How High Will the Rockets Fly Without Harden?
The championship aspirations of James Harden's new team, the Brooklyn Nets, are much discussed, but it is interesting to observe Harden's former team as well. The Houston Rockets did not win a title with Harden, and they are not likely to win a title any time soon without him, but historically speaking an MVP-level player is typically worth at least 15-20 wins. Examples of this abound, including NBA-ready rookies Larry Bird and David Robinson, whose teams improved 32 wins and 35 wins respectively upon their arrival. Bird and Robinson were not entirely responsible for those win increases, but in both situations they were primarily responsible for turning around their franchises.
Harden received the 2018 regular season MVP, and he has finished second in the MVP voting three times (2015, 2017, 2019). If he is worthy of being considered a perennial MVP candidate then he should also be worth at least 15-20 wins.
After defeating the Portland Trail Blazers 104-101 tonight, the new-look Rockets are 5-3 since trading away Harden, a significant improvement from their 3-6 start to the season with Harden (Harden missed one game, a Rockets win versus Sacramento). After his final game with the Rockets--during which he scored 16 points on 5-16 field goal shooting as Houston lost by 17 to the L.A. Lakers--Harden publicly expressed his view that the Rockets were just not good enough. It is obvious that Harden quit on the team, and that the Rockets were not as bad as they looked with Harden, but it is also obvious that replacing Harden with Victor Oladipo is not a huge talent drop off, regardless of what the NBA's MVP voters may think.
This is obviously a small sample size of games in an unusual season dominated by the specter of COVID-19 and the associated health and safety protocols enacted by the NBA to attempt to complete an abbreviated 72 game schedule. However, the notion that the Rockets could be a good team without Harden should not be shocking to anyone who has followed Harden's career.
Harden has been putting up video-game level individual numbers for many years, but those numbers did not translate into consistent postseason success for the Rockets. Harden's Houston teams lost in the first round three times in eight seasons while making just two trips to the Western Conference Finals, and failing to reach the NBA Finals. As discussed in my analysis of Daryl Morey's Houston legacy, that is not elite level playoff performance.
Harden reminds me of Gilbert Arenas and Stephon Marbury, two players who put up gaudy individual numbers but who had very little positive impact on winning. After Arenas suffered an injury that caused him to miss extensive playing time and the Washington Wizards were not much worse without him, I asked Is Gilbert Arenas the Most Overrated All-Star in the NBA? Arenas' fans did not like that article, but they also could not refute the reality that even with Arenas the Wizards struggled to stay above .500. The record shows that Arenas did not have much impact on winning when he played, and the Wizards did not completely fall apart when he did not play.
There are players who score 30 points in a way that compromises opposing defenses and leads to team success, and there are players who score 30 points in a way that has little impact on team success. If you take Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant off of a team then that team is going to struggle unless/until that team acquires a legit MVP-level player (the 1993-94 Chicago Bulls did not collapse without Jordan primarily because the Bulls still had Scottie Pippen, arguably the best all-around player in the league at that time other than Jordan). If you take Arenas or Harden off of a team, that team can survive by either adding an All-Star level player, or possibly even by pooling the collective efforts of several good but not great players.
Marbury did not score as prolifically as Arenas or Harden, but he averaged at least 20 ppg and at least 8 apg in six different seasons, a feat exceeded only by Oscar Robertson, who had 10 such seasons. Robertson was a master of the all-around game, a basketball genius; Marbury was the antithesis of Robertson in every meaningful way. Marbury made the playoffs just five times during his 13 season career, and his final playoff appearance was as a little-used reserve for the 2009 Boston Celtics; as a starter he never advanced past the first round. Marbury had all of the physical tools--he was strong, fast, and durable--but he did not know (or care) how to play winning basketball.
To a lesser extent, Steve Nash falls into the category of overrated player, but with some important caveats. At his peak, Nash was legitimately an MVP-level player, and he had a Hall of Fame-caliber career--but there is no way he should have been a two-time regular season MVP while his far more impactful contemporaries Shaquillle O'Neal and Kobe Bryant each won one regular season MVP. MVP voters assigned a value to Nash's performance that is not fully supported by what happened on the court. Of course, Nash was a better teammate than Arenas, Marbury, and Harden, and Nash had a much better understanding of what it takes to win--Nash just did not have the physical capability to dominate a game all over the court to the extent that players like Jordan, O'Neal, and Bryant could while leading teams to multiple titles.
