20 Second Timeout

The Glitch in "The Process" is a Feature, not a Bug

The New York Knicks swept the Philadelphia 76ers 4-0 to reach the Eastern Conference Finals for the second consecutive season. The last time the Knicks made it to the Eastern Conference Finals two years in a row was 1999-2000, and in my Eastern Conference Finals Preview I will analyze the Knicks in depth, but this article will focus on the 76ers. Before the playoffs began, some commentators dubbed the 76ers as a "team nobody wants to face," a designation often attached to teams that subsequently lose ignominiously in the playoffs.

The 76ers have been "next year's champion" for many years. How did they become a highly touted team that annually falls well short of championship expectations? The 76ers tanked from 2013 to 2016, winning less than 20 games in each of those three seasons. Sam Hinkie, the 76ers' general manager during those awful seasons, arrogantly called the intentional losing "The Process." Author Yaron Weitzman wrote a book about "The Process" called  "Tanking to the Top," but the 76ers did nothing of the sort: two years before Hinkie began "The Process," the 76ers lost in the second round of the 2012 playoffs--and the 76ers have not advanced beyond the second round of the playoffs since that time. The 76ers are the most prominent example of a proven fact: tanking does not work. 

The 76ers never reached the playoffs under Hinkie, who was finally replaced by Bryan Colangelo in 2016. Colangelo ended the tanking, and the 76ers went 28-54 in his first season before jumping to 52-30 in his second season. Colangelo resigned after that season, and he was replaced by Elton Brand. The 76ers went 51-31 and 43-30 in two years under Brand before the 76ers replaced him with Daryl Morey, who previously enjoyed an extended run in Houston despite not producing exceptional results. Like Hinkie, Morey relies heavily on "advanced basketball statistics," which results in Morey believing bizarre things such as publicly declaring that James Harden is a better scorer than Michael Jordan. 

Morey doubled down on Hinkie's faith in Joel Embiid--who dubbed himself "The Process" in honor of Hinkie--by signing the oft-injured Embiid to a three year maximum contract extension in October 2024. There are 14 NBA players being paid at least $50 million this season. Only four of them have not won an NBA title, and two of those four play for the 76ers. Joel Embiid is the NBA's third highest paid player ($55.2 million), and Paul George is the NBA's 13th highest paid player ($51.67 million). Morey's decisions have resulted in the 76ers paying over $100 million this season to two players who have failed to lead the team past the second round. One of the few positive things that can be said about Morey's reign of error in Philadelphia is that he drafted Tyrese Maxey in 2020. Maxey has become the 76ers' best and most consistent player, but it is not clear if Maxey can be the number one option on a team that makes an extended playoff run.

It is fascinating to contrast the dysfunctional 76ers with the Oklahoma City Thunder, the reigning NBA champions and the league's model franchise. I previously discussed in brief how the Thunder built their roster through wise personnel moves and not by tanking (even though it is true that they tanked for a couple seasons), but with the Thunder rolling while the 76ers are reeling it is worth examining in detail how the Thunder put together their deep roster.

Here is how the Thunder acquired their top nine players in regular season mpg from their 2025 championship season: 

Shai Gilgeous-Alexander--the NBA's reigning regular season MVP, Magic Johnson Western Conference Finals MVP, and Bill Russell NBA Finals MVP--is the Thunder's franchise player. The Thunder obtained Gilgeous-Alexander and the draft pick that became All-Star Jalen Williams (their second best player) by trading Paul George to the L.A. Clippers. Morey's 76ers later signed Paul George after the Clippers wisely decided to not give George a maximum contract extension. 

The Thunder used a first round draft pick obtained by tanking to select Chet Holmgren. 

Lu Dort was not drafted, Isaiah Hartenstein was a free agent, Cason Wallace was acquired in a trade, Aaron Wiggins was a second round draft pick, Isaiah Joe was a free agent who had been waived by the 76ers, and Alex Caruso was acquired in a trade that sent Josh Giddey from the Thunder to the Chicago Bulls. The Thunder had selected Giddey with a first round pick obtained by tanking, but after they determined that Giddey was not the best fit with the rest of their roster they shrewdly shipped him out to obtain a proven championship-winning veteran who is a great leader and great defensive player.

Thunder general manager Sam Presti cut his NBA teeth with the San Antonio Spurs before the Thunder hired him. Knicks coach Mike Brown is also a product of the Spurs' system. I interviewed Brown during his first stint with the Cleveland Cavaliers, and he told me that he takes after his mentor Gregg Popovich in terms of not being a big numbers guy. When I asked Brown what statistics he values, he mentioned defensive field goal percentage and points allowed but not any of the "advanced basketball statistics" that are so in vogue in some quarters and that are so heavily valued by people like Hinkie and Morey. During their 2025 championship season, the Thunder ranked first in defensive field goal percentage and third in points allowed; they ranked first and second respectively in those categories this season. 

Numbers matter, but anyone who thinks that the numbers point to tanking as an effective strategy does not understand numbers, basketball, strategy, or team building. It is not an accident that the Thunder are winning while the 76ers are sputtering; those disparate outcomes result from one team consistently making sound strategic decisions and the other team consistently making unsound strategic decisions. It is quite telling that the Thunder began their current rise by getting rid of Paul George, a player who Morey's 76ers acquired (and then overpaid) because they believe that he can be a cornerstone player on a championship team.

Labels: Chet Holmgren, Daryl Morey, Jalen Williams, Joel Embiid, New York Knicks, Oklahoma City Thunder, Paul George, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Tyrese Maxey

posted by David Friedman @ 10:59 PM

2 comments

Is "Playoff P" the Answer for Philadelphia's Postseason Woes?

Paul George expected the L.A. Clippers to give him the same contract terms that Kawhi Leonard earned, and after the Clippers declined to do so George signed a maximum contract with the 76ers that will pay George $212 million over the next four seasons. Leonard won two NBA Finals MVPs while leading two different teams to NBA championships (2014 San Antonio Spurs, 2019 Toronto Raptors), but George has never reached the NBA Finals, owns an 8-11 career playoff series record, and has a .423 career playoff field goal percentage, so George is the only person surprised that the Clippers do not value him as highly as they value Leonard. 

George is a 34 year old shooting guard who has played in more than 60 regular season games just once since 2019; granted, his most durable season during that time frame was last season (74 games), but is it reasonable to assume that an injury-prone player is going to become less injury-prone in his mid to late 30s? The 76ers are wagering more than $200 million that between the ages of 34 and 38 George will be healthier than ever and that he will be more efficient in the playoffs than ever. George dubbed himself "Playoff P," but that is a self-proclaimed belief as opposed to a performance-based tribute. James Harden's 2024 playoff disappearing act with the Clippers should not obscure the reality that "Playoff P" also came up short as the Clippers lost 4-2 in the first round to the Dallas Mavericks, culminating in horrific shooting performances in game five (4-13, .308) and game six (6-18, .333).

The 76ers are desperate to provide more help for Joel Embiid, their injury-prone star who received the 2023 regular season MVP award but has yet to play in more than 68 games in a regular season or lead his squad past the second round of the playoffs. Embiid's regular season career field goal percentage is .504, but his playoff career field goal percentage is just .459. He shot better than .490 from the field once in his seven postseason appearances. Embiid's resume indicates that he is not healthy enough, consistent enough, or dominant enough to lead a team on a long playoff run.

On paper, the George acquisition improves the 76ers by adding defensive versatility, playmaking, and perimeter scoring, but the reality will likely turn out to be that when the chips are down Embiid and George will be injured, inefficient, or both. The 76ers will have to reply heavily on Tyrese Maxey, who averaged 29.8 ppg on .478 field goal shooting in the 2024 playoffs, to save the day for Embiid and George.

The 76ers have demonstrably not "tanked to the top"--unless you believe that the second round of the playoffs is "the top," because that is the farthest that the 76ers have advanced in the playoffs since beginning the infamous "Process" 11 years ago during Sam Hinkie's reign of error. Daryl Morey became the 76ers' president of basketball operations in 2020, and he has yet to succeed where his protege Hinkie failed--and that is not surprising, because Morey's resume as an NBA executive is pedestrian despite the fact that he has been granted nearly two decades to test out his beliefs about "advanced basketball statistics." Morey ranked James Harden as a greater scorer than Michael Jordan and he never retracted that nonsensical take even after Harden's "concert tour" playoff field goal percentages and Harden's numerous playoff failures, culminating in Harden publicly blasting Morey as a liar and demanding to be traded--a demand that Morey granted without ever criticizing Harden; we all want someone to love us as much as Morey loves Harden.

