The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part IV
In The One Number That Explains the NBA's Three Point Revolution, Ben Cohen arbitrarily asserts that the one magic number is 40%. Until the 2017 NBA season, no team had attempted at least 40% of its field goals from beyond the three point arc. Last season, nine teams exceeded the threshold Cohen deems to be significant, and in the early portion of this season nearly 40% of shot attempts in the NBA are three pointers. It is undisputed and obvious that the number of three pointers attempted by NBA teams has been increasing at a rapid rate for quite some time, but Cohen does not even attempt to explain why 40% is more significant than 35% or any other number. This is not like breaking the sound barrier, or approaching the speed of light, two numbers that have physical significance in terms of the experience of an object moving at those speeds.
Cohen then jumps from his arbitrarily selected number to a broad conclusion unsupported by evidence: "The result is that it's increasingly difficult to beat a barrage of 3-pointers with anything but three pointers. There's almost no way to keep up otherwise." If that statement were true, then all that a team would have to do to win an NBA title--or at least contend for an NBA title--is to make more three pointers than all of the other teams.
However, the numbers show that three of the teams that advanced to the NBA's version of the Final Four--the Conference Finals round--last season did not finish in the top 10 in three pointers made per game. The L.A. Lakers--who won the 2020 championship and look like they have a good chance of winning the championship this season as well--ranked 24th in three pointers made per game last season. The Miami Heat, who lost to the Lakers in the NBA Finals, ranked sixth in three pointers made per game last season. The other Eastern Conference Finalist, the Boston Celtics, ranked 12th, and the Western Conference Finalist Denver Nuggets ranked 24th.
Cohen's statement is thus demonstrably false; the NBA's top four playoff finishers last season figured out how to outscore and outperform teams that shot more three pointers than they did. Moreover, the teams that shot the most three pointers were not a particularly successful group. The Houston Rockets ranked first and they lost in the second round. The Dallas Mavericks, whose chief "stat guru" is quoted by Cohen, ranked second and they lost in the first round. The Milwaukee Bucks ranked third and they lost in the second round despite having the services of the reigning two-time regular season MVP. The Toronto Raptors ranked fourth and they lost in the second round. The New Orleans Pelicans ranked fifth and did not qualify for the playoffs. The Utah Jazz ranked seventh and they lost in the first round. The Minnesota Timberwolves ranked eighth and they had the second worst record in the Western Conference. The Brooklyn Nets ranked ninth and they lost in the first round. The Portland Trail Blazers ranked 10th and they lost in the first round. Thus, the 10 teams that made the most three pointers per game last season included two teams that did not even make the playoffs, four first round losers, three second round losers, and one NBA Finalist.
In the 2020 playoffs, the Heat, Celtics, Nuggets, and Lakers finished 8th-11th respectively in three pointers made per game among the 16 postseason qualifiers.
The explosion in three point shooting does not correlate with winning, let alone cause winning. A large number of NBA teams have hired "stat gurus" who think similarly and who have similar cognitive biases, and this is one reason why so many teams are shooting so many three pointers. Every team is shooting a lot of three pointers, and many teams are shooting more three pointers than they probably should, but just shooting a lot of three pointers has no demonstrable positive impact on winning.
It is smart for a team to acquire three point shooters to spread the
floor, creating space for drivers and post up players, but it is not
smart to abandon whole swaths of the court by deeming any shot taken
from those areas to be inefficient. There is no doubt that during the
first few years after the NBA added the three point shot teams took a
while to figure out how to leverage the rule to their advantage, but the
notion that all a team has to do to win is shoot more three
pointers is incorrect.
As is often the case, the very people who claim
to be making data driven conclusions are in fact ignoring what the data
shows, because the "stat gurus" not only often misinterpret the numbers but
they do not understand--or simply disregard--factors that are not easily
quantifiable. For example, it takes a lot of energy for three point
shooters to fire up a high volume of shots while also having to run up and down
the court and guard opposing players, who are often bigger (teams
that shoot a lot of three pointers are often playing some version of
"small ball"); if I play one on one against a bigger player who I cannot guard in the paint, I may win some games just by making so many three pointers that he cannot make enough two pointers to keep up. However, unless I am in much better condition than that bigger player, the physical demands of guarding that player and fighting that player for rebounds will wear out my legs, which will in turn lower my shooting percentage. If I cannot compensate by getting some easy baskets and/or getting enough defensive stops, my three point efficiency is going to decrease while my larger opponent is still going to be able to make a high percentage of his inside shots. The NBA game is more sophisticated than recreational league basketball, but the fundamental principles remain true: a strategy that is too heavily reliant on three point shooting is a high variance strategy that is unlikely to produce sustained success.