During Nash's final season with the Dallas Mavericks (2003-04), Dallas went 52-30 in the regular season, and lost in the first round of the playoffs. Next season, the Mavericks replaced Nash with Jason Terry--a good player, but hardly an all-time great--and lost in the second round of the playoffs after posting a 58-24 regular season record. The Mavericks advanced to the NBA Finals in 2005-06 after going 60-22 in the regular season, and they eventually won an NBA title in 2011; Jason Terry was the sixth man for that team, but still ranked third on the squad in minutes played per game.
Meanwhile, Nash's Phoenix teams--which were stacked with All-Stars and All-Star caliber players, including Amare Stoudemire, Shawn Marion, and Joe Johnson--advanced to the Western Conference Finals three times in eight years but never made it to the NBA Finals.
If your former team can replace you with a solid player and have better results, and if you cannot lead a stacked team to at least one NBA Finals, then you are not the best player in the NBA. Most NBA MVPs won at least one title. The exceptions are Charles Barkley, Karl Malone, Allen Iverson, Steve Nash, Derrick Rose, Russell Westbrook, James Harden, and Giannis Antetokounmpo.
The first three players on the list each led at least one team to the NBA Finals. Westbrook was the second best player on one Finalist, and Harden was the sixth man for that 2012 Oklahoma City squad. Rose's career trajectory was altered by injury, but he also won his MVP at least in part due to the negative narrative surrounding LeBron James after he quit in the playoffs before fleeing Cleveland for Miami.
Antetokounmpo is the only player from this group who is still in his prime, so he gets a pass for now--Michael Jordan and LeBron James each won multiple regular season MVPs before they won their first NBA titles, so it remains to be seen what path Antetokounmpo's career will take.
When the Rockets shipped out Harden, they did not get rid of a player who is worth 15-20 wins. If Oladipo and John Wall--who was initially acquired to play alongside Harden--can both stay healthy then the Rockets can continue to be what they were during the Harden era: a good team, but not quite good enough to win a title.
Labels: Gilbert Arenas, Houston Rockets, James Harden, John Wall, Kobe Bryant, Michael Jordan, Shaquille O'Neal, Stephon Marbury, Steve Nash, Victor Oladipo
posted by David Friedman @ 11:27 PM
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part IV
In The One Number That Explains the NBA's Three Point Revolution, Ben Cohen arbitrarily asserts that the one magic number is 40%. Until the 2017 NBA season, no team had attempted at least 40% of its field goals from beyond the three point arc. Last season, nine teams exceeded the threshold Cohen deems to be significant, and in the early portion of this season nearly 40% of shot attempts in the NBA are three pointers. It is undisputed and obvious that the number of three pointers attempted by NBA teams has been increasing at a rapid rate for quite some time, but Cohen does not even attempt to explain why 40% is more significant than 35% or any other number. This is not like breaking the sound barrier, or approaching the speed of light, two numbers that have physical significance in terms of the experience of an object moving at those speeds.
Cohen then jumps from his arbitrarily selected number to a broad conclusion unsupported by evidence: "The result is that it's increasingly difficult to beat a barrage of 3-pointers with anything but three pointers. There's almost no way to keep up otherwise." If that statement were true, then all that a team would have to do to win an NBA title--or at least contend for an NBA title--is to make more three pointers than all of the other teams.
However, the numbers show that three of the teams that advanced to the NBA's version of the Final Four--the Conference Finals round--last season did not finish in the top 10 in three pointers made per game. The L.A. Lakers--who won the 2020 championship and look like they have a good chance of winning the championship this season as well--ranked 24th in three pointers made per game last season. The Miami Heat, who lost to the Lakers in the NBA Finals, ranked sixth in three pointers made per game last season. The other Eastern Conference Finalist, the Boston Celtics, ranked 12th, and the Western Conference Finalist Denver Nuggets ranked 24th.