The fact that Morey is betting over $200 million that George can help the 76ers win a championship is an excellent reason to believe that the 76ers will once again fall short of reaching the NBA Finals, as has been the case with every Morey-led team during his tenure running NBA franchises first in Houston and now in Philadelphia.

Labels: Daryl Morey, Joel Embiid, L.A. Clippers, Paul George, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, Tyrese Maxey

posted by David Friedman @ 12:23 PM

4 comments

James Harden is as Good at Burning Bridges as He is at Bricking Playoff Three Pointers

I already wrote about James Harden's hubris and lack of loyalty, and I did not plan to write about Harden again unless/until the Philadelphia 76ers traded him or it was time to do my 2023-24 season preview articles. However, Harden pushed his way back into the headlines by declaring, "Daryl Morey is a liar and I will never be a part of an organization that he's a part of. Let me say that again: Daryl Morey is a liar and I will never be a part of an organization that he's a part of." Harden declined to specify what he believes that Morey lied about, so Harden's claim cannot be assessed on its merits.

However, we learned that Morey is either a liar or delusional when he ranked Harden ahead of Michael Jordan as a scorer. In 2019, Chris Paul claimed that Morey lied to him with assurances that he would not be traded just days before Morey traded him to the Oklahoma City Thunder. So, even though there is no public evidence that Morey lied to Harden it would not be shocking if Morey lied to Harden--and it would also not be shocking if Harden is lying, because Harden has a track record of burning any bridges that need to be burned to assure his hasty departure from teams for which he no longer wishes to play, and it is reasonable to believe that a person who will cheat the game by reporting to camp out of shape and not playing hard is a person who would lie to get his way.

Instead of leaving it to media members to speculate about why Harden blasted the man who is most responsible for Harden receiving generational wealth to flop and flail, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver or one of his deputies should ask Harden to specify what exactly Morey allegedly lied about. If Morey merely told Harden that he would trade him and then was unwilling or unable to trade him, there is nothing for the league office to be concerned about--but if Morey told Harden that if Harden took a pay cut (as Harden did) then he would be rewarded with a huge contract extension that is a violation of the NBA's Collective Bargaining Agreement, which has strict rules against making promises that would enable teams to keep a player for a cap-friendly deal and make up the difference later when that team's payroll does not exceed the salary cap. 

The publicly known facts are that in the summer of 2022 Harden did not utilize his player option for a $47.4 million contract for the 2022-23 season and he instead signed for $33 million plus a $35.6 million option for 2023-24; this summer, Harden exercised the $35.6 million option and then immediately demanded that the 76ers trade him. 

It is obvious that something does not add up here. If Harden believed that his market value is high then he would have declined his 2023-24 option and become a free agent, confident that his desired team would outbid the 76ers for his services; of course, Harden's pathetic elimination game resume--to which he added yet another awful stat line in 2023 (nine points, five turnovers, 3-11 field goal shooting in a game seven loss to Boston)--is just one of many reasons that no one is lining up for the "privilege" of paying Harden $40 million or more for the upcoming season only to see Harden pull off his annual playoff disappearing act. The most logical reason for Harden to turn down $47.4 million, take much less money, demand a trade, and criticize his greatest benefactor is if Harden believes that Morey promised to give him a huge, multi-year contract extension this summer; if Harden expected that to happen and Morey (or the 76ers' owners) said no, then it would make sense--at least from Harden's warped perspective of entitlement--that Harden would grab all of the money that he could (his player option) and angrily ask to be traded.

The larger point here is that--to use a politically incorrect phrase that is nevertheless apt--the inmates are running the asylum, which the great Julius Erving said recently when he explained why he left several of the best modern players off of his all-time greatest players list. The way that the system is supposed to work--in society as a whole, and in the NBA in particular--is that after two parties sign a contract both parties honor that contract. You may share my distaste for how LeBron James left Cleveland in 2010, but LeBron James waited until his contract expired and then he had every legal right to seek employment with a different team--but what James Harden, Damian Lillard, Kevin Durant, Kyrie Irving, Anthony Davis, and other big name players have done in recent years is sign big money contracts and then not only demand a trade but also arrogantly assume that they have the right to pick where they are traded, in blatant violation of the terms of their contract.

We may never find out if Morey lied to Harden, but if Morey lied to Harden with promises of a big money deal then Harden would have to admit to breaking salary cap rules to prove that Morey lied. Harden may not have thought all of this through before he opened his bearded mouth and attacked his biggest fan, or Harden may just believe that if he makes the situation toxic enough then he will get his way, an approach that worked for him on his way out of first Houston and then Brooklyn.

Harden could have avoided all of this by declining his option and offering his services on the open market. The reason that Harden did not do that is the same reason that Lillard squeezed every penny out of the Portland Trail Blazers before demanding that the team trade him to Miami: both players know that they are not worth nearly as much on the open market as they would like to be paid. 

Harden and Lillard appear to believe that they can get away with not showing up for work until they are traded to their respective desired destinations, but any player who does not show up for training camp or who shows up for training camp looking like he is wearing a fat suit in preparation for portraying Professor Klump in "The Nutty Professor" should be suspended without pay. If I were Morey, I would tell Coach Nick Nurse to have Harden run laps for every missed shot and turnover in game seven versus Boston, and if Harden balked I would have him escorted out of the practice facility sans paycheck. The 76ers suspended Ben Simmons in a similar circumstance before trading him for Harden, but Harden has more power than Simmons so Philadelphia fans should brace themselves for a few games of "fat Harden" before the crisis reaches a boiling point and Morey ships Harden out. Maybe Morey will channel Michael Jordan and "take personally" Harden's public verbal assault on his character. Harden clearly thinks that he has all of the leverage, but maybe he has overplayed his hand and will be forced to "settle" for being paid over $35 million to play for Philadelphia next season.

I was a big 76ers fan as a kid, before I realized that I was more of a Julius Erving fan than a 76ers fan; after Erving retired, my attachment to the team faded, and then completely disappeared after Sam Hinkie attempted to "Tank to the Top" (an unfortunate book title which does not at all describe what happened). Reigning regular season MVP Joel Embiid is all that remains from Hinkie's infamous "Process," and it would be fascinating to hear Embiid's honest opinions about Harden and Morey. Of course, the oft-injured and never in top condition Embiid should perhaps lead a team past the second round of the playoffs before he points fingers at others.

It would be a fitting conclusion to the misguided "Process" if Embiid, Harden, and Morey all end up with teams other than the 76ers. I predicted that the 76ers would not win anything of consequence until they purged every remnant of Hinkie's reign of error, and I have not wavered an inch from that stance: franchises that spend seasons losing on purpose will not morph into champions because that is not how a championship culture is built.

Labels: Daryl Morey, James Harden, Joel Embiid, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, tanking

posted by David Friedman @ 12:30 AM

2 comments

"Tanking to the Top" is Not What the 76ers Have Done

I have never written a book review without reading the book I am reviewing, but this article is more of a review of a book review than a review of the book. Fred Barnes' The Wall Street Journal review of Yaron Weitzman's Tanking to the Top is as misguided as the title of the book itself. Weitzman's book is about the Philadelphia 76ers, who did indeed tank, but most assuredly have not reached the top.

I have previously discussed Why Tanking Does Not Work, but you do not have to take my word for it. In the April 2014 issue of The Atlantic, Derek Thompson analyzed the history of tanking:

Nearly 30 years of data tell a crystal-clear story: a truly awful team has never once metamorphosed into a championship squad through the draft. The last team to draft No. 1 and then win a championship (at any point thereafter) was the San Antonio Spurs, which lucked into the pick (Tim Duncan) back in 1997 when the team’s star center, David Robinson, missed all but six games the previous season because of injuries. The teams with the top three picks in any given draft are almost twice as likely to never make the playoffs within four years—the term of an NBA rookie contract, before the player reaches free agency—as they are to make it past the second round.

Why are teams and their fans drawn to a strategy that reliably leads to even deeper failure? The gospel of tanking is born from three big assumptions: that mediocrity is a trap; that scouting is a science; and that bad organizations are one savior away from being great. All three assumptions are common, not only to sports, but also to business and to life. And all three assumptions are typically wrong.

