Objectively Assessing Daryl Morey's Legacy
Daryl Morey, the Houston Rockets' General Manager since the 2007-08 season, has resigned, citing what he termed "personal reasons."* Paeans extolling his excellence are appearing in all of the usual sources one would be advised not to read if one wishes to understand basketball strategy. When objectively assessing Daryl Morey's legacy, it is important to focus on two factors: what he was hired to accomplish, and what he accomplished.
Daryl Morey was hired because he claimed that the way he utilized advanced basketball statistics provided a significant advantage for acquiring the best basketball talent, and that this significant advantage could be leveraged to build a championship team. He was not hired to build a team that could annually win at least 50 games, or that could win a playoff series or two; accomplishing those things was considered to be a given: Morey was hired as a "stat guru" with the goal of winning an NBA championship.
Daryl Morey served 13 years as Houston's General Manager and the Rockets never reached the NBA Finals during his tenure.
Daryl Morey failed to accomplish what he was hired to do.
One can take a wider view and see that Morey's Rockets had some notable accomplishments--but any assessment of Morey's tenure that does not first and foremost acknowledge that he failed is not an honest assessment. This is the same standard applied to athletes; the goal is to win a championship, and not winning a championship is failing to accomplish the goal. It is possible to have a great career and yet fail to win a championship--Elgin Baylor, Pete Maravich, Charles Barkley, Patrick Ewing, and Allen Iverson are Hall of Fame players who each failed to win an NBA championship--but it would be odd to suggest that not winning a championship is not a failure.
Is Daryl Morey a great general manager despite his failure to win a championship?
Daryl Morey proved that he could build teams that regularly reached the playoffs, that he could do so without tanking, and that he had a good eye for filling out his bench with solid players who had team-friendly contracts. He was above average in each of those three areas, but I am not convinced that means he was a great general manager.
The Rockets had the second best regular season record in the league during Morey's tenure, but did not come close to matching that success level during the postseason. Morey's Rockets reached the Conference Finals twice, missed the playoffs three times, and lost in the first round four times; thus, most of his teams were not championship contenders, and seven of his 13 teams did not advance past the first round.
How significant is it to reach the Conference Finals? Two teams advance that far each year in each conference, so if those appearances were evenly distributed over a 13 year period with 15 teams in each conference then each team would average 1.7 Conference Finals appearances. In the past 13 years, 10 Eastern Conference teams and 10 Western Conference teams made at least one Conference Finals appearance and six teams in each conference made at least two Conference Finals appearances.
Reaching the Conference Finals two times in a 13 year period is not particularly impressive, it is not elite, and it does not signify greatness.
How significant is it to miss the playoffs just three times in 13 years? Seven teams miss the playoffs each year in each conference, so if those missed playoff appearances were distributed evenly over a 13 year period with 15 teams in each conference then each team would average 6.1 years in which they missed the playoffs.
Missing the playoffs just three times in 13 years is definitely better than average.
How significant is it to lose in the first round four times in 13 years? Four teams lose in the first round each year in each conference, so if those losses were evenly distributed over a 13 year period with 15 teams in each conference then each team would average 3.5 first round losses.
Having four first round losses in 13 years is an average performance.
There have been some awful teams during the past 13 years. The Sacramento Kings missed the playoffs every year, the Phoenix Suns missed the playoffs 11 times, the New York Knicks missed the playoffs 10 times, and the Charlotte Hornets missed the playoffs 10 times.
There have been some great teams during the past 13 years. Four teams in each conference won at least one championship, while three teams (Golden State, L.A. Lakers, Miami Heat) won at least two championships.
Morey's Rockets were not awful, but they were not great. He was not an awful general manager, but it is difficult to make an objective, fact based argument that he was a great general manager. Of all people, he should appreciate that approach, because he believes in what the numbers say, not what the eye test or a narrative might suggest.
It is impossible to close the book on the Morey era without discussing James Harden. Morey's most significant and memorable transaction was acquiring Harden, who Morey immediately termed a "foundational player" and who Morey later proclaimed to be a better scorer than Michael Jordan.
