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Sunday, September 14, 2025

Charley Rosen: Basketball Bard

Charley Rosen, author of more than two dozen books and confidant to Hall of Fame basketball coach Phil Jackson, passed away on September 13 at the age of 84. Last year, Rosen was inducted in the New York City Basketball Hall of Fame. Few people embodied the essence of being a basketball lifer more than Rosen. The 6-8 Rosen earned team MVP honors in each of his three seasons at Hunter College (1959-62) while setting school records for scoring and rebounding. In 1961, he played on the gold-medal winning U.S. squad in the Maccabiah Games, along with future pros Larry Brown and Art Heyman. Rosen never played in the NBA or ABA, but he spent some time with the Scranton Miners of the Eastern Basketball League (EBL) before teaching English at Hofstra. 

Rosen wrote many articles for a variety of magazines, including  "Dr. J Makes the Whole World Feel Good" for the March 1973 issue of Sport, which was then edited by the incomparable Dick Schaap. Rosen had high praise for Julius Erving, who was in the middle of his second pro season: "By the time he finishes his career, the people who care about basketball history may look back and say there were two doctors who shaped the sport. The first was Dr. James Naismith--and all he did was invent the game. Dr. J made it an art."

In 1975, Rosen published his first book, Maverick, which he co-wrote with Jackson, who then played for the New York Knicks. Stan Love, who played five NBA/ABA seasons with the Baltimore Bullets, L.A. Lakers, and San Antonio Spurs, introduced his friend Rosen to Jackson, and the rest is basketball (and writing) history. Stan Love, who passed away on April 27, 2025, is the father of current NBA player Kevin Love, and the younger brother of Beach Boys singer Mike Love. 

In 1979-80, Rosen coached the men's team at Bard College; he described his experiences at Bard in his book Players and Pretenders. Rosen served as Phil Jackson's assistant with the CBA's Albany Patroons from 1983-86 before becoming a CBA head coach with Albany, Rockford, Oklahoma City, and Savannah. Rosen's experiences in the CBA formed the basis of his hilarious 1992 novel The Cockroach Basketball League. Rosen coached the SUNY New Paltz women's team from 1993-95, and subsequently became a regular contributor to a variety of websites, including ESPN.com, FoxSports.com, and HoopsHype.com. For the past 30 years or so, he typically produced a new book every other year. 

Rosen was an engaging storyteller in addition to being a shrewd observer of basketball strategy and tactics. Overall, I found his work to be entertaining and informative, but it must be noted that Rosen could be sloppy with his research, and some of his writing contains egregious errors. I won't give him a pass in life or death for errors that are inexcusable, but I will say that I generally found his skill set analysis of players and teams to be on target. For example, Rosen understood that Kobe Bryant was better than Dwyane Wade at a time when many media members who were biased in favor of Shaquille O'Neal--and thus against O'Neal's former teammate Bryant--could not bring themselves to acknowledge Bryant's greatness. Rosen also displayed an astute understanding of the differences between NBA basketball and FIBA basketball, and he explained why statistics can be very misleading. It is popular in many quarters to assert that college basketball is somehow a purer or more fundamentally sound form of basketball than NBA basketball, but Rosen cut through that nonsense nearly two decades ago with words that are still relevant today: "The NBA game has a huge advantage in player talent, offensive and defensive prowess, coaching, officiating and the overall quality of performance in every aspect but one. The only advantage the college game enjoys is the consistent enthusiasm of its players. And this is true only because some veteran NBA players on basement-dwelling teams will take an occasional game off late in the season. The worst NBA team would trounce the NCAA champs by upwards of 30 points." 

Rosen's death caused me to think back to my formative years as a basketball fan. I have enjoyed watching, playing, reading about, and writing about basketball since I was a very young child. Basketball is a lifelong passion for me just as it was for Rosen. Basketball books that I read before the age of 15 that significantly impacted and influenced me include Basketball's Biggest Stars by Angelo Resciniti, many editions of The Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball edited by Zander Hollander, A Loose Game by Lewis Cole, The Breaks of the Game by David Halberstam, Daniel Rudman's 1980 anthology Take it to the Hoop, Stuff Good Players Should Know by Dick DeVenzioThe Legend of Dr. J by Marty Bell, and The Lonely Heroes by Merv Harris--but that list would not be complete without Rosen's God, Man and Basketball Jones, a book that crackles with memorable phrases and keen insights; it was published in 1979, and I read it from cover to cover some time in the early 1980s when I was 10 or 11. An important concept from that book that stuck with me ever since is that you cannot fully understand what is happening in a basketball game if you are only watching the ball, because there are nine players who do not have the ball whose movements (or lack of movement) are significant. A funny line from that book that still makes me chuckle is Rosen's description of Elvin Hayes after delineating the different ways that various forwards play and after noting Hayes' propensity to shoot fadeaway jumpers: "If there are small forwards, power forwards, defensive forwards, and penetrating forwards, then Elvin Hayes is the only backwards-forward in the NBA."

At the end of the first chapter of God, Man, and Basketball Jones, Rosen waxed poetic about his love for basketball:

Basketball is one-on-one and burn-on-burn.