Don't misunderstand: I love the three point shot, as anyone who has played basketball with or against me will readily attest. The three pointer is without question a valuable weapon, because of the simple fact that each three pointer made is worth 50% more than each two pointer made--but that one simple fact is not all you need to know to win a championship--particularly at the highest levels of the game; at lower levels of the game a lesser team that shoots a lot of three pointers may outduel a more talented team that is not as technically efficient defensively as they could or should be, in part because the games do not last 48 minutes and the seasons do not last 82 games plus four rounds of best out of seven playoff series.
Many commentators keep pushing the narrative that basketball has entered a new golden age of small ball and three pointers, blissfully ignoring that the Lakers won the championship with a classic, old school recipe: (1) a big man who dominates defensively, rebounds well, and can score at will in the post, (2) a versatile "midsize" player who can score, rebound, pass, and defend, and (3) a collection of role players who collectively provide defense, rebounding, and timely scoring.
Winning teams play consistent defense, they control the paint at both
ends of the court, and they outrebound their opponents. A team that does
not do those things well is not going to have much success; if a team
excels tremendously in one or two categories then it may survive a
slight weakness in another category, but just jacking up three pointers
with little regard for defense, paint presence, and rebounding is not a
championship recipe, as repeatedly demonstrated by the Houston Rockets during the Daryl Morey/James Harden era.
Previous articles in this series:
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part II
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part III
Labels: "stat gurus", Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, L.A. Lakers, three point shot
posted by David Friedman @ 10:38 PM
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part III
Here is a quote from 16 years ago about the three point shot: "It was a great weapon when the players shot eight or nine times a game. Now it's way overused." Care to guess which former player turned TV commentator made that remark? The answer is none other than Steve Kerr, owner of the highest career regular season career three point shooting percentage in ABA/NBA history (.454), and the current coach of the Golden State Warriors--one of the teams most identified with the recent vast increase in the usage of the three point shot.
I first wrote about the evolution of the usage of the three point shot for NBCSports.com in March 2007, and then I posted an
updated version of that article at 20 Second Timeout a few months later. The American Basketball Association (ABA) is associated with the three point shot and deserves credit for popularizing it, but it should be noted that the ABA did not invent the three pointer; it had been used in the American Basketball League (ABL) in the early 1960s, and there are reports that the three point shot was used experimentally in a college game (Columbia versus Fordham) in 1945. Some ABA teams incorporated the three point shot into their regular offense, but not all ABA teams did so, and overall the ABA teams did not shoot nearly as many three pointers as NBA teams currently shoot.
The three point shot disappeared from the professional basketball landscape for three seasons after the ABA/NBA merger in 1976, but then the NBA brought it back for the 1979-80 season. For the first part of the decade, most NBA teams only shot three pointers to beat the shot clock, or to beat the buzzer at the end of a quarter, or when they were down by three points with little time remaining in the game. By the end of the 1980s, many teams began to use the three pointer as part of their offense. The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (instead of 23 feet nine inches everywhere but the baseline corners) for the 1995-97 seasons, which led to a spike in three point usage that continued even after the league restored the original three point line in 1997-98.
In December 2016, I revisited the evolution of the usage of the three point shot. The growing acceptance of "advanced basketball statistics" had resulted in a significant increase in the usage of the three point shot, and that trend has continued in the past several seasons. NBA teams averaged a then-record 9.7 three point field goals made per game during the 2016-17 season, and that number increased to 12.1 three point field goals made per game during the suspended (but hopefully not concluded) 2019-20 season, so now is a good time to examine how the usage of the three point shot has continued to evolve.
As discussed in the two previous articles in this series, the three point shot has evolved from a rarely used novelty, to an occasionally used weapon, to a minor part of the offensive game plan, to a major part of the offensive game plan, to a central part of the offensive game plan. To understand the distinction between the latter two concepts, think back to the Houston Rockets with Hakeem Olajuwon, or the Orlando Magic with Shaquille O'Neal; the three point shot was a major part of the offensive game plan, but the primary focus was to first get the ball to the big man, and then shoot three pointers if the opponent double-teamed the big man. In contrast, now many teams are actively hunting three point shots while openly disdaining even wide open two point shots.