Before Harden played a game for Houston, I evaluated him as an All-Star caliber player (Harden had yet to make the All-Star team) who was best suited to being the second or third option on a championship team, a la Manu Ginobili. I termed Harden the kind of player who "stat gurus" overrate, because "stat gurus" assume that an efficient bench player will be equally efficient if given extended minutes, even while facing more defensive attention as the first option. I called Harden "a very good player" but I concluded, "Harden is not an All-NBA First or Second Team caliber player. He is not
someone who can draw double teams over the course of an 82 game season
and then carry a team deep into the playoffs as the number one option.
He is not Shaquille O'Neal, Tim Duncan, Kobe Bryant or LeBron James."
James Harden became a perennial All-Star, a perennial All-NBA selection, and a perennial MVP candidate. I did not expect that and I did not expect that Harden could be successful as the number one option for an 82 game season year after year. He has been more durable and productive during the regular season than I expected, though in terms of the honors he has received I would argue that he has been overrated by the media voters to some extent; he did not deserve as many first place MVP votes and All-NBA First Team selections as he received--but part of the issue here is that the NBA has made it very difficult to legally guard Harden, at least during the regular season. Harden is permitted to travel, and to push off with his off hand, and he is rewarded with free throws when he flops and flails after he attempts a field goal. Many perimeter players benefit from changes in how the game is officiated, but Harden has benefited the most. His fans would argue that he is crafty enough to obtain advantages within the rules; there may be something to that, but for the most part he is being given benefits that were not previously provided to players, and that are not provided to most of his peers. The NBA gives him fewer such benefits in the playoffs, and Harden's numerous playoff choke jobs speak for themselves as testimony both to his mentality when placed under pressure, and to the limits of his game when he is not given such benefits.
Harden turned out to be a more productive and decorated regular season player than I expected him to be, but Harden did not prove that he is a "foundational player" if that phrase is understood to mean someone who is capable of being the best player on a championship team. That was my main scouting report critique when Morey obtained him--that Harden is best suited to be Manu Ginobili, not Kobe Bryant--and that critique has proven prophetic.
Morey's fans in the media would like for you to believe that Chris Paul's injury during game five of the 2018 Western Conference Finals is the key moment during Morey's tenure, but the notion that Houston would have won the 2018 title with a healthy Paul is both false and irrelevant. This notion is false because it assumes not only that
Houston would have beaten Golden State had Paul stayed
healthy--which ignores Houston's consistent record of playoff
self-immolation during the Morey/Harden era--but also that Houston would
have won in the Finals as well; this notion is irrelevant because injuries are
part of the game, and there are few seasons in NBA history that would
not have gone differently but for a key injury.
Morey had 13 years to build a championship team--far longer than most general managers are granted--and he failed.
If there is one defining moment from the Morey era--and I am not convinced that focusing on one moment makes more sense than evaluating Morey's entire body of work--then the best choice would not be Paul's injury, but rather what happened afterward: Houston blew a second half lead by missing 27 straight three pointers en route to losing 101-92 to Golden State in the seventh game of the 2018 Western Conference Finals. That is the ultimate example of following Morey's basketball philosophy to its inexorably logical conclusion: Morey's championship recipe involved Harden monopolizing the ball until Harden or one of Harden's teammates shot a three pointer. Harden shot 19-78 (.244) from three point range overall during the
series and 52-174 (.299) from three point range during the 2018 NBA
playoffs. Morey acquired his "foundational player," built a team around Harden, and that team collapsed in game seven while playing what Morey would consider to be analytically correct basketball. In contrast to Morey's beliefs, I consider the Morey/Harden style high variance and I expect that during the course of a playoff series Harden and the Rockets will have at least one awful performance.
Morey had 13 years to test his basketball hypothesis, and he failed to build a championship team.