Basketball is ballet with defense.

Basketball is a blur of acrobatic giants, perilous abandon, and ram-slam-in-your-mother's-eyes dunk shots.

And for even the most casual fan, basketball can also be a dribbling, leaping, flowing salvation. 

He concluded the book with this thought: "He who lives by the jump shot dies. But a true vision of Basketball Jones releases the selfless energy that sustains the game, sustains life, and brings them both to victory." 

If heaven is a playground--to borrow the title of Rick Telander's classic 1976 book about basketball in New York City that I read a few years after my first exposure to Rosen's work--then Rosen is hooping now without having to worry about bad knees or bad calls, and he is enjoying the full glory of the selfless energy of Basketball Jones.

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posted by David Friedman @ 4:05 AM

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Thursday, April 22, 2021

My Second Appearance on Benbo's Podcast: The Chosen Game, Coaching Philosophies, MVP Criteria, Interviewing Techniques, and More

I recently made my second appearance on Benbo's podcast, hosted by Dr. James Ben Guest. Our wide-ranging conversation began with sharing our thoughts about Charley Rosen's book The Chosen Game, which describes the influence that Jewish players and coaches had on the development of basketball in the early 20th century. 

Then, we talked about many other subjects, including coaching philosophies (from Nat Holman to Red Holzman to Phil Jackson, with digressions about Larry Brown and Vince Lombardi), MVP selection criteria, and my experiences interviewing various players--including Green Bay's two-time Super Bowl champion safety Tom Brown (who also played outfield and first base for the Washington Senators), six-time NBA champion Scottie Pippen, and 1971 NBA champion Oscar Robertson. 

I compared my approach to interviews with the way that some media members slant their coverage based on a person's availability/affability; for example, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar declined to do an interview with me, but that did not change my opinion that he is one of the most underrated great players in pro basketball history.

I also discussed the importance of using one's platform and talents to maximum effect. I have used this website and other platforms to speak out about the NBA's disgraceful treatment of the "Pre-65ers" and also on behalf of underrated individuals such as Artis Gilmore, Mel DanielsRoger Brown, and Slick Leonard, who each were eventually, belatedly inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame. I don't know how much influence my writing had on helping those ABA legends obtain the recognition that they deserve, but the point is that I used my voice to call attention to their greatness. It is disappointing that many people who have been blessed with large platforms/audiences squander the opportunity to, as the saying goes, comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable.

Here is the link to the podcast: Jews, Immigration, and Basketball.

Here is the link to my first appearance on Benbo's podcast: Interview with David Friedman: Great Sportswriting is Great Writing.

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posted by David Friedman @ 7:40 PM

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Tuesday, June 02, 2020

Narratives Versus Reality

Narratives often overshadow reality regarding player evaluations. During Kobe Bryant's career, an evergreen narrative was when/if Bryant would evolve to become a team player. One such article declared "Kobe Bryant has grown into a consummate team player." The writer quoted Larry Brown, who called Bryant "a model" of what an NBA player should be, and in that same article one of Bryant's teammates said of Bryant, "He doesn't make his game a personal game anymore. You don't see him doing the things on the floor that used to get him in trouble and get us in trouble." You might assume that the article is from the 2008-2010 time frame, when Bryant led the Lakers to three straight Finals appearances and back to back titles--but the article is from 2000, prior to Bryant winning three championships alongside Shaquille O'Neal.

Once the media labels a player, team, or situation a certain way, that label often sticks, and then becomes the template for future stories. The media labeled Bryant a bad teammate early in his career, and that narrative stuck. Then, media members could choose the "Bryant is now becoming a good teammate" story template or they could stick with the "Bryant has never been/will never be a good teammate" story template. Far too many Bryant stories blindly followed one of those templates, without digging deeper to find the truth.

As Fred Carter told me for one of the first stories that I wrote about Bryant, "For some people perception is reality. The echoed word becomes the accepted word. It becomes the choice phrase. But he won titles and he does get the assists. He does get steals and he does get blocks. He's not a guy who just plays on the offensive end. What happens is that people have the tendency to echo the words of everyone else. It's unfortunate."

Uninformed and/or biased media members have constructed a few narratives about Julius Erving, falsely asserting that his game was more about style than substance, that he did not have a reliable jump shot, and that he was not a good defensive player. Alternatively, some media members prefer a narrative suggesting that Erving was not a well-rounded player early in his career but that his game developed as he became older and lost some of his athleticism. These narratives do not withstand close scrutiny of Erving's career and of his skill set.

Regarding style versus substance, Erving led his teams to 10 "Final Four" appearances, six Finals appearances, and three championships during his 16 season professional career while winning two Finals MVPs and retiring as the second leading career playoff scorer in pro basketball history. Erving never played on a team with a losing record or a team that failed to make the playoffs; he was the first athlete in the history of North American major professional team sports (NBA, NFL, MLB, NHL) to achieve those distinctions in a career lasting at least 16 seasons (Karl Malone and John Stockton both later made the playoffs in each season of their 19 year careers, while Scottie Pippen made the playoffs in the first 16 seasons of his career before missing the playoffs in his 17th and final season).

