrady (26 points, including 19 points on 6-13 field goal shooting in the second half) had to single-handedly carry the Rockets' offense in the second half as Artest (1-8) and Yao (1-10) shot 2-18 from the field. Artest has always believed that he should be the number one offensive option on his team and while his confidence may be a good trait in some regards it is not at all helpful in this area: Artest should be no more than the third option on the Rockets, with the scoring distribution being something along the lines of 25 ppg for Yao, 23 ppg for McGrady and perhaps 15 ppg for Artest. Rafer Alston, Shane Battier (when he returns to action), Brent Barry and McGrady should be attempting more three pointers than Artest, who currently ranks first on the squad in three pointers attempted. Even though Artest can make three pointers, he should be capable of getting in the paint and fighting for offensive rebounds, while those other players are smaller, leaner athletes who belong on the perimeter. If Artest is shooting three pointers then what are those other players supposed to be doing? This is not the Parks and Recreation Department League where you just go out and shoot three pointers if you feel like it; each player has to fill the proper role for the team to be successful. Pierce and Allen gave up shot attempts and reduced their scoring averages to play for a winner. Can Artest accept without complaint being the third leading scorer and not taking an excessive amount of three point shots?
Perhaps some of these observations may seem like nitpicking. After all, if the Rockets made a couple more shots or got a couple more stops then they could have won the game--but that is not the right way to analyze basketball, because it could just as easily be said that if Pierce and Garnett had shot their normal percentages then the Celtics would have won comfortably. The reality is that the next time these teams play the statistics put up by individual players will probably differ to some degree but the overall patterns--Boston's physical play and tough defense, Yao's difficulty dealing with physical defenders, Artest's wavering concentration on offense--will not change. During their 3-0 start prior to this game the Rockets showed that they have enough talent to win at least 50-55 games and position themselves to make a good postseason run but if they want to truly be an elite team that advances in the playoffs then they will have to play smarter and tougher at both ends of the court.
Labels: Boston Celtics, Houston Rockets, Kendrick Perkins, Kevin Garnett, Paul Pierce, Ray Allen, Ron Artest, Tracy McGrady, Yao Ming
posted by David Friedman @ 3:50 AM
Celtics Survive Late Detroit Rally to Win Game Five, 106-102
The Boston Celtics dominated the paint, built a 17 point second half lead and withstood a big fourth quarter rally by the Detroit Pistons to post a 106-102 victory in game five of the Eastern Conference Finals. The Celtics are one win away from making their first trip to the NBA Finals since 1987. Kevin Garnett scored a game-high 33 points on 11-17 field goal shooting. He only had seven rebounds, he committed a team-high five turnovers and he did most of his scoring by making jumpers instead of posting up but scoring that many points on that kind of shooting in a pressure-packed game--more than 80% of game five winners in 2-2 series advance--is very impressive. While Garnett poured in jumpers from all angles, Kendrick Perkins did the dirty work in the paint, scoring a playoff career-high 18 points on 8-11 shooting and grabbing a playoff career-high 16 rebounds. Ray Allen had his best game of this year's playoffs, scoring 29 points on 9-15 field goal shooting, including a blistering 5-6 from three point range. Add those numbers up and you will find that Boston's top three scorers in this game shot 28-43 (.651) from the field. Paul Pierce had a solid game as well (16 points on 5-11 shooting, six assists, five rebounds). Rajon Rondo scored seven points and he shot just 3-14 from the field but he played a well rounded floor game, accumulating 13 assists, six rebounds and four steals while only having one turnover. Boston's bench only scored three points in 30 minutes of combined playing time as Celtics Coach Doc Rivers shortened his rotation tremendously.
Chauncey Billups led Detroit with 26 points and six assists, while Richard Hamilton had 25 points and six assists but also committed a game-high six turnovers. Hamilton injured his right elbow late in the game and had his arm in a sling when he left the arena, although preliminary X-rays were negative. Rasheed Wallace shot 6-9 from three point range and finished with 18 points but he only had four rebounds. Billups and Antonio McDyess led Detroit with five rebounds each.
I have repeatedly said that the three keys for the Celtics to win this series are their defensive field goal percentage, their rebounding and their ability to outscore the Pistons in the paint. Perceptive readers will note that those categories are interrelated. In game five, the Celtics shot 37-73 (.507) from the field while holding the Pistons to 31-67 (.463) shooting. During the season the Celtics had a much better defensive field goal percentage than that; nevertheless, the Celtics still outshot the Pistons and in a close game between teams that are fairly evenly matched that is very important. The Celtics outrebounded the Pistons 42-25; at halftime, Perkins had more rebounds (13) than Detroit's entire team (11)! The Celtics outscored the Pistons 36-16 in the paint and they have enjoyed double digit leads in this department in four of the five games. Looking at those numbers, it would seem like the Celtics should have won game five by a more comfortable margin. Detroit made up some ground by enjoying an edge in free throws made (29-24), by shooting excellently from three point range (11-21) and by forcing 17 turnovers.