Since Thompson wrote that article, two teams have won an NBA title subsequent to using a number one overall draft pick, but neither team triumphed by tanking. The Cleveland Cavaliers won the 2016 championship with two number one overall draft picks that they selected (LeBron James, 2003; Kyrie Irving, 2011), but tanking was not the basis for that team's success; James had left Cleveland, won two titles in Miami, and then returned to Cleveland as a free agent, while Irving has not had much team success before or after playing alongside James. The Cavaliers traded 2014 number one overall pick Andrew Wiggins for All-Star Kevin Love, who was a vital contributor for the 2016 championship team. Also, the 2019 Raptors won a title after having a number one overall draft pick in 2006, Andrea Bargnani; through a series of transactions, the Raptors ended up with a 2016 first round draft pick for Bargnani, and they traded the player that they drafted with that pick (Jakob Poeltl) as part of a package to acquire 2019 Finals MVP Kawhi Leonard, but it would be foolish to suggest that tanking contributed in any meaningful way to Toronto's title.

In contrast, under the misguided leadership of Sam Hinkie, the Philadelphia 76ers went 19-63, 18-64 and 1-21 before firing Hinkie. Hinkie took over a 34-48 team, and he promptly turned it into perhaps the worst team in NBA history. In the full seasons since Hinkie departed, the 76ers went 28-54, 52-30, and 51-31; they are 39-26 in the suspended 2019-20 season. Prior to hiring Hinkie, the 76ers lost in the second round of the playoffs in 2012. Nearly a decade later, they have yet to advance past the second round of the playoffs, and their regular season winning percentage has declined two years in a row. There is as much reason to believe that the 76ers have gone as far as they can with Joel Embiid--the poster boy draft pick of Hinkie's so-called "Process"--as there is to believe that the injury-prone Embiid will lead the 76ers to a title.

If the 76ers ever win another championship, it will be despite Hinkie's "Process," not because of it.

Tanking stands in marked contrast to Michael Jordan's approach to the game. Jordan would never accept tanking, and he would never consider second round playoff losses to be "the top."

As "The Last Dance" has reminded those who may have forgotten, or who may be too young to remember, Jordan battled against the Chicago Bulls' attempt to tank when he was injured during his second season, and he bristled at their eagerness to blow up a six-time champion at the end of his career. "The Cubs have been rebuilding for 42 years," Jordan fumed in response to the Bulls' plan to run off him, Phil Jackson, Scottie Pippen, and Dennis Rodman to start from scratch.

The Bulls won six titles in the 1990s. They have won five playoff series since chasing away Jordan and crew. "They had a dynasty. Now they have a coffee shop," was Charles Oakley's take on the Chicago Bulls in 2002. I doubt that too many people in Chicago are buying the "Tanking to the Top" premise in 1998, in 2002, in 2020, or in any other year.

Jordan's singular focus was to win as many championships as possible. He divided people into two categories: those who could help him win championships, and those who could not help him win championships. Jordan had no interest in wasting time with anyone who fit into the second category. Jordan tested any player who joined the Chicago Bulls during his tenure. Players who passed the test stayed on the team; players who failed the test did not stay on the team.

Kobe Bryant had the same mentality, though he lacked Jordan's media-savvy ability to convince the public that this mentality is a virtue. Jordan punched a teammate in practice, and regularly berated his teammates, but Jordan remains a hero; Bryant reasonably stated a preference for Shaquille O'Neal to get in shape, and he pushed his teammates to levels that they never reached before or since, and Bryant was portrayed as a horrible teammate.

Jordan and Bryant would scoff at the notion that anything less than a championship is satisfactory. They did not play to win division titles or conference titles, or lose in the second round of the playoffs. Bryant explained the mentality that he and Jordan shared:

All I thought about as a kid personally was winning championships. That's all I cared about. That's how I valued Michael. That's how I valued [Larry] Bird. That's how I valued Magic [Johnson]. It was just winning championships. Now, everybody's going to value things differently, which is fine. I'm just telling you how I value mine. If I'm Bron, you got to figure out a way to win. It's not about narrative. You want to win championships, you just gotta figure it out. Michael gave me some really good advice after the '08 Finals: "You got all the tools. You gotta figure out how to get these guys to that next level to win that championship." Going into the 2010 series, I said, "Listen, Boston, they got Ray Allen, they got Paul Pierce, they got [Kevin] Garnett, they got Sheed [Wallace], the talent is there. They're stacked." That was the first superteam. [Michael] kind of heard me lament about it, and he just goes, "Yeah, well, it is what it is; you gotta figure it out. There's no other alternative." And that's the challenge LeBron has. You have pieces that you have to try to figure out how to work with. Excuses don't work right now...

It has everything to do with how you build the team, from an emotional level. How do you motivate them?...Leadership is not making guys better by just throwing them the ball. That's not what it is. It's about the influence that you have on them to reach their full potential. And some of it's not pretty. Some of it's challenging, some of it's confrontational. Some of it's pat on the back. But it's finding that balance, so now when you show up to play a Golden State or a Boston, your guys feel like you have the confidence to take on more.

Weitzman's book endorses Hinkie's tanking, and Barnes raves, "By the time he joined the Sixers, Mr. Hinkie knew some core truths about the modern game...The author's analysis is convincing and his reporting thorough. Tanking to the Top is the best basketball book in years."

If you want to know "core truths about the modern game," read Derek Thompson's analysis cited above, or read Phil Jackson's Eleven Rings. There are many basketball books from the past few years that I would select over a misguided attempt to justify losing on purpose: in addition to Jackson's book, some other fine choices include Wooden: A Coach's Life, and The Mamba Mentality.

In the same review article, Barnes also praises The Victory Machine, by Ethan Sherwood Strauss, who is perhaps best known for annoying Kevin Durant at a press conference by asking the same question (in slightly different forms) repeatedly about why Durant had not been talking to the media recently, until Durant became frustrated. Durant labeled Strauss as "a dude...who come in here and give his whole opinion on stuff and make it seem like it's coming from me. He walk around here, don't talk to nobody, just walk in here, survey and write something like that." It takes no particular skill to ask the same unimaginative question over and over, but Strauss achieved his real goal: he obtained publicity for himself, and promptly announced that he was writing a book about the Warriors (the book that Barnes just reviewed). When you watch a sporting event and you know the names of the referees, that typically means that the referees are not doing their jobs: the sport is not supposed to be about them, but about the athletes. Similarly, if after a press conference you know the name of a reporter, it typically means that reporter was not doing his job: the press conference is not supposed to be about reporters, but about the athletes. No one tuned into that press conference to hear Strauss keep asking Durant why Durant had not talked to the media. I observed all kinds of press conference nonsense firsthand when I covered the NBA.

I don't know if those two books were assigned to Barnes, or if he picked them himself, but if those are the two best basketball books being released now--and if Barnes is the most qualified person to review those books--then that is just sad.

This is not the first instance of questionable sports analysis by The Wall Street Journal. In 2010, David Biderman contacted me regarding my research showing that Chris Paul's assist totals are inflated, but his subsequent article in The Wall Street Journal did not mention my findings. Biderman later informed me that he did not have enough room in his rather lengthy piece to do justice to my analysis. So, instead of telling the story accurately and completely, he included misleading and/or inaccurate sound bite quotes from other people regarding the use of statistics in basketball. It is enlightening to get an inside view of how the media works; the one and only goal for most media outlets is to generate content that is likely to produce advertising revenue: the truth is not even a casualty of the process, but rather it is irrelevant.

The Wall Street Journal has fared even worse when it turned its attention to chess, as I documented in Why Does Chess Not Receive Intelligent Mainstream Media Coverage?, Wall Street Journal Publishes Another Sloppily Rendered Chess Article , and Wall Street Journal Attempts to Correct Faulty Chess Article. In 2009, former Women's World Chess Champion Alexandria Kosteniuk was so outraged by one of the The Wall Street Journal articles cited above that she wrote the following on her website:

What's upsetting is that the Wall Street journalist, Barbara Jepson, tricked me by telling me that the article she was writing was about "Women's Chess", which made me very happy, as I supposed she would be writing something to support women's chess (not destroy it), that's why I took great care to answer in a positive and honest way (as I always do).

She asked me several questions including if I thought special women's titles should be eliminated. In my answer to her, I wrote very clearly with my reasoning that "Women's titles and tournaments should exist". And then she changed the title of her piece to "Abolish Women's Chess Titles", and used my name in it (I guess to add some authority to it, as if to boast she consulted with the women's world champion about it), only quoting some insignificant point I made to another question about sponsoring, without stating I was against that idea of abolishing women's titles, so that most people thought I agreed with the idea of abolishing women's titles since I was featured in her article and said nothing about the lead question of abolishing titles.

This apparently caused on purpose misunderstanding led me to get several emails from people asking me why I supported abolishing women's titles. This lie started to be posted all over the web and can still be seen on several web sites. I had to immediately respond on my blog and set things right.