If you assert that Erving's reputation is built more on style than substance--as Justin Termine recently did on SiriusXM NBA Radio--then you are betraying vast, deep ignorance about pro basketball history.

As for self-improvement, it is true that Bryant, Erving, and most elite players worked on their games throughout their careers; Bryant became a better teammate as time passed, and Erving improved his jump shot. The problem is when the media constructs a false, retrospective narrative that a young Bryant had been a bad teammate, or that a young Erving was a bad shooter. Those narratives enable media members to construct a timeline and a picture that suits their biases, but those narratives are untrue.

You may think that saying that Bryant evolved into a good team player is a compliment to Bryant--but if the truth is that he was a good team player early in his career--and it is indisputable that he was a vital contributor to three championship teams as a young player--then a media narrative that suggests that Bryant did not become a good team player until late in his career is biased, negative, and misleading.

Similarly, stories that assert that Erving did not develop a midrange jumper or focus on team defense until he joined the NBA are biased, negative, and misleading. Erving was never a great outside shooter, but he was also never as bad of a shooter as some narratives suggest. He was so dominant as an inside player that he did not need to shoot many jump shots early in his career. However, he was always at least a solid free throw shooter--demonstrating that he had a reliable touch out to at least 15 feet--and he worked on his jump shot until it became a dependable weapon.

Was Erving a shooter like Stephen Curry? Of course not--but, Stephen Curry will never be able to beat a double team by driving to the hoop and then dunking over the center rotating to defend the rim.

Let's go back to March 1973--during Erving's second season in the ABA--and examine how Erving was viewed by his contemporaries, and how he was depicted by a well-known (and still active) basketball writer. In March 1973, Erving was not considered a limited player who lacked a jump shot and did not play much defense; he was already being discussed as perhaps the best forward of all-time.

Charley Rosen wrote the article "Dr. J Makes the Whole World Feel Good" for Sport, a now-defunct magazine that was then experiencing its glory days under the skilled editorial eye/hand of Dick Schaap. Oddly, in some of his subsequent writing, Rosen forgot a few of the insights about Erving that he learned while researching this article.

Rosen quoted Al Bianchi, Erving's first coach in the ABA: "With a little more experience, he'll be the best forward who ever played the game. Absolutely the best. The only one who compares to Julie is Elgin Baylor--they both have great body control. Julie can put the ball down just as well as Baylor, he can shoot as well, he can rebound better, run better, plays defense a hell of a lot better, and Julie shoots with both hands--he doesn't have to water his left hand three times a day to keep it alive."

Floyd Layne, a former collegiate basketball star who Rosen mentioned only as one of Erving's Rucker League coaches, told Rosen that Erving is already the best forward of all-time: "The thing that makes him so great is his tremendous imagination. He has more moves than Bobby Fischer. Julius is Earl Monroe with size and power."

In my interview with Bianchi, I referenced the notion that Erving developed his jump shot during his career, and Bianchi stated, "What he did was, he scored. I don't know if you can say that he was not a good outside shooter, but he scored. He was a guy who could put points on the board. His outside shot was more than adequate..."

The important distinction between reality and the media narrative is that Erving's jump shot was "more than adequate" from the start. Many media members want the public to believe either that Erving never learned how to shoot, or that he did not become even a decent shooter until late in his career; this is a useful false narrative for anyone who is asserting that, for instance, Rick Barry or Larry Bird were better than Erving.

Rosen described watching Erving dazzle the Kentucky Colonels with 45 points on 16-31 field goal shooting and 13-13 free throw shooting in a 122-115 victory for Erving's Virginia Squires on November 17, 1972. That performance was one of 13 40 point games Erving racked up during the 1972-73 season, when he led the ABA in scoring with a career-high 31.9 ppg average. Rosen observed that "almost all" of Erving's field goals were "from outside." Rick Barry had recently said that Erving had poor shooting range, but Erving told Rosen that he disagreed with that notion: "He doesn't know. I just never took long jumpers on him, that's all. His game is hoisting from the outside, but if I did that I wouldn't be going to the strongest part of my game, which is inside--and it wouldn't be to my advantage, or to my team's. I don't have to go out of my way to prove to anybody that I can shoot."

Shooting range is important because it enables a player to punish defenders for sagging off of him. LeBron James shot just .356 from the field as the Spurs swept his Cavaliers in the 2007 NBA Finals; James did not have much shooting range at that stage of his career, enabling the Spurs to shut him down by packing the paint and daring him to shoot from the outside. However, at no point during Erving's career was his outside shooting a liability to the extent that it was for a significant portion of James' career.

Erving shot .506 from the field and .777 from the free throw line during his ABA/NBA career. His career three point percentage (.298) is not bad considering that many of his three point shot attempts were last second heaves to beat the shot clock or the game clock; he ranked sixth in the ABA in three point field goal percentage in both 1975 and 1976, the only seasons during his career when the shot was at least occasionally a part of his repertoire as opposed to being a desperation weapon (the three point shot did not exist during the first three seasons of Erving's NBA career, and did not become widely used until after Erving retired).