One might assume that adding a point per shot for long field goal attempts would increase overall scoring, particularly as the three point shot gained greater acceptance, but history shows otherwise. NBA teams averaged 110.3 ppg in 1978-79, the year before the league added the three point shot. Scoring held steady during the 1980s, and then declined throughout the 1990s. By 1995-96, scoring had fallen under 100 ppg (99.5 ppg) for the first time since 1956-57. NBA scoring reached its modern nadir in the lockout-shortened 1999 season (91.6 ppg), and did not recover to the 100 ppg level until the 2008-09 season, by which time the league had passed rules restricting defensive contact on the perimeter; these rules opened up the game, made it much more difficult to guard players on the perimeter, and--among other things--played a major role in helping Steve Nash to become a two-time regular season MVP. Scoring regressed slightly in the early part of the next decade, but has been on an upward progression for several years, peaking at 111.4 ppg in the 2019-20 season.
Having a three point shot rule does not, in and of itself, increase or
decrease team scoring; scoring is impacted by many different factors,
including other rules changes, new coaching philosophies, and skill set
evolution (or decline, depending on your perspective).
There is also not a direct correlation between shooting a lot of three pointers and winning championships. The Golden State Warriors made five straight Finals appearances from 2015-19, winning titles in 2015 and 2017-18, but during that time they only once led the league in three pointers made--2016, the year that they lost to Cleveland in the Finals. The Warriors ranked second in three pointers made in 2015, fourth in 2017, eighth in 2018, and third in 2019. Here are the rankings for three point shots made by NBA championship teams since I wrote my first article about the evolution of the usage of the three point shot:
2008: Boston (eighth)
2009: L.A. Lakers (17th)
2010: L.A. Lakers (13th)
2011: Dallas (eighth)
2012: Miami (20th)
2013: Miami (third)
2014: San Antonio (12th)
2015: Golden State (second)
2016: Cleveland (second)
2017: Golden State (fourth)
2018: Golden State (eighth)
2019: Toronto (eighth)
During the 2019-20 season, the Milwaukee Bucks rank fourth in three pointers made, while the Toronto Raptors rank fifth, the Boston Celtics rank 13th, the L.A. Clippers rank 18th, the Denver Nuggets rank 24th, and the L.A. Lakers rank 25th. The three teams that have made the most three pointers--Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans--are unlikely to win the 2020 championship (assuming that the season is completed), and most of the rest of the top 10 teams are championship long shots at best (Miami, Minnesota, Utah, Portland, Brooklyn).
Even the championship winners/championship contenders that shoot a lot of three pointers are not teams that are built around three point shooting the way that the current Rockets are. The Golden State Warriors utilized the three
point shot as a very effective offensive weapon, but the foundation for their championship success was their tremendous defense: the Warriors ranked first in defensive field goal percentage in 2015 and 2017 before slipping just slightly to third in 2018. Their 73-9 team in 2016 that lost in the NBA Finals ranked third in defensive field goal percentage.
In order to win games during which their shooting touch deserts them, a legitimate championship contender must be able to rely on consistently great defense.
While there is not much correlation between the three point shot rule and team scoring, or shooting a lot of three pointers and winning a championship, the increase in the usage of the three point shot has dramatically changed the shot charts for the league's most prolific individual scorers. During the first decade that the NBA used the three point shot, even the top scorers did not shoot a high volume of three pointers.
Alex English, the NBA's leading scorer of the 1980s, scored 21,018 points during that decade while making just 16 three pointers. The next two players on that list made even fewer three pointers; Moses Malone scored 19,082 points in the 1980s while making three three pointers, and
Adrian Dantley scored 18,157 points in the 1980s while making six three pointers. Only four of the decade's top 10 scorers made at least 100 three pointers during the 1980s, headlined by Larry Bird and
Mark Aguirre; Bird ranked fourth in scoring (17,899 points) while making 455 three pointers, and Aguirre ranked eighth in scoring (14,488 points) while making 255 three pointers. Bird ranked second in the 1980s in three pointers made, trailing only Dale Ellis (472).
Only 11 players made at least 200 three pointers during the 1980s--but 12 players made at least 200 three pointers during the 2018-19 season! Each of the league's top 10 scorers during the 2019-20 season is averaging at least one three pointer made per game, and seven of those 10 players are averaging at least two three pointers made per game. Four of the top five scorers are averaging at least three three pointers made per game, led by James Harden, who ranks first in both scoring (34.4 ppg) and three point field goals made (271). Harden's Rockets have
gone all-in with small ball, relying on volume three point shooting to overcome their lack of size/lack of rebounding, but after experiencing initial success the Rockets
sputtered recently.