In a harbinger of things to come, the Celtics scored their first points of the game by completely breaking down Detroit's defense in the paint: Pierce passed to Kevin Garnett in the high post and Garnett fed Perkins on the low block for a dunk. Boston built a 21-16 lead but the Pistons closed the first quarter with a 7-2 run to tie the score at 23-23.
The Pistons opened the second quarter with a 10-2 run to take their largest lead of the game. Eight of those points came on dunks and free throws. Detroit benefited from a dubious flagrant foul call when P.J. Brown contested Jason Maxiell's dunk attempt at the 10:28 mark. A flagrant foul is supposed to be called when there is excessive contact that includes a windup, a significant impact and a follow through; if all of those conditions are met then a flagrant two foul--resulting in immediate ejection of the guilty party--will be called, otherwise it is a flagrant one foul, which means that the offended team is awarded two free throws plus possession of the ball. The Brown-Maxiell play did not include any of the required elements, which Van Gundy and Mark Jackson both immediately noted (though not in so many words). Mike Breen defended the call, saying that making contact with an airborne player is dangerous. I am sympathetic with Breen's concerns and the issue he mentioned is precisely why I thought that the fouls by DeShawn Stevenson and Brendan Haywood against LeBron James and the foul by Jason Kidd against Jannero Pargo all warranted the flagrant designation. However, Brown's play was simply a clean, hard foul. Van Gundy predicted that the league office will rescind the flagrant foul in this instance but he noted that if the Celtics were to lose as a result of the free throws and extra possession then such an admission of error would be of little value.
Detroit's second quarter run was fueled in part by several Boston turnovers. Once the Celtics got their ballhandling under control they closed the quarter by outscoring the Pistons 27-13. Several of Boston's turnovers in this game resulted from overpassing as players who were open for shots instead tried to feed their teammates; Van Gundy said, "Sometimes the most unselfish play is taking the open shot"--which is
a point that I made regarding Kobe Bryant's 28 point, one assist performance in the Lakers' 93-91 win over the Spurs on Tuesday: "Bryant understands that when he is the open man he has to knock down shots; it is not unselfish to pass the ball when you are open and the player you are passing to is well defended." Van Gundy repeatedly admonished Garnett and Rondo for passing the ball when they were wide open. Some people ask why I often mention Bryant in posts about games in which he did not play but the answer to that should be obvious: Bryant is the best, most fundamentally sound player in the game, so it is often instructive to contrast the way that he plays with the way that other, less skilled players play. An uninformed person will look at a boxscore, see one assist by Bryant's name and 13 assists by Rondo's name and conclude that Bryant is selfish and Rondo is selfless--but an informed observer like Van Gundy understands that player evaluation must go a lot deeper than box score numbers. Statistics have great value but only when they are placed in proper context.
The Celtics extended their 52-46 halftime lead to 73-56 during the third quarter. Boston continued to punish Detroit on the glass and with points in the paint. Then, as Detroit scrambled to deal with those problems Allen suddenly found his shooting stroke and poured in 16 third quarter points. However, Van Gundy foreshadowed the close ending of the game when he observed that the Celtics began playing with less crispness on offense and less energy on defense after they got the big lead; he warned that such a loss of focus could let the Pistons get back in the game. Sure enough, the Pistons cut the margin to eight early in the fourth quarter and what could have been a Celtics rout turned into a real nail biter. It looked like the Celtics started playing not to lose rather than aggressively trying to win the game; Jackson said, "This is as poor an execution of pick and roll basketball to close out a game as I've ever seen." After Rodney Stuckey's three pointer at the 1:23 mark made the score 100-99 Boston, the Celtics seemed to be on the verge of a collapse like the one that Portland experienced versus the Lakers in the 2000 playoffs. The Celtics called a timeout and then ran a very nice play that led to Allen drilling an open jumper from just inside the three point line. Billups then missed two shots and Garnett missed a jumper. Rather than letting Detroit even attempt a tying three pointer, Rivers instructed his player to foul and essentially turn the final seconds of the game into a free throw contest. Stuckey made both of his free throws but Allen restored the three point advantage by also making two free throws. With the time remaining down to :04 and the Pistons out of timeouts, it became necessary for Detroit to try to make the first free throw, miss the second and then control the rebound. Ironically, Stuckey missed the first free throw while trying to make it and then made the second free throw while trying to miss it. Garnett closed out the scoring by sinking two clutch free throws to make it a two possession game.
The Pistons have made it to the Eastern Conference Finals for six straight seasons but unless they can win two games in a row against the team with the best regular season record in the NBA this will be their third consecutive defeat in this round of the playoffs. Their only two Finals appearances during the past six years came with Larry Brown as the coach and a young Ben Wallace patrolling the paint. Without Brown's leadership and Wallace's paint presence, the Pistons have simply not been the same team in the playoffs: they do not defend the paint well on a consistent basis against elite teams and their "liberation offense" is unproductive for long stretches.
Labels: Boston Celtics, Chauncey Billups, Detroit Pistons, Kendrick Perkins, Kevin Garnett, Paul Pierce, Ray Allen, Richard Hamilton, Rodney Stuckey
posted by David Friedman @ 6:59 AM