Erving shot at least .491 from the field in each of his first 14 seasons, and he never shot worse than .471 from the field. He dunked often and well, but he also had a reliable 15-18 foot jump shot. That being said, opposing teams preferred for Erving to shoot a jump shot as opposed to dunking, so defenders backed off from Erving a bit, and shaded him away from his dominant right hand--but Erving's field goal percentage did not plummet when facing such defensive tactics, unlike what happened to James on many occasions.

Erving shot .745 from the free throw line as a rookie. He matched that career-low during the 1979 season, but in his other 14 pro seasons he never again shot worse than .750, and in nine seasons he shot at least .776, including three campaigns during which he shot .800 or better.

Rosen concluded, "By the time he finishes his career, the people who care about basketball history may look back and say there were two doctors who shaped the sport. The first was Dr. James Naismith--and all he did was invent the game. Dr. J made it an art."

In the March 1975 issue of Sport, Jimmy Breslin referred to Erving as "The best basketball player alive at this time, and perhaps the best basketball player of his size ever to be alive at any time."

The Rosen and Breslin articles are not isolated examples taken out of context. It is not difficult to find many other articles from the early to mid-1970s raving about Erving. Occasionally, his outside shot and defense are mentioned as relative weaknesses in contrast to his dominant scoring and rebounding, but contemporary commentators were not suggesting that Erving could not shoot or that he was a defensive liability, nor were they saying that Erving's game consisted of more style than substance.

The false narratives about Erving's jump shot and defense developed later, and then were retroactively applied to Erving's career to suggest either (1) he started out with a subpar jump shot but he improved or (2) that, unlike Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant, he never developed a reliable jump shot. Regarding defense, there is no question that Erving was elite in terms of steals and blocked shots. Few players in basketball history can come close to his combined prowess in those categories, and those few players are considered top notch defensive players. Erving ranked in the top 10 in both steals and blocked shots during six different seasons. Hakeem Olajuwon is next on the list (four times), followed by Bobby Jones (two times) and Ben Wallace (two times). Only 10 players have accomplished this feat even once. Erving set the record with 12 seasons with at least 100 steals and at least 100 blocked shots, a mark later tied by Hakeem Olajuwon. Kevin Garnett is next on the list with eight such seasons. Erving was the first player to post at least 200 steals and at least 100 blocked shots during a season, and only three players have joined the 200-100 Club: Michael Jordan, Hakeem Olajuwon, and Scottie Pippen.

Are we supposed to believe that Erving is the only player racking up 100 steal/100 blocked shot seasons who was a poor defender? Erving was a dominant, high minutes player for several excellent, defensive-minded teams. Is it credible to suggest that the team leader--who was racking up steals and blocked shots--was not an integral part of that defensive success?

Erving is too nice to speak up for himself, but that does not excuse blatant rewriting of basketball history.

Termine, the loudmouth radio host who regularly lionizes Rick Barry while disparaging Erving, recently made a big deal about Erving not winning an NBA title without Moses Malone, and about Erving's head to head performance versus Bob Dandridge in the 1978 playoffs.

Erving won two ABA titles and led the 76ers to three NBA Finals without Malone. Malone and Erving were teammates for four seasons out of Malone's 21 year professional career. Malone advanced to the NBA Finals one time in 17 seasons without Erving. Was the younger Malone a more dominant player than Erving during the 76ers' championship season? Of course--but Erving had been the 1981 regular season MVP (Malone won the award in 1979 and 1982 with Houston and in 1983 with Philadelphia) and in 1983 Erving made the All-NBA First Team while finishing fifth in MVP voting. Termine acts as if Erving was Gary Payton latching onto the coattails of Dwyane Wade and Shaquille O'Neal to win an NBA title, when in fact Erving was an MVP-level player for a 65 win team that set a postseason record by going 12-1 (that mark was broken by the 2001 Lakers, who went 15-1 in an expanded playoff format).

Barry is one of the greatest players of all-time, but Erving was superior as an inside scorer, rebounder, and defensive player. Barry was a better free throw shooter, outside shooter, and passer than Erving--but Erving was superior in categories that have more of an impact on winning, and his superiority in his best areas was more pronounced than Barry's superiority in his best areas.

Head to head comparisons of individual players in a team sport have some value, but should be placed in context. It is beyond the scope of this article to dig into every contextual factor in the head to head battles of Erving-Barry or Erving-Dandridge. It is worth mentioning that Barry and Dandridge are each older than Erving (a factor that should also be considered when comparing Erving to Bird, who is several years younger than Erving).

Erving faced Barry in one 1972 ABA playoff series, when Erving was a rookie and Barry was already an established All-NBA/All-ABA performer. Erving averaged 30.7 ppg and 21.0 rpg in that series, while Barry averaged 29.0 ppg (Barry's rpg average for that series is not available, but he averaged 6.5 rpg overall in the 1972 playoffs, and thus it is fair to assume that Erving outrebounded Barry by a substantial margin in that series). Barry's New York Nets defeated Erving's Virginia Squires 94-88 in game seven despite Erving producing a game-high 35 points, plus 20 rebounds. The Squires led the series 2-0, but the teams had to wait nine days to play game three due to scheduling conflicts with the Nets' home court; during the delay, injured All-ABA First Team guard Bill Melchionni healed enough to return to action for the Nets, while Virginia players Doug Moe and George Irvine got hurt during practice.