The Morey/Harden media fanboys write nonsense such as "There is no
clearer path to 50 wins in the NBA than to give (Harden) the ball and
get out of his way." That is not true: LeBron James, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Kawhi Leonard,
Kevin Durant, and Stephen Curry (to name just a few players who are better than Harden) each provide at least as clear of a
path to 50 wins as Harden does, though it
would be fair to say that Antetokounmpo has yet to fully prove
his playoff bona fides (but Antetokounmpo is younger, bigger, and more
versatile than Harden, so Antetokounmpo's playoff upside potential is
greater than Harden's). It is also not relevant how clear a path Harden provides to 50 wins. Morey was hired to deliver a championship, and he termed Harden to be a "foundational player" for that quest.
Team chemistry is not valued by "stat gurus" because it cannot be directly measured, though it can of course be observed. Harden has a track record of driving away coaches and co-stars who will not do things his way, and Morey tolerated this because Morey viewed Harden to be a "foundational player": Dwight Howard, Coach Kevin McHale, and Chris Paul (to name just the three most prominent examples) were expendable because they did not defer sufficiently to Harden's whims. It is evident that star players did not want to come to Houston and be spectators for the Harden "dribble, dribble, dribble" show (as Charles Barkley termed it). It will be interesting to see how long the James Harden/Russell Westbrook partnership lasts with a new front office and new coaching staff running the team, but Harden's unwillingness or inability to work well with star players is a factor whose importance Morey underestimated (if he even considered it at all).
Morey picked a good time to leave Houston; the Rockets owe a ton of money to James Harden, Russell Westbrook, and Eric Gordon, so the Rockets neither have the right roster nor the necessary roster flexibility to be a serious title contender. Morey and his fans in the media can selectively cite regular season win totals to paint his Houston tenure as a success, and he will likely land another NBA front office job in the near future if he wants one.
---
*Even though Morey is publicly presenting his
departure as a voluntary choice, it would be naive to
ignore the fact that Morey's October 2019 tweet about Hong Kong--and the NBA's ensuing loss of millions of dollars in Chinese revenue--likely played at least some role in hastening the end of his career in Houston. That is most unfortunate. I have already addressed the China issue at length
but it is worth mentioning again that the NBA is driven primarily by
profits, not social justice; the NBA promoted certain slogans and
causes in the "bubble" because without doing so the players may not have
played, and that would have cost the NBA at least several hundred
million dollars--but promoting those slogans no doubt hurt the NBA's
ratings and popularity, so next season you can expect that the overt
presentation of those slogans will be much more muted, if not completely
silenced.
China is a totalitarian regime running concentration camps,
but you will never see an officially licensed NBA product stating
"Chinese Lives Matter" because that would be bad for business. I would
never tell anyone to "shut up and dribble," but I would suggest that there is
a lot more to being educated than briefly skimming a small, biased
sampling of source material, and there is a lot more to being truly "woke" than just supporting the popular cause of the moment while disregarding human rights abuses committed by people whose sponsorships are putting millions of dollars in your pockets. Dr. Martin Luther King preached, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." That would have looked great on an NBA court or jersey, but it would have been a hypocritical message from the league because the NBA's policies do not reflect an understanding of that wisdom.
If you are foolish enough to draw some kind of moral equivalency between the problems in the United States--which are real and which definitely need to be addressed--and the brutal, totalitarian policies of China then please remember that democracies build walls to keep people out while dictatorships build walls to prevent people from leaving. If you are in the United States and don't understand the differences between the United States and China, then by all means avail yourself of the freedom to leave, and spend enough time in China to learn exactly what the differences are. If you speak the wrong slogan while you are in China, you may not be able to leave--but that would be part of your education.
Labels: Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, James Harden
posted by David Friedman @ 9:23 PM
Lakers Dominate Paint, Rout Heat to Capture NBA Championship
The classic game five showdown created hope that we might see a competitive game six and possibly be treated to a seventh game as well, but in retrospect it appears that the Miami Heat had nothing left in the tank. The L.A. Lakers proved to be too big, too deep, and too talented, building a 28 point halftime lead, extending the margin to as much as 36 late in the third quarter, and then coasting the rest of the way to a 106-93 win to clinch a 4-2 series victory. The Lakers now own 17 NBA titles, tying the Boston Celtics for the most ever. LeBron James captured his fourth NBA championship and his fourth Finals MVP after leading both teams in scoring (28 points on 13-20 field goal shooting) and assists (10) while grabbing 14 rebounds. Only Michael Jordan has more Finals MVPs (six) than James, who broke a tie with Willis Reed, Magic Johnson, Tim Duncan, and Shaquille O'Neal to move into sole possession of second place on that list. James is the first player to win at least one Finals MVP with three different teams.