Cohen's statement is thus demonstrably false; the NBA's top four playoff finishers last season figured out how to outscore and outperform teams that shot more three pointers than they did. Moreover, the teams that shot the most three pointers were not a particularly successful group. The Houston Rockets ranked first and they lost in the second round. The Dallas Mavericks, whose chief "stat guru" is quoted by Cohen, ranked second and they lost in the first round. The Milwaukee Bucks ranked third and they lost in the second round despite having the services of the reigning two-time regular season MVP. The Toronto Raptors ranked fourth and they lost in the second round. The New Orleans Pelicans ranked fifth and did not qualify for the playoffs. The Utah Jazz ranked seventh and they lost in the first round. The Minnesota Timberwolves ranked eighth and they had the second worst record in the Western Conference. The Brooklyn Nets ranked ninth and they lost in the first round. The Portland Trail Blazers ranked 10th and they lost in the first round. Thus, the 10 teams that made the most three pointers per game last season included two teams that did not even make the playoffs, four first round losers, three second round losers, and one NBA Finalist.
In the 2020 playoffs, the Heat, Celtics, Nuggets, and Lakers finished 8th-11th respectively in three pointers made per game among the 16 postseason qualifiers.
The explosion in three point shooting does not correlate with winning, let alone cause winning. A large number of NBA teams have hired "stat gurus" who think similarly and who have similar cognitive biases, and this is one reason why so many teams are shooting so many three pointers. Every team is shooting a lot of three pointers, and many teams are shooting more three pointers than they probably should, but just shooting a lot of three pointers has no demonstrable positive impact on winning.
It is smart for a team to acquire three point shooters to spread the
floor, creating space for drivers and post up players, but it is not
smart to abandon whole swaths of the court by deeming any shot taken
from those areas to be inefficient. There is no doubt that during the
first few years after the NBA added the three point shot teams took a
while to figure out how to leverage the rule to their advantage, but the
notion that all a team has to do to win is shoot more three
pointers is incorrect.
As is often the case, the very people who claim
to be making data driven conclusions are in fact ignoring what the data
shows, because the "stat gurus" not only often misinterpret the numbers but
they do not understand--or simply disregard--factors that are not easily
quantifiable. For example, it takes a lot of energy for three point
shooters to fire up a high volume of shots while also having to run up and down
the court and guard opposing players, who are often bigger (teams
that shoot a lot of three pointers are often playing some version of
"small ball"); if I play one on one against a bigger player who I cannot guard in the paint, I may win some games just by making so many three pointers that he cannot make enough two pointers to keep up. However, unless I am in much better condition than that bigger player, the physical demands of guarding that player and fighting that player for rebounds will wear out my legs, which will in turn lower my shooting percentage. If I cannot compensate by getting some easy baskets and/or getting enough defensive stops, my three point efficiency is going to decrease while my larger opponent is still going to be able to make a high percentage of his inside shots. The NBA game is more sophisticated than recreational league basketball, but the fundamental principles remain true: a strategy that is too heavily reliant on three point shooting is a high variance strategy that is unlikely to produce sustained success.
Don't misunderstand: I love the three point shot, as anyone who has played basketball with or against me will readily attest. The three pointer is without question a valuable weapon, because of the simple fact that each three pointer made is worth 50% more than each two pointer made--but that one simple fact is not all you need to know to win a championship--particularly at the highest levels of the game; at lower levels of the game a lesser team that shoots a lot of three pointers may outduel a more talented team that is not as technically efficient defensively as they could or should be, in part because the games do not last 48 minutes and the seasons do not last 82 games plus four rounds of best out of seven playoff series.
Many commentators keep pushing the narrative that basketball has entered a new golden age of small ball and three pointers, blissfully ignoring that the Lakers won the championship with a classic, old school recipe: (1) a big man who dominates defensively, rebounds well, and can score at will in the post, (2) a versatile "midsize" player who can score, rebound, pass, and defend, and (3) a collection of role players who collectively provide defense, rebounding, and timely scoring.
Winning teams play consistent defense, they control the paint at both
ends of the court, and they outrebound their opponents. A team that does
not do those things well is not going to have much success; if a team
excels tremendously in one or two categories then it may survive a
slight weakness in another category, but just jacking up three pointers
with little regard for defense, paint presence, and rebounding is not a
championship recipe, as repeatedly demonstrated by the Houston Rockets during the Daryl Morey/James Harden era.
Previous articles in this series:
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part II
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part III
Labels: "stat gurus", Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, L.A. Lakers, three point shot
posted by David Friedman @ 10:38 PM