The Erving-Barry regular season head to head tally is 19-9 in Erving's favor, with Erving averaging 26.6 ppg compared to Barry's 24.7 ppg. Erving leads Barry in championships (three to one), regular season MVPs (four to none), All-Star selections (16 to 12), Finals MVPs (two to one), and All-Defensive Team selections (one to none). Each made the All-NBA/All-ABA First Team nine times. If for some bizarre, illogical reason you prefer to not count their ABA accomplishments, then Erving and Barry are tied with one championship each, Erving leads in regular season MVPs (one to none), Erving leads in All-Star selections (11 to eight), Barry leads in Finals MVPs (one to none), and they are tied with five All-NBA First Team selections each. Barry did not make the All-NBA Team after age 32 or the All-Star team after age 34, while Erving made the All-NBA Second Team at 34, and the All-Star team at 37.

I have tremendous respect for Rick Barry, but it is difficult to understand how anyone could rank him ahead of Julius Erving. Termine has hosted shows with Barry, and often interviews him, but those personal connections should not matter to a purported historian of the game.

Termine harped on the Erving-Dandridge matchup in the 1978 playoffs, but anyone with sense understands that you do not evaluate Erving's 16 year Hall of Fame career based on one playoff series. Further, it is not like Dandridge dominated Erving. First, we will look at the numbers, and then we will consider some context (consult my four part series about Erving's playoff career for an in depth look at Erving's postseason resume). Dandridge averaged 22.8 ppg, 6.3 rpg, 4.2 apg, and 2.0 spg in the 1978 Eastern Conference semifinals while shooting .508 from the field and .750 from the free throw line (his regular season numbers during that campaign were 19.3/5.9/3.8/1.3/.471/.788); Erving averaged 21.5 ppg, 9.3 rpg, 3.3 apg, and 1.3 spg in the 1978 Eastern Conference semifinals while shooting .473 from the field and .742 from the free throw line (his regular season numbers were 20.6/6.5/3.8/1.8/.502/.845).

Erving led the 76ers in scoring during the series, and was just three total rebounds short of leading the team in that department as well; Dandridge was second on his team in scoring and fourth on his team in rebounding as the Bullets outrebounded the 76ers by more than 4 rpg. Elvin Hayes led the Bullets in scoring (23.0 ppg) and rebounding (15.7 rpg) while shooting .452 from the field as he destroyed 76ers power forward George McGinnis (13.8 ppg, 8.0 rpg, .387 FG%). The Bullets, with two top 50 players (Hayes and Wes Unseld) plus four-time All-Star Dandridge, won the 1978 title and returned to the Finals in 1979.

That playoff series was not the highlight of Erving's career, but Termine had the gall to compare it to James Harden's perennial playoff choking. Harden never belongs in any conversation with Erving, unless the conversation begins and ends with, "Julius Erving was a vastly superior player to James Harden."

By the way, according to Basketball Reference, Erving won 11 out of 15 regular season head to head encounters with Dandridge while outpacing Dandridge in scoring by nine ppg (24.7 ppg to 15.7 ppg). It is also worth looking at what happened after one playoff series during which an All-Star forward had a very solid performance against one of the greatest players of all-time. Much is made of how Michael Jordan motivated himself by slights real and imagined. It is a reasonable assumption that Erving did not much care for the narrative that Dandridge outplayed him during the 1978 playoffs. Here is how their next nine head to head encounters went, with Erving's team winning eight of the nine games: Erving 25, Dandridge 18; Erving 26, Dandridge 20; Erving 20, Dandridge 18; Erving 27, Dandridge 8; Erving 21, Dandridge 12; Erving 40, Dandridge 0 (Dandridge played just seven minutes in that game); Erving 36, Dandridge 18; Erving 24, Dandridge 14; Erving 28, Dandridge 2. Erving outscored Dandridge 27.4 ppg to 12.2 ppg in those games.

Erving did not talk trash and did not bring attention on himself in any way other than performing at an elite level, so his dominance over Dandridge is easy to ignore for media members who prefer to push a slanted narrative suggesting that one playoff series somehow proves that Erving should not be ranked ahead of Barry and Bird.

None of the above is meant to denigrate Dandridge, an excellent player who was a key member of two NBA championship teams. The point is that contrived narratives and cherry-picked examples are often used by media members (and not just when covering sports). Be smart enough to dig deeper, or to consult materials written by someone who dug deeper.

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posted by David Friedman @ 8:04 PM

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Thursday, August 29, 2019

Player Comparisons and Analysis Must Be Based on Facts

The sad state of sports journalism is not a new story, nor is it a story whose narrative is likely to improve any time soon. It is striking and disappointing how frequently player comparisons are made that contain inaccurate factual statements--and some of the most prominent, respected commentators have been guilty of this. For example, during Kobe Bryant's prime when there were heated debates about Michael Jordan versus Kobe Bryant, Kobe Bryant versus Steve Nash, and so forth, Mike Wilbon appeared on Dan Patrick's podcast and told Patrick that he had just been researching some numbers--whereupon Wilbon then incorrectly cited Jordan's field goal attempts per game and field goal percentage, while also incorrectly citing Bryant's field goal attempts per game! Not surprisingly, Wilbon's analysis and conclusions were skewed by the inaccurate statistics that he cited.