Was Kerr's assessment 16 years ago correct? Since there are no live NBA games now or for the foreseeable future, there is plenty of time to watch classic games from the 1980s and 1990s, and then compare those games--in terms of quality of play, and in terms of entertainment value--with the games that we have been watching recently. I am not opposed to the three point shot--I love the ABA, and I love shooting three pointers when I play pickup or rec league ball--but I prefer to watch basketball players and teams that utilize all areas of the court on offense, as opposed to basketball players and teams that jack up three pointers regardless of time, score, matchups or momentum because the "stat gurus" made the supposedly revolutionary discovery that three is more than two. I cannot say that there is a "right" number of three pointers per game (even though the "stat gurus" think that they can), but both in terms of winning championships and in terms of entertainment value I do not think that 30, 40, or 50 three point shot attempts per team per game--numbers that we are seeing on a regular basis in today's game--is optimal.
Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot
Most Three Pointers Made
Year/League..Team..3 FGM..Player (team)..3 FGM
1967-68/ABA..
Pittsburgh..243..
Les Selvage (Anaheim)..147
1968-69/ABA..
Kentucky..335..
Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..199
1969-70/ABA..Kentucky..330..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..198
1970-71/ABA..Indiana..306..George Lehmann (Carolina)..154
1971-72/ABA..Indiana..220..Glen Combs (Utah)..103
1972-73/ABA..Indiana..172..Bill Keller (Indiana)..71
1973-74/ABA..San Diego..216..Bo Lamar (San Diego)..69
1974-75/ABA..Indiana..224..Bill Keller (Indiana)..80
1975-76/ABA..Indiana..250..Bill Keller (Indiana)..123
1979-80/NBA..San Diego..177..Brian Taylor (San Diego)..90
1980-81/NBA..San Diego..132..Mike Bratz (Cleveland)..57
1981-82/NBA..Indiana..103..Don Buse (Indiana)..73
1982-83/NBA..San Antonio..94..Mike Dunleavy (San Antonio)..67
1983-84/NBA..Utah..101..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..91
1984-85/NBA..Dallas..152..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..92
1985-86/NBA..Dallas..141..Larry Bird (Boston)..82
1986-87/NBA..Dallas..231..Larry Bird (Boston)..90
1987-88/NBA..Boston..271..Danny Ainge (Boston)..148
1988-89/NBA..
New York..386..Michael Adams (Denver)..166
1989-90/NBA..Cleveland...346..Michael Adams (Denver)..158
1990-91/NBA..Portland..341..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..172
1991-92/NBA..Milwaukee..371..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..162
1992-93/NBA..
Phoenix..398..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)/Reggie Miller (Indiana)..167
1993-94/NBA..
Houston..429..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)..192
1994-95/NBA*..
Houston..646..
John Starks (New York)..217
1995-96/NBA*..
Dallas..735..
Dennis Scott (Orlando)..267
1996-97/NBA*..Miami..678..Reggie Miller (Indiana)..229
1997-98/NBA..Seattle..621..Wesley Person (Cleveland)..192
1998-99/NBA^..Houston..336..Dee Brown (Toronto)..135
1999-00/NBA..Indiana..583..Gary Payton (Seattle)..177
2000-01/NBA..Boston..592..Antoine Walker (Boston)..221
2001-02/NBA..Boston..699..Ray Allen (Milwaukee)..229
2002-03/NBA..Boston..719..Ray Allen (Milwaukee-Seattle)..201
2003-04/NBA..Seattle..723..Peja Stojakovic (Sacramento)..240
2004-05/NBA..
Phoenix..796..Kyle Korver (Philadelphia)/Jason Richardson (Phoenix)..226
2005-06/NBA..
Phoenix..837..
Ray Allen (Seattle)..269
2006-07/NBA..Phoenix..785..Arenas (Washington)/Bell (Phoenix)..205
2007-08/NBA..Orlando..801..Jason Richardson (Charlotte)..243
2008-09/NBA..New York..823..Rashard Lewis (Orlando)..220
2009-10/NBA..
Orlando..841..Aaron Brooks (Houston)..209
2010-11/NBA..Orlando..770..Dorell Wright (Golden State)..194
2011-12/NBA^^..Orlando..670..Ryan Anderson (Orlando)..166
2012-13/NBA..
New York..891..
Stephen Curry (Golden State)..272
2013-14/NBA..Houston..779..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..261
2014-15/NBA..
Houston..933..
Stephen Curry (Golden State)..286
2015-16/NBA..
Golden State..1077...
Stephen Curry (Golden State)..402
2016-17/NBA..
Houston..1181..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..324
2017-18/NBA..
Houston..1256..James Harden (Houston)..265
2018-19/NBA..
Houston..1323..James Harden (Houston)..378
*
The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (prior to
and subsequent to these three seasons the three point arc was 22 feet in
the corners and 23 feet nine inches elsewhere).
^ Season shortened to 50 games by a lockout.
^^ Season shortened to 66 games by a lockout.