Now you, dear reader, please judge for yourself what kind of article that Wall Street Journal was? 

It was about the same kind of article that would assert (1) that Sam Hinkie understands deep truths about the NBA and (2) that a book praising tanking as a good strategy is the best basketball book of the past several years.

Labels: Ethan Sherwood Strauss, Fred Barnes, Kevin Durant, Kobe Bryant, Michael Jordan, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, tanking, The Atlantic, Wall Street Journal, Yaron Weitzman

posted by David Friedman @ 8:32 PM

4 comments

The Sad Saga of The Ringer's Gleeful Takedown of Bryan Colangelo

The website The Ringer is not merely content to bury Bryan Colangelo's career (or at least the Philadelphia portion of it) but is also pouring dirt on the grave.

A few weeks ago, The Ringer broke the story that several anonymous Twitter accounts that could be linked to Colangelo had posted information critical of Sam Hinkie and of various 76er players. The 76ers hired an independent law firm to conduct an investigation and that investigation determined that Colangelo's wife had made the offensive posts. Although Colangelo denied any knowledge of his wife's activity and declared that he did not agree with what she had posted, the two-time NBA Executive of the Year who had rebuilt the 76ers into a contender in the wake of Hinkie's infamous and disastrous tanking "Process" resigned under pressure.

Now The Ringer has posted a second article that essentially states that everything good that happened for the 76ers last season was a result of Hinkie's brilliance, while any questionable decisions came from Colangelo. Specifically, The Ringer accused Colangelo of failing to resolve the "logjam" of big men on the roster and of choosing Markelle Fultz with the first pick in the 2017 draft over the alleged objections of various unnamed 76ers' staffers. The Ringer conveniently failed to note that the 76ers were a losing team every season under Hinkie and only became a contender after Colangelo remade the culture and the roster in the wake of Hinkie's departure. The Ringer also left out that Hinkie whiffed on the opportunity to draft Kristaps Porzingis, Myles Turner or Devin Booker in 2015 (Hinkie selected Jahlil Okafor) and that Hinkie chose Nerlens Noel in 2013 instead of Giannis Antetokounmpo or C.J. McCollum.

Thus, The Ringer left out the "minor" detail that the aforementioned "logjam" of Okafor and Noel was created by Hinkie's poor drafting and unwillingness to get rid of either big man. Colangelo inherited a mess and rapidly turned it into a playoff team, yet The Ringer proposes that Hinkie should get the credit.

Not only is that a bizarre take, but it is an odd thing to post right after Colangelo resigned.

Sirius XM NBA Radio's Frank Isola made some excellent points regarding Colangelo's situation. First, Isola noted that the burner Twitter accounts in question hardly had any subscribers and he joked that Colangelo's wife could have reached a larger audience by opening up a window and shouting than by posting to a feed that few people follow. Second, Isola pointed out that it is commonplace for NBA executives and other insiders to feed information to media members, who then disseminate that information to a large audience. Third, Isola stated that it is ironic that Colangelo was forced out because his wife leaked team information and now The Ringer is posting an anti-Colangelo story filled with information that could only have been leaked to The Ringer by team sources. "Where is the investigation of that?" Isola asked.

Isola's broadcast partner Brian Scalabrine added this observation: the Boston Celtics require each member of the personnel department to write out their preferences before each draft, so no one can later claim 20/20 hindsight regarding the team's selections. If people within the 76ers organization want to throw Colangelo under the bus, let them step up publicly and prove with written time-stamped notes that they did not support the Fultz selection.

Isola joked that apparently Hinkie is responsible for every good decision that the 76ers have made--even the ones that took place after his departure--and Isola said that The Ringer's piling on with Colangelo is starting to seem personal. Isola could not fathom what The Ringer's motive is but I have an idea. The Ringer is Bill Simmons' brainchild. Simmons (1) loves "stat gurus" like Hinkie and (2) is on the record stating that he could do a better job than most NBA executives. Taking down a respected executive like Colangelo while simultaneously rewriting Hinkie's career in a favorable fashion is right up Simmons' alley.

There is little doubt that Colangelo could have and should have handled the Twitter account situation better, but The Ringer's coverage of Colangelo reeks of personal animus, a hidden agenda and double standards (Isola called the hand-wringing about the tweets while ignoring the more widespread leaking of information "fake outrage"). Isola is right to call out The Ringer for its biased coverage of Colangelo and Hinkie.

Labels: Bill Simmons, Bryan Colangelo, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, The Ringer

posted by David Friedman @ 7:11 AM

12 comments

The "Process" is Overhyped

The Philadelphia 76ers have received a lot of publicity/hype so far this season and there has been much talk that Sam Hinkie's infamous "Process"--which involved many seasons of intentionally losing, with the hope of building a contender by obtaining high draft picks--has paid off. The reality is that the 76ers are currently 15-18, ranking 10th out of 15 Eastern Conference teams. If still being a sub-.500 team after years of losing on purpose is classified as a success then I would hate to see what failure looks like.

It is true that the 76ers have improved. Hinkie took over a 34-48 team that subsequently went 9-63, 18-64 and 1-21 under his command. Since Hinkie's departure, the team has gone 52-123. That .297 winning percentage is nothing to write home about but it is a vast improvement over the .159 winning percentage that the 76ers posted during his reign of error. Now that Bryan Colangelo has been in charge for two and a half seasons, the 76ers have gone from being historically awful to close to mediocre.

However, Hinkie's "Process" had very little to do with the 76ers' improvement. Hinkie "accomplished" two things: (1) he institutionalized a losing culture (which Colangelo is in the process--to borrow a word--of changing) and (2) he built a roster that contained few legitimate NBA players (because Hinkie's goal was to lose). On the final day of the 2015-16 season, the 76ers' active roster consisted of Robert Covington, Jerami Grant, Ish Smith, Kendall Marshall, Nerlens Noel, Hollis Thompson, T.J. McConnell, Richaun Holmes, Isaiah Cannon, Elton Brand, Christian Wood and Carl Landry. The 76ers' current roster--the one that is not awful and has posted a close to mediocre record--consists of Joel Embiid, Robert Covington, Justin Anderson, Richaun Holmes, Ben Simmons, Timothe Luwawu-Cabarrot, Trevor Booker, Dario Saric, Jerryd Bayless, T.J. McConnell, Furkan Korkmaz, Amir Johnson, J.J. Redick and Markelle Fultz (plus two-way players Jacob Pullen and James Michael McAdoo). So, only three players remain from Hinkie's last season; of those three players, Covington is a starter, McConnell is the seventh player in the rotation and Holmes ranks 11th in minutes played per game. Of course, Embiid--who has been an injury-plagued player during his brief career--was selected by Hinkie in the 2014 NBA Draft but he has only played in 56 games in three and a half seasons; he currently leads the team in scoring (23.8 ppg) and rebounding (11.1 rpg) but he operates under a minutes restriction and it is not clear if he will ever be a full-time, healthy player.

So, the sum product of Hinkie's "Process" is the injury-prone Embiid, one other starter, a rotation player and a guy who rarely sees action. If Hinkie had not been relieved of his duties, the 76ers would have an almost completely different looking roster, they still would have a losing attitude and they would not have even ascended to mediocre status.

What about Ben Simmons? Indeed, what about him? He was the consensus best player in the draft, Colangelo took him and it looks like he will be the Rookie of the Year. Intentionally losing games for years at a time--with no relief in sight until Hinkie was fired--just to obtain a 25% chance of getting the number one draft pick with the hope that Simmons or a player of his caliber would be available is not a sound franchise-building strategy. If Simmons becomes a great player, then Colangelo deserves credit for drafting him and--most importantly--for placing him in a culture that breeds success instead of failure. It is far from certain that, even if Hinkie had drafted Simmons, the 76ers under Hinkie would have placed Simmons in the best possible environment to succeed.

Well-run franchises are not built by tanking and they are able to stay at or near the top of the standings year after year without having top picks in the Draft. Look at the San Antonio Spurs or, broadening our view to other sports, look at the New England Patriots. It is not necessary to tear down a roster and/or lose intentionally in order to build a winner.

The 76ers are not even a playoff team as of today, so they are not worthy of much discussion--but if they are going to be discussed and if any credit is going to be given for the team's improvement, then the discussion should focus on the fine job that Colangelo has done of fixing the mess that Hinkie created.

Labels: Ben Simmons, Bryan Colangelo, Joel Embiid, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie

posted by David Friedman @ 11:41 AM

7 comments

The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot, Part II

Charles Barkley recently made some very derogatory comments about the Golden State Warriors and he reiterated his contention that jump-shooting teams are not built to win championships. As the father of a wonderful young daughter, I echo Rachel Nichols' eloquent statement that "girlie" or "girl" should never be used as a synonym for, as she put it, something that is "weak" or "lame."