Anthony Davis showed no sign of ill effects from the foot injury that hobbled him last game, and his stat line of 19 points, a game-high 15 rebounds, and two blocked shots understates his impact. He started at center after Coach Frank Vogel benched Dwight Howard in favor of Alex Caruso to improve the Lakers' perimeter defense. Vogel's move paid immediate and decisive dividends as Davis demonstrated his mobility and agility by showing on pick and roll plays before sagging into the paint to discourage drives and lob passes. This version of the Lakers' "small" lineup is a bit smaller than the lineup that the Lakers utilized versus Houston earlier in the playoffs, but it is not really small: Davis is 6-10, James is 6-9, Danny Green is 6-6, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope is 6-5, and Caruso is 6-5. The Lakers have a big team, and even their biggest players are very mobile. At halftime, the Lakers not only led 64-36, but they had scored almost as many points in the paint (34) as the Heat had scored overall.
Rajon Rondo scored 19 points on 8-11 field goal shooting, doing most of his damage in the paint. He added four rebounds and four assists. The criticisms of the Lakers' depth are puzzling. How many teams have the luxury of bringing off of the bench a player who was the starting point guard for a championship team and who has a credible case for being inducted in the Basketball Hall of Fame? The last time the Lakers won the championship, their starting point guard was Derek Fisher, who would not have started at point guard for any of this year's Western Conference playoff teams.
Caldwell-Pope contributed 17 points on 6-13 field goal shooting. The Lakers have two MVP-level players performing at peak efficiency, and that is hard to beat when multiple role players are scoring in the high teens while all five players on the court at any given time are connected on a string defensively. The Lakers were favored in every playoff series and every playoff game for good reason, and it is not like LeBron James had to work miracles for the Lakers to win the title.
Bam Adebayo led the Heat with 25 points and 10 rebounds. He shot 10-15 from the field and passed for five assists while looking healthier, more confident, and more aggressive than he had since injuring his neck in game one of this series. Jimmy Butler, who played so splendidly in the first five games of the series, looked like he needed more time to recover from playing almost every second in game five; he played 45 minutes, but produced just 12 points on 5-10 field goal shooting, plus eight assists and seven rebounds. Butler's pedestrian game six performance is a reminder of just how great and consistent LeBron James is while also highlighting the difference between an All-Star/fringe All-NBA player and a perennial MVP candidate: James first appeared in the NBA Finals 13 years ago, and he is still able to string together one great game after another, while the younger Butler was not quite able to produce six great games in his first NBA Finals.
Jae Crowder (12 points) and Duncan Robinson (10 points) were the only other Heat players to score in double figures. Goran Dragic returned to action for Miami for the first time
after tearing the plantar fascia in his left foot in game one of this
series, coming off of the bench to score five points on 2-8 field goal shooting in 19 minutes. Bringing back a rusty, limited Dragic was a risky move after the Heat had already won two games in the Finals without him, but Dragic's return ending up not making a difference; the other Heat players (with perhaps Adebayo being the lone exception) were gassed, and Dragic did not perform appreciably better or worse than his teammates did as the Lakers took command.
The plus/minus numbers for this game were misleading for both teams, because the Lakers raced out to a huge lead and then just cruised in the second half. Kelly Olynyk did not see action until the outcome was decided, but he led Miami with a +19 plus/minus number after scoring nine points in 15 minutes. Olynyk's plus/minus was better than the plus/minus of every Laker except Caruso (+20), which is why plus/minus is not meaningful in small sample sizes unless you watch the whole game and can provide some context for the numbers.