Bold indicates an ABA/NBA record.
Labels: "stat gurus", Alex English, Golden State Warriors, Houston Rockets, James Harden, Larry Bird, Mike D'Antoni, Stephen Curry, Steve Kerr, three point shot
posted by David Friedman @ 1:05 AM
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part II
Charles Barkley recently made some very derogatory comments about the Golden State Warriors and he reiterated his contention that jump-shooting teams are not built to win championships. As the father of a wonderful young daughter, I echo Rachel Nichols' eloquent statement that "girlie" or "girl" should never be used as a synonym for, as she put it, something that is "weak" or "lame."
Moving past Barkley's ill-advised method of delivering his message, is there any truth to Barkley's assertion about jump-shooting teams purely from the standpoint of strategically analyzing basketball? I have discussed this subject a number of times in a variety of contexts. For instance, I wrote
The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot for NBCSports.com nearly 10 years ago and then a few months after publication (during which time NBCSports.com was torn down and then rebuilt without maintaining links to prior content) I
updated the article and posted it at 20 Second Timeout.
To best understand my take on the strengths and limitations of the three point shot as a basketball weapon, it would be helpful to provide some historical background, both in terms of the sport of basketball in general and also in terms of how my involvement in the sport as a recreational player informed my perspective about the three point shot.
Let's start with "advanced basketball statistics." Newer visitors to 20 Second Timeout--and perhaps even some of my veteran readers--may wonder why I refer to high profile advocates of "advanced basketball statistics" as "stat gurus." I borrowed that phrase from a line that Mike Lupica delivered a few times many years ago on the "Sports Reporters"; he would refer to someone who is supposed to be an expert at something as a "guru" and then he would say, "It is time for the guru to start 'guruing.'" I no longer recall who specifically Lupica was talking about but that wry sense of "OK, smart guy, it's about time that you actually prove that you know what you are doing" perfectly captures how I feel about many of the pompous analytics acolytes who act like they know more about basketball than people who have been playing and/or coaching the sport at the highest level for decades. Is there some value in trying to analyze the sport objectively? Of course there is but there should be a sense of humility and an understanding that the numbers don't capture everything about a sport that is played (and coached and officiated) by human beings, not robots.
Dean Oliver and Dan Rosenbaum are two of a handful of people whose basketball statistical work I respect--but far too many "stat gurus" are less concerned with objective truth than they are with making a name for themselves by proving that their pet theories are some kind of basketball gospel. Those self-serving, self-interested and self-satisfied "stat gurus" have had a pernicious effect on the way that the game is played, analyzed and discussed. Those "stat gurus" act like no one effectively utilized basketball statistics until they came along. I've got news for them: Dean Smith was using plus/minus back in the 1970s, if not earlier; Hubie Brown was hired by the Kentucky Colonels--who he led to the 1975 ABA title--because he impressed team management with his intricate understanding of basketball statistics and how those statistics can be used as tools to build a winning team.
"Advanced basketball statistics" are only as meaningful and relevant as (1) the box score numbers upon which they are based and (2) the accuracy of the formulas that are used to slice and dice those box score numbers. I have already
demonstrated that assist statistics cannot be fully trusted, which means that any "advanced" formula that places a high value on assists will artificially inflate the value of players who accumulate many assists. There is good reason to question the accuracy/reliability of other box score numbers as well: subjectivity impacts the scoring of rebounds, steals, blocked shots and turnovers.
Hall of Famer/Top 50 player Rick Barry once told me that the only statistic he completely trusted was free throw percentage. Perhaps that seems self-serving of Barry because he owns one of the best career free throw percentages in pro basketball history but his point is that a player can inflate his field goal percentage by only shooting easy shots, rebounds can be padded by tips/taps that are not consistently recorded the same way and so forth. Then there is the reality--acknowledged by Rosenbaum but glossed over by many "stat gurus"--that "advanced basketball statistics" do not accurately measure individual defense. It should be obvious that subjective--but critically important--factors such as leadership, attitude and willingness/ability to play through injuries cannot be measured analytically at all. This is why I roll my eyes when a "stat guru" confidently declares that he can accurately rank every player in the NBA to the second decimal point of his proprietary "advance basketball statistic."
Many "stat gurus" assert that post play and the midrange game are inefficient, while the most efficient basketball shots are three pointers and free throws. The three point shot has evolved from a late game situational shot to a supplementary weapon to the mainstay of many teams' offenses. It should be remembered that even before "advanced basketball statistics" gained widespread influence, teams like the 1990s Houston Rockets and 1990s Orlando Magic utilized a "1 in, 4 out" offense featuring a dominant center surrounded by three point marksmen who punished opponents for double teaming the post. At that time, the three point shot was used to open up the game for the dominant post player but that dominant post player was still the focal
point.