Moving past Barkley's ill-advised method of delivering his message, is there any truth to Barkley's assertion about jump-shooting teams purely from the standpoint of strategically analyzing basketball? I have discussed this subject a number of times in a variety of contexts. For instance, I wrote The Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot for NBCSports.com nearly 10 years ago and then a few months after publication (during which time NBCSports.com was torn down and then rebuilt without maintaining links to prior content) I updated the article and posted it at 20 Second Timeout.

To best understand my take on the strengths and limitations of the three point shot as a basketball weapon, it would be helpful to provide some historical background, both in terms of the sport of basketball in general and also in terms of how my involvement in the sport as a recreational player informed my perspective about the three point shot.

Let's start with "advanced basketball statistics." Newer visitors to 20 Second Timeout--and perhaps even some of my veteran readers--may wonder why I refer to high profile advocates of "advanced basketball statistics" as "stat gurus." I borrowed that phrase from a line that Mike Lupica delivered a few times many years ago on the "Sports Reporters"; he would refer to someone who is supposed to be an expert at something as a "guru" and then he would say, "It is time for the guru to start 'guruing.'" I no longer recall who specifically Lupica was talking about but that wry sense of "OK, smart guy, it's about time that you actually prove that you know what you are doing" perfectly captures how I feel about many of the pompous analytics acolytes who act like they know more about basketball than people who have been playing and/or coaching the sport at the highest level for decades. Is there some value in trying to analyze the sport objectively? Of course there is but there should be a sense of humility and an understanding that the numbers don't capture everything about a sport that is played (and coached and officiated) by human beings, not robots.

Dean Oliver and Dan Rosenbaum are two of a handful of people whose basketball statistical work I respect--but far too many "stat gurus" are less concerned with objective truth than they are with making a name for themselves by proving that their pet theories are some kind of basketball gospel. Those self-serving, self-interested and self-satisfied "stat gurus" have had a pernicious effect on the way that the game is played, analyzed and discussed. Those "stat gurus" act like no one effectively utilized basketball statistics until they came along. I've got news for them: Dean Smith was using plus/minus back in the 1970s, if not earlier; Hubie Brown was hired by the Kentucky Colonels--who he led to the 1975 ABA title--because he impressed team management with his intricate understanding of basketball statistics and how those statistics can be used as tools to build a winning team.

"Advanced basketball statistics" are only as meaningful and relevant as (1) the box score numbers upon which they are based and (2) the accuracy of the formulas that are used to slice and dice those box score numbers. I have already demonstrated that assist statistics cannot be fully trusted, which means that any "advanced" formula that places a high value on assists will artificially inflate the value of players who accumulate many assists. There is good reason to question the accuracy/reliability of other box score numbers as well: subjectivity impacts the scoring of rebounds, steals, blocked shots and turnovers.

Hall of Famer/Top 50 player Rick Barry once told me that the only statistic he completely trusted was free throw percentage. Perhaps that seems self-serving of Barry because he owns one of the best career free throw percentages in pro basketball history but his point is that a player can inflate his field goal percentage by only shooting easy shots, rebounds can be padded by tips/taps that are not consistently recorded the same way and so forth. Then there is the reality--acknowledged by Rosenbaum but glossed over by many "stat gurus"--that "advanced basketball statistics" do not accurately measure individual defense. It should be obvious that subjective--but critically important--factors such as leadership, attitude and willingness/ability to play through injuries cannot be measured analytically at all. This is why I roll my eyes when a "stat guru" confidently declares that he can accurately rank every player in the NBA to the second decimal point of his proprietary "advance basketball statistic."

Many "stat gurus" assert that post play and the midrange game are inefficient, while the most efficient basketball shots are three pointers and free throws. The three point shot has evolved from a late game situational shot to a supplementary weapon to the mainstay of many teams' offenses. It should be remembered that even before "advanced basketball statistics" gained widespread influence, teams like the 1990s Houston Rockets and 1990s Orlando Magic utilized a "1 in, 4 out" offense featuring a dominant center surrounded by three point marksmen who punished opponents for double teaming the post. At that time, the three point shot was used to open up the game for the dominant post player but that dominant post player was still the focal point.

Teams that are run by--or at least influenced by--"stat gurus" deemphasize the value of the traditional big man in favor of deploying small lineups, shooting a lot of three pointers and (ideally) drawing a lot of fouls (typically via dribble penetration).

As for my personal involvement in the sport as a player, I have played rec league basketball since I was a kid in the 1970s. The strong suit of my game was always my jump shot (which really is not a traditional jump shot but some hybrid of Michael Cooper's set shot and Larry Bird's two hands behind his head delivery) but I spent my formative years playing without the three point shot. In 1987-88, the 19-9 three point shot was introduced into high school and college basketball. That wonderful arc soon appeared on the courts where I played both pickup ball and rec league ball. In the pickup games, we played to 12 by ones and twos. Under that scoring system, a good three point shooter is more valuable than a good post player; if I made even just 3 of 10 three pointers I scored six points, which is half the amount needed to win the game and a total that a post player could only match by shooting 60% from the field.

I really enjoyed playing 1 on 1 to 12 under that scoring system; I could hit six threes and take out a bigger, stronger opponent who was trying to wear me down one point at a time.

Of course, in league play when threes were not worth twice as much as twos, the math was not quite as favorable for a three point shooter but I did often mention to skeptical teammates that if I could make just one third of my three pointers I was as efficient as a post player who was making half of his shots in the paint. I was often the youngest participant in these games and the older guys who disdained long jumpers (and did not bother to do the simple math) got on my case for shooting so many three pointers. I told them rather bluntly that unless they were shooting 50% in the paint, then my three pointer was a higher percentage shot if I was connecting 33% of the time (and I probably was shooting closer to 40%), without even taking into account that the offensive team was more likely to rebound a long jumper than a missed shot in the paint. In addition, team defense is poorly organized in most rec leagues, so a smart and patient team can easily obtain wide open three point shots, particularly if the league does not use a shot clock.

So, from a young age I understood that in short games scored by ones and twos and in rec league games where post play was erratic and team defense was disorganized the three point shot was a very potent weapon.

Similarly, in the 40 minute college game featuring a short season followed by a one and done playoff system, it is possible to have a lot of success by constructing a good three point shooting team with well conditioned athletes who could beat the defense up and down the floor. Such teams generally play at a fast pace and thrive on shooting three pointers in transition. Rick Pitino has had success with this approach at multiple NCAA Division I schools and Paul Westhead enjoyed success both in NCAA Division I basketball and in the WNBA, where he led the Phoenix Mercury to the 2007 title. Westhead is the only coach to win a championship in both the WNBA and the NBA (1980 L.A. Lakers), though ironically Magic Johnson ran Westhead out of L.A. because Johnson felt that Westhead's offense at that time was too slow and methodical. However, NBA basketball consists of an 82 game regular season followed by four rounds of best of seven playoff series. Each regulation game lasts 48 minutes, not 40. Strategies that work in the college game are not necessarily applicable to the NBA game.

What does all of this have to do with Charles Barkley's comment about jump shooting teams? The NBA does not keep score by ones and twos and NBA defense is infinitely better than rec league defense. The notion that you can win big in the NBA just by shooting a large number of three pointers may make mathematical sense but it does not make real world sense. In that regard, there is some truth to what Barkley said. Take, for example, the Houston Rockets, who are now coached by Mike D'Antoni, whose Phoenix teams led the NBA in three point field goals made for three consecutive seasons (2005-07). The Rockets have a potent offense and are on pace to shatter many three point shooting records but they rank 22nd in defensive field goal percentage after finishing 19th in that category (under Kevin McHale and J.B. Bickerstaff) last season. That is a recipe for elimination early in the playoffs.

The nuance that Barkley is missing when he singles out the Warriors is that the Warriors differentiated themselves from other three-point happy teams (such as D'Antoni's Suns and Rockets) by playing organized, intense and effective defense. In their 2015 championship season, the Warriors led the league in defensive field goal percentage; they ranked third in that category last season and they currently rank second this season despite the loss of Andrew Bogut's rim protection.