The Heat kept the game close for about the first 10 minutes, but the Lakers finished the first quarter on an 11-4 run to lead 28-20 before blowing the game open in the second quarter. The Lakers decimated the Heat's interior defense by relentlessly driving to the hoop, and the Lakers played suffocating defense that turned each Miami possession into a tedious, disorganized mission to generate an open shot.
After the game, James accepted the Finals MVP by asking/begging to receive "respect," but it is odd--if not unseemly--for a player who owns four regular season MVPs and four Finals MVPs to complain about not being respected. James finished second in the 2020 regular season MVP voting this season behind a player who had a historically great season while leading his team to the NBA's best record for the second season in a row. James is widely recognized as one of the greatest players of all-time, and only someone who is biased and/or foolish would deny that he deserves to be mentioned in any such discussion.
Does winning this championship elevate James above every player who ever played the game? It is human nature to be most aware of and most impressed by whatever we have seen most recently, never mind the fact that many of the people watching the NBA today are too young to remember or know much about the accomplishments of Michael Jordan--not to mention the accomplishments of his great predecessors such as Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Bill Russell. I bring up those three players specifically because of a statistic that ESPN kept emphasizing: James just joined Russell, Abdul-Jabbar, and Jordan as the only players who have won at least four championships and at least four regular season MVPs. What ESPN did not emphasize--although the accompanying graphic showed the numbers--is that James has both fewer titles and fewer MVPs than each of the other three players.
Bill Russell won 11 championships and five regular season MVPs. Also, the Finals MVP was first awarded during his last season, when his Celtics won the championship but the Lakers' Jerry West became the first (and still the only) player from the losing team to receive the Finals MVP. How many Finals MVPs would Russell have won had that award been presented throughout his career?
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar won six championships and a record six regular season MVPs. He also won two Finals MVPs.
Michael Jordan won six championships and five regular season MVPs. As noted above, he holds the record with six Finals MVPs.
When trying to use facts and logic to prove a point, it is useful to have an analysis rubric. Lawyers are taught many different rubrics, but one widely used rubric is known as IRAC (Issue/Rule of Law/Analysis/Conclusion). Here, the issue is "Who is the greatest basketball player of all-time?" and ESPN's proposed rule of law is that such a player must win at least four championships and at least four regular season MVPs. If our analysis focuses on applying that rule to that issue, how does one reach the conclusion that the greatest player of all-time is the player from that list who won the fewest championships and the fewest MVPs? If ESPN is proposing that list as designating the "rule of law" for this issue, then James ranks fourth, not first, unless there is some convincing analysis explaining why the championships and regular season MVPs won by the other three players should be worth less than the championships and regular season MVPs won by James. Of course, this hypothetical IRAC exercise is ignoring the not insignificant question of whether ESPN's "rule of law" is even the correct one, because this rule excludes from consideration players such as Magic Johnson, Tim Duncan, and Kobe Bryant, each of whom won more titles than James while also posting a better Finals winning percentage.
ESPN's post-game set is not a law school classroom, nor is it designed to be a forum for calm, logical and in depth discussion; the point of live TV is to get in and get out with quick, provocative hot takes. That is not to discount the value or relevance of anything that is said in such a setting, but if there is a definitive answer to this "issue" (and I am not convinced that there is) it will not be found in such a setting.
Keep in mind that the TV networks and media outlets that cover the
NBA have a vested interest in promoting James as the greatest player ever. It does not help their bottom
line to have a nuanced conversation about this topic, let alone to say
that the greatest player played in the 1990s or--even worse--in the
1960s or 1970s. If you are trying to get people to watch the games and
follow the league now then it is not desirable to say that the best player retired
decades ago.
James belongs in the greatest player of all-time conversation--and he belonged there before last night. Instead of spending this moment providing a hot take that lifts James above everyone else, or providing a take down that ranks James below a few other players, let's spend this moment by simply saying that LeBron James and the Lakers deserve congratulations and credit for capping off
this most unusual and difficult season with an impressive championship
run.