Teams that are run by--or at least influenced by--"stat gurus" deemphasize the value of the traditional big man in
favor of deploying small lineups, shooting a lot of three pointers and (ideally) drawing a lot of fouls (typically via dribble penetration).
As for my personal involvement in the sport as a player, I have played rec league basketball since I was a kid in the 1970s. The strong suit of my game was always my jump shot (which really is not a traditional jump shot but some hybrid of Michael Cooper's set shot and Larry Bird's two hands behind his head delivery) but I spent my formative years playing without the three point shot. In 1987-88, the 19-9 three point shot was introduced into high school and college basketball. That wonderful arc soon appeared on the courts where I played both pickup ball and rec league ball. In the pickup games, we played to 12 by ones and twos. Under that scoring system, a good three point shooter is more valuable than a good post player; if I made even just 3 of 10 three pointers I scored six points, which is half the amount needed to win the game and a total that a post player could only match by shooting 60% from the field.
I really enjoyed playing 1 on 1 to 12 under that scoring system; I could hit six threes and take out a bigger, stronger opponent who was trying to wear me down one point at a time.
Of course, in league play when threes were not worth twice as much as twos, the math was not quite as favorable for a three point shooter but I did often mention to skeptical teammates that if I could make just one
third of my three pointers I was as efficient as a post player who was
making half of his shots in the paint. I was often the youngest
participant in these games and the older guys who disdained long jumpers
(and did not bother to do the simple math) got on my case for shooting
so many three pointers. I told them rather bluntly that unless they were
shooting 50% in the paint, then my three pointer was a higher
percentage shot if I was connecting 33% of the time (and I probably was
shooting closer to 40%), without even taking into account that the offensive team was more likely to rebound a long jumper than a
missed shot in the paint. In addition, team defense is poorly organized in most rec leagues, so a smart and patient team can easily obtain wide open three point shots, particularly if the league does not use a shot clock.
So, from a young age I understood that in short games scored by ones and twos and in rec league games where post play was erratic and team defense was disorganized the three point shot was a very potent weapon.
Similarly, in the 40 minute college game featuring a short season followed by a one and done playoff system, it is possible to have a lot of success by constructing a good three point shooting team with well conditioned athletes who could beat the defense up and down the floor. Such teams generally play at a fast pace and thrive on shooting three pointers in transition. Rick Pitino has had success with this approach at multiple NCAA Division I schools and
Paul Westhead enjoyed success both in NCAA Division I basketball and in the WNBA, where he led the Phoenix Mercury to the 2007 title. Westhead is the only coach to win a championship in both the WNBA and the NBA (1980 L.A. Lakers), though ironically Magic Johnson ran Westhead out of L.A. because Johnson felt that Westhead's offense at that time was too slow and methodical. However, NBA basketball consists of an 82 game regular season followed by four rounds of best of seven playoff series. Each regulation game lasts 48 minutes, not 40. Strategies that work in the college game are not necessarily applicable to the NBA game.
What does all of this have to do with Charles Barkley's comment about jump shooting teams? The NBA does not keep score by ones and twos and NBA defense is infinitely better than rec league defense. The notion that you can win big in the NBA just by shooting a large number of three pointers may make mathematical sense but it does not make real world sense. In that regard, there is some truth to what Barkley said. Take, for example, the Houston Rockets, who are now coached by Mike D'Antoni, whose Phoenix teams led the NBA in three point field goals made for three consecutive seasons (2005-07). The Rockets have a potent offense and are on pace to shatter many three point shooting records but they rank 22nd in defensive field goal percentage after finishing 19th in that category (under Kevin McHale and J.B. Bickerstaff) last season. That is a recipe for elimination early in the playoffs.
The nuance that Barkley is missing when he singles out the Warriors is that the Warriors differentiated themselves from other three-point happy teams (such as D'Antoni's Suns and Rockets) by playing organized, intense and effective defense. In their 2015 championship season, the Warriors led the league in defensive field goal percentage; they ranked third in that category last season and they currently rank second this season despite the loss of Andrew Bogut's rim protection.