Championship teams typically rank in the top five or 10 in defensive field goal percentage. The 2000-02 Shaquille O'Neal-Kobe Bryant Lakers are an interesting example. The Lakers led the league in defensive field goal percentage in 2000 and in 2002. In 2001 they slipped to 11th but still won the title. What happened? Unlike Bryant, O'Neal did not always fully exert himself during the regular season--but O'Neal was capable of playing championship level defense when he felt like it and after coasting through the 2001 regular season he ramped up his effort during the 2001 playoffs, when the Lakers ranked second in defensive field goal percentage. O'Neal decided to "heal on company time" during the 2002-03 season as the Lakers plummeted to 21st in defensive field goal percentage and this time O'Neal was not willing or able to turn it up in the playoffs: the Lakers ranked 15th out of 16 playoff teams in defensive field goal percentage and they lost in the second round to the eventual champion San Antonio Spurs, who ranked second in defensive field goal percentage during the 2003 playoffs and during the 2003 regular season.

In other words, instead of continually bashing the Warriors, Barkley should focus his attention on the Rockets: that is the jump shooting team that will never win a championship (as opposed to the Warriors, a jump shooting team that plays defense and has already won a championship).

There is an important point implied but not explicitly mentioned in Barkley's statement: the three point shot is a high variance shot, as I discussed in The Score, the Key Stat, the Bottom Line: A New 20 Second Timeout Feature, noting that three point field goal percentage can be a misleading statistic: if a player shoots 6-9 from three point range in one playoff game and 1-9 from three point range in the next playoff game that works out to a very good .389 3FG% but his team will likely lose the second game (and may not win the first game, either, if the team is deficient defensively and/or on the boards). In that article, I argued that Gilbert Arenas' three point field goal percentage did not justify his style of play and that a team was not likely to have much playoff success when led by a point guard who is indifferent defensively and who has poor shot selection--even if his overall shooting percentage is not bad, the high variance inherent in shooting a lot of shots from three point range (many of which were bad shots, even if they sometimes connected) is a recipe for disaster for that point guard and his team.

James Harden is similar to Arenas in many ways, though Harden is a better and more consistent player than Arenas was. My prediction for a Harden-led team is the same as my accurate prediction regarding an Arenas-led team: I would be surprised if such a team advances past the second round of the playoffs.

The Rockets' organization has been led for nearly a decade by Daryl Morey, who has been widely praised in the mainstream media as a visionary despite the fact that during his first eight years in Houston the Rockets missed the playoffs three times and only won three playoff series. Last season, the Rockets barely qualified for the playoffs but instead of revising their offense happy/defense optional approach Morey doubled down by hiring D'Antoni. The Rockets might win 50 games this season, as some of D'Antoni's Phoenix teams did. Harden might win the MVP over more deserving players, as D'Antoni's Phoenix point guard Steve Nash did twice. However, it will be surprising if the Rockets advance very far in the playoffs, barring a defensive turnaround similar to the 2001 Lakers (which is highly improbable, to say the least).

Successful NBA teams have judiciously incorporated "advanced basketball statistics" into their programs but teams (like Houston) that have gone all in have not reached the highest level. This is a valid point that Barkley could (and should) make during TNT telecasts.

The Philadelphia 76ers are the poster children for a "stat guru" run amuck or, as I put it a couple years ago, The 76ers Are the Waterloo for "Stat Gurus." Sam Hinkie, a protege of Morey's, instituted an infamous "process" in Philadelphia that came close to ruining a once storied franchise. Hinkie's media buddies still try to paint him as some kind of visionary but he actually is the 21st century Ted Stepien with a much better sense of public relations. In the early 1980s, Ted Stepien tore down the Cleveland Cavaliers to the point that the league had to essentially wrest control of the franchise from him, which is what happened (in a more subtle way) to Hinkie as well. It took Wayne Embry years to undo the damage that Stepien did and by the time Embry turned the Cavaliers into contenders there were no traces left of Stepien's handiwork; it will similarly take years for Bryan Colangelo to salvage the 76ers and by the time they become good again Hinkie's "process" will be a distant, dark memory.

Since the "process" began, the 76ers have never had a winning percentage above .250 and, despite some recent misguided media hype about Hinkie being vindicated, they are currently 5-18 (.217 winning percentage).

One of the many aspects of pro sports that Hinkie fails to understand is that a loser's mentality is contagious and must be purged from an organization if that organization is going to enjoy any success. You cannot turn your franchise into a perennial loser, stockpile some talent and then suddenly become a championship team; the Cleveland Browns' front office has been infiltrated with Hinkie-like thinking and they have turned the Browns into a de facto expansion team on par with the ultimate NFL laughingstock, the 1976 Tampa Bay Buccaneers.

When Mike Ditka was hired as the head coach of the Chicago Bears in 1982, he told his players that he had good news and bad news: the good news was that the Bears would win the Super Bowl within three years but the bad news was that many of them would no longer be on the team by that time. Both predictions came true. No "advanced basketball statistic" blueprint takes the place of a basic understanding of how to build a team that has a championship mindset and championship habits, two traits that are missing in both Houston and Philadelphia.

So, there is some truth to what Barkley said but--because he failed to articulate his message clearly and because he used some unfortunate language that overshadowed his larger point--it is easy to dismiss him as an old school curmudgeon. It is true that teams that rely on jump shooting and do not play excellent defense will not win a championship--but it is not correct to lump the Warriors into a category that should be headlined by the Rockets.

Evolution of the Usage of the Three Point Shot

Most Three Pointers Made

Year/League...Team...3 FGM...Player (team)...3 FGM

1967-68/ABA..Pittsburgh..243..Les Selvage (Anaheim)..147
1968-69/ABA..Kentucky..335..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..199
1969-70/ABA..Kentucky..330..Louie Dampier (Kentucky)..198
1970-71/ABA..Indiana..306..George Lehmann (Carolina)..154
1971-72/ABA..Indiana..220..Glen Combs (Utah)..103
1972-73/ABA..Indiana..172..Bill Keller (Indiana)..71
1973-74/ABA..San Diego..216..Bo Lamar (San Diego)..69
1974-75/ABA..Indiana..224..Bill Keller (Indiana)..80
1975-76/ABA..Indiana..250..Bill Keller (Indiana)..123

1979-80/NBA..San Diego..177..Brian Taylor (San Diego)..90
1980-81/NBA..San Diego..132..Mike Bratz (Cleveland)..57
1981-82/NBA..Indiana..103..Don Buse (Indiana)..73
1982-83/NBA..San Antonio..94..Mike Dunleavy (San Antonio)..67
1983-84/NBA..Utah..101..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..91
1984-85/NBA..Dallas..152..Darrell Griffith (Utah)..92
1985-86/NBA..Dallas..141..Larry Bird (Boston)..82
1986-87/NBA..Dallas..231..Larry Bird (Boston)..90
1987-88/NBA..Boston..271..Danny Ainge (Boston)..148
1988-89/NBA..New York..386..Michael Adams (Denver)..166
1989-90/NBA..Cleveland...346..Michael Adams (Denver)..158
1990-91/NBA..Portland..341..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..172
1991-92/NBA..Milwaukee..371..Vernon Maxwell (Houston)..162
1992-93/NBA..Phoenix..398..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)/Reggie Miller (Indiana)..167
1993-94/NBA..Houston..429..Dan Majerle (Phoenix)..192
1994-95/NBA*..Houston..646..John Starks (New York)..217
1995-96/NBA*..Dallas..735..Dennis Scott (Orlando)..267
1996-97/NBA*..Miami..678..Reggie Miller (Indiana)..229
1997-98/NBA..Seattle..621..Wesley Person (Cleveland)..192
1998-99/NBA^..Houston..336..Dee Brown (Toronto)..135
1999-00/NBA..Indiana..583..Gary Payton (Seattle)..177
2000-01/NBA..Boston..592..Antoine Walker (Boston)..221
2001-02/NBA..Boston..699..Ray Allen (Milwaukee)..229
2002-03/NBA..Boston..719..Ray Allen (Milwaukee-Seattle)..201
2003-04/NBA..Seattle..723..Peja Stojakovic (Sacramento)..240
2004-05/NBA..Phoenix..796..Kyle Korver (Philadelphia)/Jason Richardson (Phoenix)..226
2005-06/NBA..Phoenix..837..Ray Allen (Seattle)..269
2006-07/NBA..Phoenix..785..Arenas (Washington)/Bell (Phoenix)..205
2007-08/NBA..Orlando..801..Jason Richardson (Charlotte)..243
2008-09/NBA..New York..823..Rashard Lewis (Orlando)..220
2009-10/NBA..Orlando..841..Aaron Brooks (Houston)..209
2010-11/NBA..Orlando..770..Dorell Wright (Golden State)..194
2011-12/NBA^^..Orlando..670..Ryan Anderson (Orlando)..166
2012-13/NBA..New York..891..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..272
2013-14/NBA..Houston..779..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..261
2014-15/NBA..Houston..933..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..286
2015-16/NBA..Golden State..1077..Stephen Curry (Golden State)..402

* The NBA shortened the three point arc to a uniform 22 feet (prior to and subsequent to these three seasons the three point arc was 22 feet in the corners and 23 feet nine inches elsewhere).