Labels: Anthony Davis, Bam Adebayo, Jimmy Butler, L.A. Lakers, LeBron James, Miami Heat
posted by David Friedman @ 4:07 AM
To Shoot or to Pass: Is That Really the Question?
Game five of the 2020 NBA Finals was an instant classic. Miami's Jimmy Butler (35 points, 12 rebounds, 11 assists) and L.A.'s LeBron James (40 points, 13 rebounds, seven assists) staged a duel for the ages, and the outcome hung in the balance after James passed to Danny Green for a wide open top of the key three pointer--but Green missed, the Heat won, and now the inevitable question is being asked: should James have passed the ball to Green or should James have shot the ball with the game (and the series) on the line?
This is not a simple yes or no question. There are multiple layers of basketball strategy and sports psychology worth examining. James' shot/pass decision making has been questioned before. His critics argue that he is too passive and/or that he is afraid to take a potential game-winning shot, so he literally passes that responsibility to someone else. James' supporters point to "clutch" metrics that suggest that James is a highly efficient scorer in close, late game situations, and that he is more efficient in those situations than many of the players who his critics believe should be ranked ahead of James.
It is undeniable that James is an elite scorer, although he is often depicted as a "pass first" player. James is a great passer, but he
is foremost a scorer who shoots the ball a lot. James ranks fourth in ABA/NBA history with 24,781 career regular
season field goal attempts, and in 15 of his 17 seasons he ranked in the top 10 in field goal attempts, including 10 times in the top five, and five times as the second ranked player. James has averaged 19.6 field goal attempts per game during his regular season career, and 20.7 field goal attempts per game during his playoff career.
How do those per game numbers compare to the numbers posted by other great scorers? Consider a few examples.
Kobe Bryant averaged 19.5 FGA/game during the regular season and 20.5 FGA/game during the playoffs. George Gervin, who won four scoring titles and would never be described as a pass first player, averaged 19.4 FGA/game during the regular season and 20.4 FGA/game during the playoffs. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, who ranks first on the regular season career scoring list, averaged 18.1 FGA/game during the regular season and 18.7 FGA/game during the playoffs.
The fact that James shoots the ball so often is one reason that his end of the game shot/pass decision making is and should be scrutinized. If you are shooting the ball a lot during most of the game then why are you passing the ball with the game on the line? That is a fair question to ask.
The difference that I observe between James compared to Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant is that when James drives--particularly late in the game--James seems to be trying to draw a double team so that he can pass. In contrast, Jordan and Bryant drove the ball to score and they only passed the ball if they failed to create a clear advantage for themselves. That subtle distinction is significant. Jordan and Bryant did not necessarily pass the ball just because a teammate was open; in some situations, they felt that they had more of an advantage elevating from certain spots on the floor over two defenders than a teammate had even if that teammate was open (a coach might say that the teammate was open for a reason; ESPN's Jay Williams terms this "He with us," meaning that the opposing team is so happy to see that player shoot because the opposing team feels that player is "with us" in the sense that he is likely to miss).
The "right basketball play" on paper may not be the optimal play. That is a difference between James' mentality compared to the mentality of Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant.
From the standpoint of a basketball purist, you can argue that James' mindset is not wrong. He draws double teams, he passes on time and on target to his teammate, and his teammate is a professional basketball player who should be able to make a wide open shot. That all sounds good and looks good on paper. The deeper reality here is that an open top of the key shot for Danny Green may be a good shot but it may also not be the optimal shot for that player in that situation. If James' philosophy is to drive and pass, then the coaching staff should be considering who they would prefer to be taking the shot, and from what position on the court. Trailing by one point at that time, is the shot that the Lakers wanted a Danny Green three pointer from the top of the key? The corner three pointer is closer to the hoop, and most three point specialists now prefer that shot. Why not place Green in one corner, place another three point shooter in the other corner, place Anthony Davis on the baseline, and place another player on a wing, with James in the middle of the court? In that alignment, if the Heat double off of Green then James has an easy pass for a short corner three pointer.