Charley Rosen has been writing about basketball for decades, and his observations are often insightful. However, a trip through the archives reveals that he has repeatedly made basic factual errors that skewed his analysis. Here are two examples.

In a 2005 FoxSports.com article titled "All-Time Overrated NBA Players," Rosen included Bob McAdoo. Rosen's critique of McAdoo began, "Here's all anyone needs to know about McAdoo's game" and then Rosen based his entire argument on a description of McAdoo's matchups versus Dave Cowens. Rosen claimed that Cowens' physical defense wore McAdoo down to such a great extent that "By the end of the fourth quarter, he'd be looking to receive the ball near the three point line. Anything to avoid contact. In other words, McAdoo was nothing more than a big, quick, soft, jump-shooter deluxe."

The specific details provided by Rosen add superficial credibility to his analysis--but that credibility is shattered by the fact that Cowens and McAdoo faced each other in 38 regular season games, but just four of those games took place after the NBA added the three point shot in the 1979-80 season (none of their 12 head to head playoff games took place during the NBA's three point shot era). McAdoo shot just 1-6 from three point range in those four games--at that time, the three pointer was more of a desperation shot at the end of a quarter than a regular part of the offense--but he also scored 28, 29, 32 and 19 points (27.0 ppg) compared to 10, 15, 4 and 10 points scored (9.8 ppg) by Cowens. BasketballReference.com only has overall field goal percentage data for three of those four games, but the numbers that they have show that McAdoo outshot Cowens .596 (31-52) to .392 (11-28). Rosen's case against McAdoo is destroyed by Rosen's sloppy research. If there is a valid argument to be made against McAdoo, that argument is clearly not that Cowens had great success defending McAdoo by pushing McAdoo out past the three point line; the numbers show that McAdoo gave Cowens--and anyone else who might have been guarding him--the business with a capital "B" during those games. By the way, if you extend the comparison to before 1979-80 you do not save Rosen's argument: McAdoo outscored Cowens 28.6 ppg to 17.9 ppg head to head overall in the regular season, and McAdoo outscored Cowens 29.3 ppg to 21.8 ppg head to head in the playoffs. While it may be true that there was more to those matchups than just scoring, that is not what Rosen argued; Rosen specifically stated that "all you need to know about McAdoo's game" is how well Cowens defended McAdoo.

The second example is even worse. In a companion piece titled "All-Time Underrated NBA Players," Rosen sung Willis Reed's praises: "Reed was a reliable and versatile scorer from the high post, the pivot and along either baseline. Possessed of a soft jumper, and deadly hooks and fadeaways, Reed was the Knicks' fail-safe option on offense...It's not surprising that Reed also played rock-'em-sock-'em defense." So far, so good--but Rosen concluded by asking, "Why isn't he in the Hall of Fame?" Say what? Reed was inducted in the Basketball Hall of Fame in 1982!

Rosen's mistake is not just a random throwaway line, either. Rosen then goes into detail about how a hip injury curtailed Reed's career and prevented him from playing long enough to be a Hall of Fame candidate.

This is not like calling a player a nine time All-Star when that player actually made the All-Star team 10 times. That is sloppy but it does not reframe the entire conversation. Rosen's error is just breathtaking ignorance not only by the writer, but by the editor as well. Rosen wrote a book about the 1972 Lakers, who played Reed's Knicks in the NBA Finals. Did Rosen's research never uncover the basic fact that Reed was inducted in the Hall of Fame just 10 years after that series?

It is important to consider any media coverage or commentary with a critical eye and informed brain--and that is true not just regarding sports media, but the media in general.

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posted by David Friedman @ 7:06 PM

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Monday, November 26, 2018

Separating the Grownups From the Kids in Basketball

Whenever a professional sports team starts a season in a particularly atrocious fashion, someone inevitably half-seriously says that (insert name of best college team that season in that sport) could beat the struggling professional team. While that may be a good punchline for a joke, it is not serious analysis.

For a hot minute, we heard speculation that Duke's basketball team could beat the Cleveland Cavaliers. While Duke looks like a serious NCAA championship contender and the Cavaliers do not look very good at all--although they have played a lot better in their past two games, beating Philadelphia and Houston--the idea that a college team is better than an NBA team is not well thought out, as we could all see on Wednesday as Gonzaga defeated Duke 89-87 in the Maui Invitational Championship game. Are we now supposed to think that at least two college teams could beat the Cavaliers?

The notion that even the best college team is better than the worst NBA team is not logical. The worst NBA team has multiple players who starred in college and/or internationally; the NBA players are, in general, much more mature physically, mentally and emotionally than college players. Even if the best college team on its best day could beat the worst NBA team on its worst day one time (which is possible, though not likely if the NBA team is taking the game seriously), that college team would not win 10 games over the course of an NBA season, while that worst NBA team would be a heavy favorite to win the NCAA title.