Championship teams typically
rank in the top five or 10 in defensive field goal percentage. The 2000-02 Shaquille O'Neal-Kobe Bryant Lakers are an interesting example. The Lakers led the league in defensive field goal percentage in 2000 and in 2002. In 2001 they slipped to 11th but still won the title. What happened? Unlike Bryant, O'Neal did not always fully exert himself during the regular season--but O'Neal was capable of playing championship level defense when he felt like it and after coasting through the 2001 regular season he ramped up his effort during the 2001 playoffs, when the Lakers ranked second in defensive field goal percentage. O'Neal decided to
"heal on company time" during the 2002-03 season as the Lakers plummeted to 21st in defensive field goal percentage and this time O'Neal was not willing or able to turn it up in the playoffs: the Lakers ranked 15th out of 16 playoff teams in defensive field goal percentage and they lost in the second round to the eventual champion San Antonio Spurs, who ranked second in defensive field goal percentage during the 2003 playoffs and during the 2003 regular season.
In other words, instead of continually bashing the Warriors, Barkley should focus his attention on the Rockets: that is the jump shooting team that will never win a championship (as opposed to the Warriors, a jump shooting team that plays defense and has already won a championship).
There is an important point implied but not explicitly mentioned in Barkley's statement: the three point shot is a high variance shot, as I discussed in
The Score, the Key Stat, the Bottom Line: A New 20 Second Timeout Feature, noting that three point field goal percentage can be a misleading statistic: if a player shoots 6-9 from three point range in one playoff game and 1-9 from three point range in the next playoff game that works out to a very good .389 3FG% but his team will likely lose the second game (and may not win the first game, either, if the team is deficient defensively and/or on the boards). In that article, I argued that Gilbert Arenas' three point field goal percentage did not justify his style of play and that a team was not likely to have much playoff success when led by a point guard who is indifferent defensively and who has poor shot selection--even if his overall shooting percentage is not bad, the high variance inherent in shooting a lot of shots from three point range (many of which were bad shots, even if they sometimes connected) is a recipe for disaster for that point guard and his team.
James Harden is similar to Arenas in many ways, though Harden is a better and more consistent player than Arenas was. My prediction for a Harden-led team is the same as my accurate prediction regarding an Arenas-led team: I would be surprised if such a team advances past the second round of the playoffs.
The Rockets' organization has been led for nearly a decade by Daryl Morey, who has been widely praised in the mainstream media as a visionary despite the fact that during his first eight years in Houston the Rockets missed the playoffs three times and only won three playoff series. Last season, the Rockets barely qualified for the playoffs but instead of revising their offense happy/defense optional approach Morey doubled down by hiring D'Antoni. The Rockets might win 50 games this season, as some of D'Antoni's Phoenix teams did. Harden might win the MVP over more deserving players, as D'Antoni's Phoenix point guard Steve Nash did twice. However, it will be surprising if the Rockets advance very far in the playoffs, barring a defensive turnaround similar to the 2001 Lakers (which is highly improbable, to say the least).
Successful NBA teams have judiciously incorporated "advanced basketball statistics" into their programs but teams (like Houston) that have gone all in have not reached the highest level. This is a valid point that Barkley could (and should) make during TNT telecasts.
The Philadelphia 76ers are the poster children for a "stat guru" run amuck or, as I put it a couple years ago,
The 76ers Are the Waterloo for "Stat Gurus." Sam Hinkie, a protege of Morey's, instituted an infamous "process" in Philadelphia that came close to ruining a once storied franchise. Hinkie's media buddies still try to paint him as some kind of visionary but he actually is the 21st century Ted Stepien with a much better sense of public relations. In the early 1980s, Ted Stepien tore down the Cleveland Cavaliers to the point that the league had to essentially wrest control of the franchise from him, which is what happened (in a more subtle way) to Hinkie as well. It took Wayne Embry years to undo the damage that Stepien did and by the time Embry turned the Cavaliers into contenders there were no traces left of Stepien's handiwork; it will similarly take years for Bryan Colangelo to salvage the 76ers and by the time they become good again Hinkie's "process" will be a distant, dark memory.
Since the "process" began, the 76ers have never had a winning percentage above .250 and, despite some recent misguided media hype about Hinkie being vindicated, they are currently 5-18 (.217 winning percentage).
One of the many aspects of pro sports that Hinkie fails to understand is that a loser's mentality is contagious and must be purged from an organization if that organization is going to enjoy any success. You cannot turn your franchise into a perennial loser, stockpile some talent and then suddenly become a championship team; the Cleveland Browns' front office has been infiltrated with Hinkie-like thinking and they have turned the Browns into a de facto expansion team on par with the ultimate NFL laughingstock, the 1976 Tampa Bay Buccaneers.
When Mike Ditka was hired as the head coach of the Chicago Bears in 1982, he told his players that he had good news and bad news: the good news was that the Bears would win the Super Bowl within three years but the bad news was that many of them would no longer be on the team by that time. Both predictions came true. No "advanced basketball statistic" blueprint takes the place of a basic understanding of how to build a team that has a championship mindset and championship habits, two traits that are missing in both Houston and Philadelphia.