^ Season shortened to 50 games by a lockout.

^^ Season shortened to 66 games by a lockout.

Bold indicates an ABA/NBA record.

Labels: "stat gurus", Charles Barkley, Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, James Harden, Kobe Bryant, L.A. Lakers, Mike D'Antoni, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, Shaquille O'Neal, three point shot

posted by David Friedman @ 3:21 PM

41 comments

Terri-Bull: Premature Breakup of the Jordan-Pippen Bulls Demonstrated Why Tanking Does Not Work

When the Philadelphia 76ers hired Jerry Colangelo to fix the mess that Sam Hinkie created, I remembered that Colangelo was aghast and astonished by how Jerry Krause broke up the Chicago Bulls in 1998. Krause ran off Phil Jackson, Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen after the Bulls had just won three straight NBA titles from 1996-98. In November 2004 Colangelo was the chairman and CEO of the Phoenix Suns, who went into Chicago and drilled Krause's hapless Bulls 94-74. Colangelo said, "The concept of taking your championship run and then going all the way back and starting over again? There's no guarantees. You gotta be lucky. You can't afford any mistakes, bad drafts. Your picks don't turn out to be big time-players? You've got a problem. So, in my opinion, you stay as competitive as possible for as long as possible. If you back up the truck, you never know. Look, in my almost four decades in sport, I never had the pleasure of having that (Jordan-style) dynasty. Knowing me as I do? I couldn't break it up."

Becoming really bad in order to become really good is not just counterintuitive; it does not work. Colangelo is right: in any endeavor, "you stay as competitive as possible for as long as possible." Krause's demolition of the Bulls' dynasty is a cautionary tale that should be taught in business schools and should be mandatory homework for anyone who becomes a sports executive.

It is easy to refute the revisionist history--propagated by none other than Krause and Bulls' owner Jerry Reinsdorf--that Krause had to do something because Jackson, Jordan and Pippen did not intend to stay around. In a July 24, 1998 Chicago Sun-Times article by Jim O'Donnell titled "Phil's agent has fill of Reinsdorf tactics," Phil Jackson's agent Todd Musburger reminded the world who broke up the Bulls and how he did it:

"Phil's not coming back. That has long been clearly understood. It's been understood since last July, when Jerry Krause told Phil, 'You can go 82-and-bleeping-0 and you're not coming back. This is it for you and the Chicago Bulls."

Think about that. I have heard of an owner or a GM threatening to fire a coach if he does not win a certain number of games but who tells a coach that he will be fired even if the coach wins every game? Krause was so eager to prove that he was the brains behind the Bulls' championships that he ripped apart a dynasty in order to build a championship team from scratch in his own image--and the aftermath of that foolish decision was so disastrous that it lent a lot of credence to the speculation that instead of being a brilliant talent evaluator he was a solid GM who lucked into having Michael Jordan and then put some good pieces around Jordan.

What prompted Musburger to speak out to O'Donnell on that particular day? During the Bulls' televised press conference announcing the hiring of Tim Floyd as director of basketball operations, Reinsdorf said that the path was still open for Jackson to return as coach and that Floyd would only be the coach if Jackson decided not to return. In other words, one year after telling Jackson he was fired no matter how well the team did in the next season, Reinsdorf and Krause tried to act like the hatchet job never happened.

Musburger declared, "That's why what I heard on the TV Thursday from Reinsdorf was incredible. And what really made my blood boil was that, if nothing else, Phil left in dignity. After all he went through in his final 12 months around that team, all he did was win one last championship, and then fulfilling the expressly stated wishes of Jerry Krause and Jerry Reinsdorf, he left. No final cheap shots, no besmirching of any reputations, nothing. Simple, quiet dignity. And now they were going to dredge his good name back up to rewrite history once again and drag him through this."

Musburger called it "obscene" that Reinsorf hijacked a day that should have belonged to Floyd and concluded, "I guess as the work day ended, the thing I was most happy about is that the more dimensional members of the media no longer need a road map when it comes to any of the convoluted paths chairman Reinsdorf and his associates may lead them down. The chairman's ways and means are too well-known by now. But why he couldn't allow Tim Floyd to have his moment without having once again flail at Phil's wonderful legacy with the Bulls remains beyond my comprehension. Thursday simply should have belonged to Tim Floyd."

In his July 24, 1998 Chicago Tribune column titled "Jackson should've called their bluff," Bernie Lincicome wrote that the press conference announcing Floyd's hiring "is so hollow it echoes." Lincicome urged Jackson, "Hey, Phil, you should have called their bluff. Asked for $12 million and demanded they exile Tim Floyd to the Corn Palace in Mitchell, S.D. for the duration. I have a map. And a floor plan."

Lincicome continued, "Is this any way to kill a dynasty? There never is a good way, but I'll take the end of the Celtics over this. Larry Bird lying on the floor in a back plaster. Kevin McHale hobbling on one foot. Robert Parish rooted like a lamp post. How is this ending? With lies and dares, and, to use Reinsdorf's own words, 'fairy tales.'"

At the press conference, Reinsdorf said that Floyd was "Director of basketball operations, with duties normally handled by a head coach."

Lincicome scoffed, "When is a coach not a coach? When he is aside. But just for the sake of context, let's grant that it was all true. Floyd would give up a perfectly fine job where he was wanted and respected in order to schlep around as Krause's fanny pack for as long as Jackson and Jordan and the rest wanted to shun him? Would you even want a man like this coaching your team?"

Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Bill Lyon put it simply in a January 21, 1999 piece titled "Gored to Death: Arrogant acts have gutted the Bulls' dynasty": 

Only scant months ago, there was raging debate about how the Bulls measured up to the Boston Celtics of Bill Russell, to the 76ers of Wilt Chamberlain, to the Celtics of Larry Bird, to the Los Angeles Lakers of Magic Johnson. The skeleton that's left may end up being measured against the 1972-73 Philadelphia 76ers, the patron saint of losers, authors of a 9-73 record...

So what, by their hubris, Reinsdorf and Krause have done is deny the rest of us the final act of the dynasty, one farewell championship for Jordan, or one incredibly emotional quest for it.

They have interfered with the natural order of things. To feed their own egos, they have purposefully committed needless folly.

They have killed a dynasty.

If there is justice, the Bulls will be bad for a very long time.

Justice arrived swiftly in Chicago. Floyd went 49-190 in four years as the Bulls' coach. Reinsdorf and Krause replaced arguably the best coach in pro basketball history--a coach who won six titles in Chicago and went on to win five more titles in L.A. with the Lakers--with arguably the worst coach in pro basketball history. Bulls' power forward Charles Oakley summed it up succinctly near the end of Floyd's reign of error (and was fined $50,000 by the team for his candor): "They had a dynasty, now they have a coffee shop." Without Jackson, Jordan, Pippen, Dennis Rodman and most of the rest of the core members of the Bulls' second three-peat squads, the Bulls promptly posted the worst five-year record of any non-expansion team in NBA history (96-282, a winning percentage of .254). The Bulls missed the playoffs for six straight years, did not win a playoff series until 2007 (four years after Krause retired as the Bulls' GM) and have made it to exactly one Eastern Conference Finals (2011) since Krause dismantled the roster.
 
It is foolish to break up a championship team in order to build from the ground up or turn a mediocre team into a cellar dweller in order to use draft picks to become a contender. After the Dallas Mavericks won the 2011 championship, owner Mark Cuban elected to not keep key rotation players Tyson Chandler and J.J. Barea; the Mavericks have not won a playoff series since 2011. Instead of continuing to add pieces around Dirk Nowitzki, Cuban wasted the final years of Nowitzki's career. This is not Hinkie-style tanking (though Cuban has said that he believe the strategy is sound--which is an absurd belief), but it is breaking up a championship team without giving that team a realistic chance to defend its crown.