James is not Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant. His first thought at the end of the game is usually not going to be to drive to score. Therefore, the coaching staff should take this into account, and position the other players accordingly. Maybe they did that, and maybe the Danny Green top of the key three pointer is the shot that they wanted--but, given the time, the score, and the other possibilities, that does not seem like the optimal shot.
Of course, the Lakers' hopes did not end after Green missed. Markieff Morris gathered the offensive rebound and then turned the ball over trying to throw a lob pass to Davis in the post. Morris is not a post feeder; the Lakers run no plays involving Morris getting the ball at the free throw line area and then throwing a lob pass into the post. This is why it is so important for each player to know his role, his skill set, his limitations, and score/time/game situation. The Lakers did not have a timeout, but Morris had three better options than the one he chose: (1) Shoot the ball and expect Davis (who had good position under the hoop) to get the rebound if the shot misses, (2) drive to the hoop for a potential game-winning layup (or free throws), or (3) do a quick handoff to a guard or to LeBron James curling off of Morris. Perhaps there was not enough time left for the third option unless Morris and a guard (or James) read the situation the same way instantly, but the first two options are higher percentage plays than what Morris did.
This analysis is not just about the outcome--James passing, Green missing, Morris committing a turnover--but rather about the thought process that should take place in crucial situations of a basketball game. No one makes the optimal decision every time, but if you repeatedly think about and practice crucial situations then when those situations arise you are more likely to make the optimal decision.
It is easy to say that the Bill Russell/Red Auerbach player/coach tandem was lucky to win 11 titles, or that the Michael Jordan/Phil Jackson player/coach tandem was lucky to win six titles, but luck had less to do with those two examples of sustained success than the ability to consistently make optimal decisions under pressure.
The 2020 NBA Finals--like every NBA Finals involving LeBron James--is being treated as a referendum on who is the greatest basketball player of all-time. ABC's pregame show before game five spent a segment talking about how James was about to join the elite group of players with four championships and four Finals MVPs. It is not crazy to include James in the conversation about who is the greatest basketball player of all-time, but it would be nice--if not realistic to expect--if such a conversation delved into the nuances that distinguish the candidates from each other. Bill Russell's teams won the championship almost every year of his career for over 20 years, from high school to college to the Olympics to 11 NBA titles in 13 seasons. He was the leader on every one of those teams, and he displayed a genius-level basketball mind that was finely tuned to making optimal decisions in crucial situations (which is not to say that he never made a mistake). Wilt Chamberlain remains the most dominant force in pro basketball history. His teams had trouble beating Russell's teams, but Chamberlain was the best player on two of the greatest single season teams ever (one of which beat Russell's Celtics to end the Celtics' championship streak at eight consecutive seasons). Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's sustained excellence--both as an individual player and as the key performer on championship teams--is remarkable, and he owned the single greatest shot in pro basketball history: the sky hook. Michael Jordan's Bulls learned difficult lessons in playoff battles versus the Celtics and Pistons, but once Jordan got a taste of the NBA Finals he dominated, winning six titles and six Finals MVPs in six appearances. Kobe Bryant was a dominant two way midsize player in Jordan's mold. Bryant was an All-NBA level performer for three consecutive championship teams before he even reached his prime years, and then he won back to back titles (plus back to back Finals MVPs) with a team whose second best player had been a one-time All-Star prior to joining forces with Bryant.
There are other players who could be mentioned in this conversation as well but the point of this brief history lesson is that each of these players faced different challenges, had different skill sets, and displayed a different mentality. If it is even possible to select one player as the greatest then the answer is not going to be found by citing one statistic or by being caught up in the moment of what we just saw on TV; the 2020 championship does not mean more than the 1969 championship because it is happening right now in front of our eyes on HD TV while the 1969 championship survives only in grainy footage.
Coach Bob Knight often said that in basketball the mental is to the physical as four is to one. How each great player thought the game and mentally executed under extreme duress is a timeless standard by which to measure--or attempt to measure--elite level basketball.
Labels: Bill Russell, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Kobe Bryant, L.A. Lakers, LeBron James, Michael Jordan, Wilt Chamberlain
posted by David Friedman @ 12:12 PM