The reality is that Early Entry Players Have Diluted Both College and Pro Basketball, as I noted over a decade ago: "March Madness is always exciting...but it is obvious that the overall level of play in college basketball is not as high as it used to be--and that is hardly a surprise considering how many of the very best players are 'one and done' guys who go to the NBA after their freshman seasons, not to mention the number of players who went straight to the NBA from high school in the past decade before the NBA forbade that from happening. For better or worse, most of the best basketball players in the world who are 19 or older are all in the NBA."

The college game was undoubtedly better and deeper in the past than it is now, which is not to say that the great college teams from previous eras could have beaten the worst NBA teams. Think about it this way: it has been three decades since the best college players in the U.S.--not the best team, but the best players taken from all of the top teams--could win an Olympic gold medal. The pro game, whether overseas or in the NBA, is simply a level above the college game. Both sports should be appreciated on their own merits but no matter how good a college team looks against other college teams and/or how bad a pro team looks against other pro teams there is a clear separation between the pro ranks and the amateur ranks.

Charley Rosen put it well over a decade ago in response to a reader's question about the pro game versus the college game: "The NBA game has a huge advantage in player talent, offensive and defensive prowess, coaching, officiating and the overall quality of performance in every aspect but one. The only advantage the college game enjoys is the consistent enthusiasm of its players. And this is true only because some veteran NBA players on basement-dwelling teams will take an occasional game off late in the season. The worst NBA team would trounce the NCAA champs by upwards of 30 points." 

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posted by David Friedman @ 3:06 AM

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Thursday, November 21, 2013

Charley Rosen Explains Why Statistics Can be Very Misleading

The title of Charley Rosen's article about the limitations of basketball statistics says it all: The Numbers Game is Fraudulent. The two part series deserves to be read in its entirety but here are some choice excerpts to whet your appetite (the passages are not numbered in the original piece):

1) Yet even as Sabermetrics has become the latest craze in the NBA (as per the recent hiring of the stat-crunching John Hollinger by Memphis) there are many fallacies in this way of evaluating basketball players. The primary one being that most statistics tally what happens when a player either has the ball in his possession or is in close proximity to the ball. Since there are 10 players on the court, 80-90 percent of the game is ignored. 

Consider assists: Used to be that a pass-catch-shoot-and-make was the only sequence that led to an assist. Nowadays, an assist can be awarded when the pass-recipient takes one dribble and two steps before his make.

2) Points scored is another misleading number. Points racked up by players on bad teams are relatively meaningless. It’s when a player scores that really counts, plus the circumstances. Amassing stats on how many fourth quarter points somebody scores, or how many times he scores in the last two minutes of a close game, etc. are also limited evaluations. Did a player score because a defender missed an assigned rotation? Or the player grabbed a teammate’s airball and wound up with an uncontested layup? Or was it a breakaway dunker created by a teammate’s steal, offensive rebound, and or perfect outlet pass?

3) Let’s examine minutes and games played. In NBA.com, minutes are given in whole numbers. This means a guy who plays one second and one who plays eighty-nine seconds are both credited with one game and one minute played. This eighty-eight second difference could conceivably include at least four possessions, and could therefore be the difference between a totally insignificant appearance and a critical one. 

4) Now we come to my favorite group of people...According to Ed Rush, the one-time supervisor of NBA officials, the calls made by the league’s refs are correct 92 percent of the time. But that means that eight percent of fouls and infractions called are erroneous – even with late-game access to tape replays. Plus, Rush offered no approximation of how many times the refs err by not tooting their whistles... 

If the refs have a distorted view of the game, then statistics such as free-throws attempted, fouls, turnovers, and even wins and losses are anything but objective. 

So what are we left with?

Free-throw shooting. Three-point accuracy. 

To truly judge the effectiveness of any given player, disregard the numbers and disregard the ball. Instead watch what he does when he doesn’t have possession or isn’t even in the neighborhood of the ball. Does he set weakside picks? Make cuts that open up space for a teammate? Make the pass that leads to an assist pass? Box out? Make appropriate defensive rotations? Get back on defense? And so on. 

After all, in no circumstances can numbers ever measure the human spirit. 

Rosen's point about assists is particularly relevant and also easy to verify; Chris Paul is indisputably a great passer but I have repeatedly documented that his assist totals are inflated. I don't know if the NBA has unofficially broadened the definition of an assist to the extent that the statistic is rendered almost meaningless or if certain scorekeepers favor home players and/or star players but it should be obvious that if the raw box score statistics are not trustworthy then the so-called "advanced basketball statistics" must be taken with a heavy grain of salt.

Many "stat gurus" are all too willing to ignore the problematic nature of box score statistics while at the same time insisting that their proprietary "advanced" numbers are infallible but Dean Oliver is one researcher who consistently communicates in a very measured tone about the limitations of "advanced basketball statistics." Oliver's recent ESPN.com article is a welcome departure from the haughty tone and wildly outrageous claims that far too often characterize the writing produced by proponents of "advanced basketball statistics." Oliver has high hopes for the future of "advanced basketball statistics" but he also candidly admits, "The problem with player value metrics is that there is little to validate them, meaning that no metric has established itself as clearly the best. Metrics couldn't even be fairly compared. As each new metric has been developed, it has served mostly to complement traditional scouting, a way to reality check when subjective opinions formed by watching and hearing about players were going too far astray." Oliver believes that, for now, "advanced basketball statistics" are more valuable in terms of evaluating a team's effectiveness and best lineup combinations as opposed to producing allegedly definitive individual player evaluations.