When you are blessed enough to have a championship-caliber team, you should do everything possible to augment the roster and keep the championship window open as long as possible. Two organizations are widely referred to as "model franchises" in the NBA and NFL respectively: the San Antonio Spurs and the New England Patriots. Since 1999, the San Antonio Spurs have won five championships and have never missed the playoffs. Since the New England Patriots hired Bill Belichick in 2000, the Patriots have won the Super Bowl four times and have only missed the playoffs three times (once with an 11-5 record, once with a 9-7 record and once with a 5-11 record in Belichick's first year on the job). Those teams have never tanked and have never prematurely dismantled a championship caliber roster; at times, those teams have phased out individual players who were past their primes but those teams always replaced those players in order to remain at an elite level. Those teams effectively used their draft picks even though their success relegated them to making their selections near the end of each round of the draft; instead of tanking to get higher draft picks, these teams did the necessary scouting/player evaluation to find good players. Also, free agents want to sign with the Spurs and Patriots because they know that those franchises have a winning culture. No talented free agent was ever going to sign with someone like Jerry Krause after he broke up the Bulls or with Sam Hinkie after he plunged the 76ers into the tank.

Rest assured that if Colangelo has anything to say about it the 76ers' tanking days are over (they will still lose for a while until Colangelo brings some real players into the fold but Colangelo will actually be looking for real NBA players, not rejects from the Washington Generals)--and that if Colangelo builds the 76ers up to contender status he will not break apart the team in order to stockpile draft picks.

Labels: Jerry Colangelo, Jerry Krause, Michael Jordan, Phil Jackson, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie, San Antonio Spurs, Scottie Pippen, Tim Floyd

posted by David Friedman @ 3:59 PM

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The 76ers Are the Waterloo for "Stat Gurus"

Tanking is wrong for many reasons--it violates the spirit of true competition, it rips off the fans, it destroys that franchise's opportunity to build a winning culture--but the most basic reason is the proven fact that it does not work. Sam Hinkie was an executive with the Houston Rockets for eight years. The Rockets won one playoff series during that time. Based on that remarkably unremarkable record, the Philadelphia 76ers hired Hinkie in 2013 to run their basketball operations. Hinkie took over a team that went 34-48 in 2012-13. Since that time, the 76ers went 19-63, 18-64 and 1-21 while Hinkie's supporters implored everyone to "trust the process." Hinkie is a "stat guru" whose "process" is tanking and he has dropped the 76ers so far into the tank it will be years before they see daylight again. During Hinkie's reign of error the 76ers have been widely recognized as one of the most analytically minded franchises in sports, so it is not an exaggeration to say that Hinkie's failure is a Waterloo moment for "stat gurus"--at least the self-promoting "stat gurus" who have been saying for years that if they only got the chance to run an NBA franchise they could do so much better than the people who have actually devoted their lives to playing, scouting and coaching.

Hinkie is Ted Stepien with a spreadsheet. Stepien was not intentionally tanking but he did such a horrible job as the owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers in the early 1980s that the NBA had to step in and save the franchise--which is pretty much what just happened in Philadelphia, as NBA Commissioner Adam Silver reportedly strongly suggested to the 76ers' owners that they bring in some outside help (which means, make sure that Hinkie never makes another personnel decision as long as he lives). Hinkie turned the 76ers into a laughingstock and the team is so terrible that other franchises had trouble selling tickets when Hinkie brought his version of the Washington Generals thinly disguised as a professional sports team into their towns. The 76ers have now hired Jerry Colangelo to clean up Hinkie's mess. As one writer quipped, Colangelo is going to talk a lot less about PER and a lot more about WINS. Colangelo has his work cut out for him but if anyone can turn the 76ers around he can, because he has enjoyed a tremendous career as a sports executive. Colangelo also should be commended for keeping his promise to correct some longstanding Basketball Hall of Fame injustices.

Hinkie's abject Philadelphia failure should also draw some attention to what is happening in Houston, where he served as Daryl Morey's protege. Morey's long tenure in Houston (Morey took over the basketball operations in May 2007) has produced nothing special; in Morey's first eight seasons, the Rockets missed the playoffs three times and won just three playoff series, with two of those victories coming last year. The Rockets are 10-12 this season and may not even make the playoffs just one year after their improbable (read "fluke") run to the Western Conference Finals--speaking of which, just how much does it mean to make the Conference Finals once? It may seem like that is getting really close to winning a title but it is actually only the halfway point, because it takes eight playoff wins to reach the Conference Finals and eight more playoff wins to claim the championship. Since Morey took over in Houston, 10 of the 15 Western Conference teams have reached the Conference Finals at least once (eight of the 15 Eastern Conference teams have reached the Conference Finals at least once during the same period).

Morey loudly claimed--and media outlets like ESPN and the New York Times loudly repeated his claims--that his use of so-called "advanced basketball statistics" created a clear advantage that would translate directly into wins. Or, to coin a phrase, "trust the process." Nearly a decade later, we have a large enough sample size of evidence to make a solid hypothesis: whatever "process" Morey and Hinkie are doing, it does not work, at least if you are trying to win a championship by doing it.

Statistics are a very important tool for executives, coaches, scouts, media member and fans. I have loved sports statistics since I was a kid and this website is chock full of statistics--but any piece of data is only as good as the person who is using it and the context in which that piece of data is applied. Of course the smartest front offices in the NBA are using the most advanced statistics possible--but they are not doing so to promote themselves as geniuses and they are not using numbers devoid of context.

The numbers tell Daryl Morey that James Harden is a "foundational player." Morey does not know or care that the eye test reveals that Harden does not give full effort on a consistent basis, he is an awful defender and he has no leadership skills. Harden has some All-Star level offensive skills but he relies way too much on begging for contact when he drives and on launching three pointers when he does not drive. Harden has little to no post up or midrange game. So, Harden can erupt for 35 or 40 points on any given night--but when his team really needs him in a big playoff game, he can also shoot 2-11 from the field with a playoff single-game record 13 turnovers.

It is no surprise that Harden's Rockets lost in the first round of the playoffs in each of his first two seasons with the team. It is somewhat unexpected that the Rockets made it to the Conference Finals last year but, as noted above, any executive who can keep his seat warm for nearly a decade will more than likely stumble into one Conference Finals appearance. Harden is not the right guy to be the best player on a legit contender. Three teams in each conference made the Conference Finals at least three times since 2007: Miami, Cleveland and Boston in the East and the L.A. Lakers, San Antonio and Oklahoma City in the West. We know that Harden would not have been close to being the best player on any of those teams, in no small part because he came off of the bench for Oklahoma City.

This season, we are seeing the real Harden and the real Rockets (which we also saw during his first two full seasons with the team). Harden is scoring a lot of points while not shooting well, his team is far from being a legit contender and his bad attitude played no small part in getting his coach fired. It should be clear to the rest of the world now what should have been clear all along: it would have been a travesty if James Harden won the MVP last year. Harden is Stephon Marbury with an overgrown beard, a coach killer who is more interested in his endorsements and the celebrity life than he is in being a great basketball player. Harden declares that he is better than Stephen Curry and LeBron James. What a joke. Curry actually works on his game and comes back each season with something new. James is a 6-8 beast with an all-around skill set who has led his teams to six Finals and two championships; yeah, there are some gaping holes in James' championship resume and it took him too long to even partially figure out the championship mentality that guys like Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant were born with but putting Harden in the same sentence with James is like comparing a Yugo to a Rolls-Royce.

What this all comes down to is character and character is always revealed eventually. Character means doing the right things the right way all of the time. Character means having the courage of your convictions (which is not at all the same thing as sticking with the same course as you plunge into an iceberg). Championships are not won by accident. If you have an overabundance of talent, you may achieve some success without character but that success will inevitably be transitory. Before Mike Tyson fought Evander Holyfield, Teddy Atlas--who trained the young Tyson--said that Tyson was scared of Holyfield, that Tyson lacked heart and that the moment things got tough he would commit a foul to get out of the fight because he did not want to be there and would not be able to accept losing like a real man. Atlas nailed it, because Atlas knew Tyson's character and Atlas was not fooled by the "baddest man on the planet" hyperbole surrounding Tyson.

You cannot win a championship if you have a loser's mentality. That is what Hinkie failed to understand when he sent the 76ers into the tank based on some numbers-based idea of accumulating top draft picks and that is what Morey failed to understand when he decided to make Harden the "foundation" in Houston. Harden's story is apparently appealing to a lot of media members and he fooled a lot of people into giving him recognition that he did not earn but none of that stuff matters when you have to get in between the lines in the playoffs and produce. The cliche is true: you win with character, not characters. I have spent my whole NBA writing career figuratively betting against characters like Stephon Marbury, Gilbert Arenas, Carmelo Anthony and James Harden even when those guys were at the height of their popularity and I will place that eye test evaluation against a spreadsheet any day of the week. 

Labels: Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets, James Harden, Jerry Colangelo, Mike Tyson, Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie

posted by David Friedman @ 9:33 PM

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