So, there is some truth to what Barkley said but--because he failed to articulate his message clearly and because he used some unfortunate language that overshadowed his larger point--it is easy to dismiss him as an old school curmudgeon. It is true that teams that rely on jump shooting and do not play excellent defense will not win a championship--but it is not correct to lump the Warriors into a category that should be headlined by the Rockets.
Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot
Most Three Pointers Made
Year/League...Team...3 FGM...Player (team)...3 FGM
1967-68/ABA..
Pittsburgh..243..
Les Selvage (Anaheim)..147
1968-69/ABA..
Kentucky..335..
Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..199
1969-70/ABA..Kentucky..330..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..198
1970-71/ABA..Indiana..306..George Lehmann (Carolina)..154
1971-72/ABA..Indiana..220..Glen Combs (Utah)..103
1972-73/ABA..Indiana..172..Bill Keller (Indiana)..71
1973-74/ABA..San Diego..216..Bo Lamar (San Diego)..69
1974-75/ABA..Indiana..224..Bill Keller (Indiana)..80
1975-76/ABA..Indiana..250..Bill Keller (Indiana)..123
1979-80/NBA..San Diego..177..Brian Taylor (San Diego)..90
1980-81/NBA..San Diego..132..Mike Bratz (Cleveland)..57
1981-82/NBA..Indiana..103..Don Buse (Indiana)..73
1982-83/NBA..San Antonio..94..Mike Dunleavy (San Antonio)..67
1983-84/NBA..Utah..101..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..91
1984-85/NBA..Dallas..152..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..92
1985-86/NBA..Dallas..141..Larry Bird (Boston)..82
1986-87/NBA..Dallas..231..Larry Bird (Boston)..90
1987-88/NBA..Boston..271..Danny Ainge (Boston)..148
1988-89/NBA..
New York..386..Michael Adams (Denver)..166
1989-90/NBA..Cleveland...346..Michael Adams (Denver)..158
1990-91/NBA..Portland..341..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..172
1991-92/NBA..Milwaukee..371..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..162
1992-93/NBA..
Phoenix..398..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)/Reggie Miller (Indiana)..167
1993-94/NBA..
Houston..429..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)..192
1994-95/NBA*..
Houston..646..
John Starks (New York)..217
1995-96/NBA*..
Dallas..735..
Dennis Scott (Orlando)..267
1996-97/NBA*..Miami..678..Reggie Miller (Indiana)..229
1997-98/NBA..Seattle..621..Wesley Person (Cleveland)..192
1998-99/NBA^..Houston..336..Dee Brown (Toronto)..135
1999-00/NBA..Indiana..583..Gary Payton (Seattle)..177
2000-01/NBA..Boston..592..Antoine Walker (Boston)..221
2001-02/NBA..Boston..699..Ray Allen (Milwaukee)..229
2002-03/NBA..Boston..719..Ray Allen (Milwaukee-Seattle)..201
2003-04/NBA..Seattle..723..Peja Stojakovic (Sacramento)..240
2004-05/NBA..
Phoenix..796..Kyle Korver (Philadelphia)/Jason Richardson (Phoenix)..226
2005-06/NBA..
Phoenix..837..
Ray Allen (Seattle)..269
2006-07/NBA..Phoenix..785..Arenas (Washington)/Bell (Phoenix)..205
2007-08/NBA..Orlando..801..Jason Richardson (Charlotte)..243
2008-09/NBA..New York..823..Rashard Lewis (Orlando)..220
2009-10/NBA..
Orlando..841..Aaron Brooks (Houston)..209
2010-11/NBA..Orlando..770..Dorell Wright (Golden State)..194
2011-12/NBA^^..Orlando..670..Ryan Anderson (Orlando)..166
2012-13/NBA..
New York..891..
Stephen Curry (Golden State)..272
2013-14/NBA..Houston..779..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..261
2014-15/NBA..
Houston..933..
Stephen Curry (Golden State)..286
2015-16/NBA..
Golden State..1077..
Stephen Curry (Golden State)..402
*
The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (prior to
and subsequent to these three seasons the three point arc was 22 feet in
the corners and 23 feet nine inches elsewhere).
^ Season shortened to 50 games by a lockout.
^^ Season shortened to 66 games by a lockout.
Bold indicates an ABA/NBA record.
Labels: "stat gurus", Charles Barkley, Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, James Harden, Kobe Bryant, L.A. Lakers, Mike D'Antoni, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, Shaquille O'Neal, three point shot
posted by David Friedman @ 3:21 PM