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posted by David Friedman @ 2:29 AM

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Friday, November 20, 2009

Gilbert Arenas Sought Charley Rosen's Advice--but Did not Follow It

Charley Rosen recently wrote an interesting account of how Gilbert Arenas responded to some of Rosen's critiques of Arenas' game:

A couple of years back, one of the Wizards public relations staff called in response to my pointing out that Gilbert Arenas tended to turn his head on defense and was burned by two or three backdoor plays every game. Arenas wanted to know, the PR guy said, what he could do to prevent this, and what other pieces of his game I thought could be improved.

Although this was the provenance of his coaches, the PR guy diligently took notes as I discussed how to avoid being back-doored. Actually, it's just by adhering to a fundamental defensive principle--open up until you can see both the ball and your man. If the specific angles prohibit this, then watch the ball while keeping some physical connection--a hand on the nearest hip will do--with your man.

Anything else?

I talked about Arenas' shot selection, and his frequent domination of the ball.

Anything else?

Yes. I wasn't particularly fond of the way Arenas spun the basketball prior to releasing his free throws. Remembering how Arenas had botched a pair of last-second free throws that cost the Wiz a playoff game against the Cavs back in 2006, the PR person was eager to relay my advice to Arenas.

The problem with spinning the ball the way Arenas does is that he doesn't end up with the same grip as he prepares to shoot. Sometimes his fingers are aligned with the seams and sometimes not. And shooting free throws is all about duplicating the same pre-shot posture and preparation, the same grip, the same rhythm, and the same stroke on every shot. Even the slightest variation requires a slight adjustment that destroys the groove the shooter seeks to maintain.

As good a natural shooter as he is, Arenas should also be at least five percentage points higher than his lifetime free-throw accuracy of 80.9 percent--77.3 percent in the playoffs. Paying more attention to being consistent rather than flashy was the answer.

OK! Arenas would be thrilled to hear all of this. Thanks.

Glad to be of help.

The next time the Wizards played, I zeroed in on Arenas' defense.

Nope, he still lost visual and physical contact with his man in order to follow the bouncing ball.

Nope, he still massaged the ball too much and took bad shots.

Ah, but on his first trip to the stripe, he avoided circling the ball around his waist and made sure that his hands were in optimum position on the ball before releasing his shot--which hit the rim softly, made two complete circles, and then dropped off.

On his second free throw, Arenas was back to his great-circle routine. The shot was good.

The experiment was over forever.

So far this season, he's shooting 72.9 percent from the stripe.

The Sporting News--and others--declared that Arenas' healthy return would transform the Washington Wizards into serious Eastern Conference contenders; I predicted that the Wizards would merely go back to being what they have always been when Arenas was healthy: a lower level playoff team. So far, the Wizards have not even met my expectations, compiling a 3-7 record that places them six games behind the Southeast Division-leading Atlanta Hawks in the Southeast Division and just a half game ahead of the cellar dwelling Charlotte Bobcats (who have performed worse than I expected and have already significantly changed their roster by acquiring the volatile Stephen Jackson). There is apparently a mainstream media rule against criticizing the popular Arenas, so his defenders are quick to assert that Arenas is not really himself yet and that he has not fully recovered from the knee injuries/surgeries that cost him the better part of the past two seasons. I agree that the "eyeball test" shows that Arenas does not have quite the same explosiveness that he did a couple years ago--but the numbers show that he is essentially the same player that he has always been. Here are his averages this season after 10 games, with his career averages listed in parentheses:

36.8 mpg (37.3), 22.9 ppg (22.8), 7.6 FGM/g (7.3), 19.3 FGA/g (17.2), .394 FG% (.426), 2.1 3FGM/g (2.1), 5.3 3FGA/g (5.8), .396 3FG% (.359), 5.6 FTM/g (6.0), 7.6 FTA/g (7.4), .737 FT% (.807), 3.8 rpg (4.2), 6.5 apg (5.5 apg), 1.2 spg (1.7), 4.2 TO/g (3.3).

The main difference in Arenas' game so far is that his reaction to his lower field goal percentage is to jack up a couple more shots per game. He has always been an erratic, inefficient player; that has not changed and it is not likely to change. Arenas is not entirely to blame for Washington's disappointing start; the Wizards missed the contributions of Antawn Jamison, who just scored 31 points in his season debut--a victory over Cleveland--after sitting out the first nine games because of a shoulder injury. Assuming that Jamison stays healthy, the Wizards will likely rally to finish above .500, some fools will say that Arenas deserves All-NBA (or even MVP) consideration and then the Wizards will get blasted in the first round and we will not have to hear about them until next fall.

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posted by David Friedman @ 4:01 PM

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